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ABSTRACT 
 
China’s booming investment in and trade with many African countries since the early 
2000s marks the beginning of a new wave of industrial escalation on a global scale and 
at the same time a revived campaign for a new world information and communication 
order. The launch of CCTV-Africa in Nairobi, Kenya in January 2012 was a significant 
milestone in the ‘China media going global’ project initiated by the Chinese government 
in 2009.  
 
This research is aimed at conducting a reception analysis of the African audiences of 
CCTV-Africa from the perspective of critical political and economic media studies. The 
focus of this research is not limited to the audience reception of the media content 
produced by CCTV-Africa but also focuses on the wider context of China-Africa political 
and economic interactions within the global structure of capitalism. The thesis will 
explore how the Chinese media is paving its way in the African news market and the 
process of manufacturing ideological consent among its target audience of the elite class 
through the medium of CCTV-Africa news programmes by analyzing how African 
students in China perceive the ideology of Sinicism delivered by CCTV-Africa.  
 
Therefore, this thesis has two main aims: first, to provide a definition of ideological 
Sinicization through a comprehensive illustration of China’s political-economic reality as 
a semi-peripheral country and its political and economic interaction with the peripheral 
countries in Africa, deploying the revised theoretical frame of structural imperialism 
developed by Johan Galtung. The second goal is to look into the mechanism of the 
process by which CCTV-Africa news programmes represent ideological Sinicization. The 
term Sinicization is deployed in this research to summarize the ideological 
homogenization of the China-African elite class through the establishment of ‘harmony 
of interests’.  
 
One the one hand, as a semi-peripheral country conditioned by the contemporary global 
    
system of economy, China attempts to boost its economic interaction with peripheral 
countries from Africa in order to complete its domestic economic transition from semi-
periphery to core. On the other hand, countries from Africa see the economic 
cooperation with China as an alternative opportunity to transfer their peripheral statues 
to semi-periphery by developing their labour-intensive industries. Therefore, there exists 
a consensus amongst transnational elite class underpinned by the “harmony of interest” 
to pursue economic growth.  
 
Such consensus is reinforced by the news of CCTV in Africa which is the state-controlled 
international media of Chinese government. Target audiences of CCTV in Africa, as the 
opinion leaders of their local societies, are more or less influenced by either the reality 
of China-Africa cooperation or the ideological agenda of CCTV in Africa to support such 
consensus. And the findings of this research achieved through content analysis and 
individual interviews show that the majority of the African audiences of CCTV-Africa do 
agree with the ideological agenda of the news channel to promote the economic 
development in local societies.  
 
The audience reception research of the thesis is situated within an analysis of the 
political and economic context, which conditions the agenda and production of the 
media. The extensive review of the literature of international communication studies, 
imperialism studies and ideology studies, contributes to establishing a theoretical 
framework for the empirical research. Together with the data collected from field 
research, it is intended that this analysis should contribute to the understanding of the 
development of China-Africa communication and media studies and also to the 
enrichment of the research topics in this field.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
China’s booming investment in and trade with many African countries since the early 
2000s have aroused numerous discussions and controversies regarding the nature of 
Sino-African interactions. Among many other things, the launch of CCTV-Africa, based in 
the Kenyan capital Nairobi since January 2012, marked a significant moment when 
China’s state media - China Central Television (CCTV) marched into the continent of 
Africa following the instruction of ‘China media going global’ project initiated by the 
Chinese government since 2009 (see essays in Thussu, De Burgh and Shi, 2018). The 
global expansion of China’s foreign media is mostly regarded as the diplomatic behaviour 
to promote the soft power of China. This tendency is closely interlinked with the political 
economic goal of the Chinese government as manifested in the national plan ‘Belt and 
Road Initiative’ (also known as ‘One Belt, One Road’) partly to overcome China’s 
domestic economic dilemmas. 
 
Although China and many African countries are usually regarded as the passive 
recipients of the Western cultural and media hegemony, the power structure between 
China and Africa has developed into a far more complex one than the alliance of the 
‘Third World’ against superpowers in the Cold War years. CCTV-Africa is not yet an 
influential media in African societies. However, it seems that African governments and 
the elite classes in Africa, motivated by either the direct economic benefits from China 
or the eagerness to follow the economic development of ‘China Model,’ are being 
encouraged to embrace Chinese journalism and its hidden ideology of ‘Sinicization.’  
 
The ideology of any society in a particular epoch is dialectically determined by the social, 
political and economic structure in which it is embedded. As far as modern China is 
concerned, there is a specific kind of dominant ideology of ‘Sinicism’. ‘Sinicism’, it is 
suggested here, is shaping China’s international interactions with other nations. This 
thesis aims to explore how the Chinese state media CCTV-Africa delivers the ideology of 
Sinicism to its African audience through ‘Sinicization’. The term ‘Sinicization’ is deployed 
 
in this research to summarize the ideological homogenization of the China-African elite 
class through the establishment of a ‘harmony of interests’. 
 
The thesis will explore how the Chinese media is paving its way in the African news 
market and the process of manufacturing ideological consent among its target audience 
of the elite class through the medium of CCTV-Africa news programmes. The chosen 
subjects of the empirical fieldwork part of the research are African students who are 
studying in China, as their demographic characteristics indicate they have the potential 
for being or becoming the elites of African societies in their respective countries. Their 
potential roles as future leaders in Africa also mean that they are a ‘captive’ future 
audience for CCTV and China’s cultural messages. Exploring how the African students in 
China perceive this ideology of Sinicism delivered by CCTV-Africa is of great importance 
to understand the mechanism of mass media to build up the connection between social 
reality and human perception.  
 
The economic realities faced by China propel it to conduct a series of strategies and 
policies to survive in the global system of capitalism. The economic transformation in 
the domestic market and the ‘going out’ policy of Chinese government are the 
manifestations of such realities. It is inevitable for China to enhance both its hard power 
and soft power in the global system in order to assert its place as a rising power. Under 
such circumstances, the incidence of Sinicization can be understood as the one of the 
consequences of the thorough penetration of global capitalism into the global South. 
Employing the theoretical framework of structural imperialism developed by Johan 
Galtung, it will be argued in this thesis that China is in the role of a semi-peripheral 
country in its political and economic interactions with the peripheral countries in Africa. 
Accordingly, the elite of China and that of African countries are more likely to align with 
each other by the ‘harmony of interests’ of maintaining their dominant status and 
superior living conditions.  
 
In researching the case of Chinese media in Africa, the researcher does not want to limit 
 
the audience study of CCTV-Africa to the analysis of media content and effects in 
isolation from the political and economic context which conditions the agenda and 
production of such content and expression. Thus, instead of putting the weight 
exclusively on the empirical studies, the researcher also recognises the significance of 
examining key aspects of theory and concepts to inform the development of the most 
appropriate theoretical framework. Through the literature reviews in the first part of the 
thesis, this research sets out to analyse how the process of mass media communication 
is related to the dissemination of certain dominant ideologies. Therefore, this research 
aims to conduct a reception analysis of the African audiences of CCTV-Africa from the 
perspective of critical political and economic media studies.  
  
1.1 The Context of this Research 
In the introduction of the book Global Communications: Toward a Transcultural Political 
Economy, published in 2008, Paula Chakravartty and Yuezhi Zhao raised two crucial 
questions: ‘What are the global political economic and cultural implications of China’s 
increasing economic presence in Africa?’ and ‘Can there be a true “partnership in 
development” between China and Africa, as China’s official discourse champions?’ 
(Chakravartty and Zhao, 2008:2). Almost ten years later, these two questions have 
become highly significant, especially after Chinese President Xi Jinping announced ten 
major China-Africa cooperation projects offering $60 billion to Africa at the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Johannesburg in 2015. The deep injection of 
Chinese capital into African markets marks the beginning of a new wave of industrial 
escalation on a global scale and at the same time a revived campaign for a new world 
information and communication order. 
 
The dream of the Egyptian Marxist economist Samir Amin for an emerging new world 
order replacing the polarizing economic system of global capitalism dominated by 
Western countries (Amin, 2000) seems to be coming true, due to the increasing global 
influence of non-Western alliances such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa). However, while people are celebrating the rejuvenation of the ex-colonial 
 
countries, many historical puzzles remain unanswered. In the book The Star Raft: China’s 
Encounter with Africa, published in 1988, the British author Philip Snow accurately 
sensed the forming of a new identity of non-western civilizations (Snow, 1988: xvii). 
Pointing out the core argument, Snow asked: ‘Will Brazil step up its growing economic 
role in Africa? … Will China and India eventually manage to settle their incessant border 
quarrels and discover common aims?’ (ibid: xvi). Regional hegemonies, as noted by Arjun 
Appadurai, along with many other internal frictions, have posed a new challenge to 
developing countries (Appadurai, 1990). As Daya Thussu observed in his chapter ‘The 
Scramble for Asian Soft Power in Africa’, emerging economies such as India and China 
from the global South are to some extent in competition with each other to win over the 
discourse in Africa (Thussu, 2016). 
 
China ‘officially’ started its campaign in 2012 when China Central Television (CCTV-Africa) 
established its African hub in Nairobi and the new English section of CCTV-Africa. CCTV-
Africa1 is believed to be ‘the first international media to dedicate more time to Africa 
through CCTV Africa programmes such as Africa Live, Talk Africa and Faces of Africa’ 
(Zhang, 2014). Although the reputation of CCTV-Africa has not yet reached the level of 
the leading Western media such as the BBC or CNN, which have been broadcasting to 
African publics for decades, the attention this state channel has drawn from both 
academic and media industries has been considerable. For example, the positive 
reporting style of CCTV-Africa, which is framed as ‘Constructive Journalism’ by Zhang 
Yanqiu (2014), is promoting fierce discussions in the field of journalism studies. Whether 
such a journalistic approach is the manifestation of genuine constructive journalism or 
an ideological agenda responding to the pursuit of political and economic policies by the 
Chinese government, cannot yet be clarified due to insufficient research.  
 

1 CCTV-News channel was relaunched as China Global Television Network (CGTN) on 
1st January 2017, and CCTV-Africa is renamed CGTN-Africa. The data and information 
about CCTV-Africa in this research refers to the English news channel of CCTV with the 
focus on the continent of Africa that existed before the rebranding of CGTN-Africa. 
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1.2 The Aims and Originality of This Research 
The aim of this research is to cast light on the discussion about the correlation and 
struggles between mass ideologies and political economic structures from a 
transnational perspective, using the case study of CCTV-Africa and its African audiences. 
The main research questions are as follows:  
 
1. How do the African students studying in China, as the potential elite opinion 
leaders of their local societies, perceive the (ideological) messages delivered by 
the news produced by CCTV-Africa? 
2. How has the reality of increasing Sino-African political and economic 
interactions contributed to the way that African students understand the media 
content of CCTV-Africa? 
 
The hypothesis of this research is that African students studying in China, conditioned 
by the political and economic structure of Sino-African bilateral interaction and their 
social class, tend to interpret CCTV-Africa positively and decode most of the ideological 
messages delivered by the news in a dominant position (applying the theory and 
terminology of Stuart Hall on encoding and decoding – Hall, 1980)  
 
The contributions of this research to knowledge are both theoretical and empirical. The 
originality of this research lies in mainly five aspects. The first is the substitution of the 
concept of ‘ideology’ for that of ‘culture’ in the theoretical framework of the ‘cultural 
imperialism’ paradigm, which is the main theoretical base of this research. The second 
is the revision of the ‘harmony of interests’ model of Johan Galtung’s structural theory 
of imperialism based on ‘world systems’ and ‘sub-imperialism’ theories. The third is the 
concept of ‘Sinicization,’ which is used here to summarize the ideological agenda of 
CCTV-Africa underpinned by the political and economic realities faced by China and 
China-Africa relations. The fourth is the renewal of the ‘encoding/decoding’ model of 
Stuart Hall by bringing in the typology of ideological receptions of Christian Fuchs. The 
fifth is the contribution of this research to the topic of how African students studying in 
 
China perceive the ideological agenda of CCTV-Africa.  
 
1.3 The Outline of the Thesis 
This dissertation is mainly categorized within four themes: firstly, the literature review 
(Chapters 2, 3 and 4): the second is the theoretical framework (Chapters 5 and 6); the 
third is methodologies and methods (Chapter 7); and the fourth and final theme is the 
findings of this research and conclusions (Chapters 8 and 9). 
 
Chapter 2 is a general thematic literature review of the studies that are related to China-
Africa communication and media studies. In this chapter, the works on China-Africa 
communication studies are covered in four main aspects: ‘Political and Economic Studies’, 
‘History, Foreign Relations and Public Diplomacy Studies’, ‘Soft Power studies’ and 
‘Journalism Studies’. Chapter 2 draws a general picture of the status quo of China-Africa 
studies, which reveals the under-studied nature of this topic in the field of audience 
studies on the Chinese media in Africa from the perspective of a political and economic 
critique. The political and economic dynamics between China and African countries are 
illustrated in order to explain how the interactions between China and Africa are 
conditioned by the global structure of the neoliberalist market economy and to provide 
a basis for the analysis of structural theory in Chapter 4.  
 
Chapter 3 is a literature review of the audience studies in the field of international 
communication studies of four major theoretical paradigms: ‘Dominant/Modernization 
Paradigm’, ‘Dependency/Imperialism Paradigm’, ‘Globalization Paradigm’ and a new 
emerging paradigm which has not yet been specifically titled. Chapter 3 emphasizes the 
importance of reviving the critical approach of ‘cultural imperialism’ in the field of 
international communications studies, and at the same time points out the necessity to 
establish a new agenda for audience research of international communication. 
 
Chapter 4 reviews the background of the ‘cultural imperialism’ paradigm, the concept of 
‘culture’ and ‘imperialism’ studies. This chapter is aimed at further examining the 
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historical development of the ‘cultural imperialism’ paradigm, exploring the problems of 
the theoretical framework of the paradigm and determining the latest trends in the field 
of ‘imperialism’ studies, in order to have an understanding of what kind of revision is 
needed to revive this paradigm. In the section on ‘imperialism’ studies, five major 
theories related to imperialism are reviewed respectively: ‘Imperialism of the Second 
International’, ‘Dependency Theory’, ‘Structural Theory of Imperialism’, ‘World-Systems 
Theory’ and ‘New Imperialism’. The chapter argues that Galtung’s structural theory of 
imperialism, which classifies the world into two major components – Core and Periphery 
– is particularly relevant in relation to the proposition that the dominant hierarchical 
relation between Core and Periphery, as well as its theoretical extension in relation to 
the ‘semi-periphery’, is maintained through the establishment of a ‘harmony of interests’ 
between global elites. 
 
Chapter 5 is a contribution to the establishment of the theoretical framework of this 
research by reviewing the literature on the concept of ‘ideology’, particularly in the 
context of Marxist studies. However, this chapter also points out the difference between 
the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘ideology’ and illustrates the necessity of substituting 
‘culture’ with ‘ideology’ in this research.  
 
Chapter 6 brings in the key concept of this research – ideological Sinicization. The first 
section of this chapter provides a solid explanation of the political and economic base 
and the theoretical foundation of this concept; and the second section illustrates how 
such a concept is manifested in the tangible case of CCTV-Africa and the reception of its 
news content by its African audiences. The chapter looks at how China’s ideology of 
Sinicism is being delivered by CCTV-Africa to its African audiences. To understand the 
substance of the ideology it is important first to understand the political and economic 
structure of the ideology. Therefore, this chapter depicts a general picture of the political, 
economic background of Sinicism and Sinicization within the theoretical framework of a 
semi-imperialism critique, in which China is defined as a semi-peripheral country that is 
inevitably undergoing sub-imperialist expansion. It also introduces the concrete 
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manifestation of the ideology of Sinicism in the case of Sino-African political and 
economic relations and to illustrate how Sinicism, theoretically speaking, can be 
manufactured as ideological consent between the elite classes in China and those in 
African countries.  
 
Chapter 7 has two main parts: the first generally reviews the theories of quantitative, 
qualitative and critical research; and the second section introduces the research design 
of this thesis. As we can see from the contents, four methods of both qualitative and 
quantitative variety are deployed in this research – questionnaire, interview, content 
analysis and discourse analysis. Individual interviewing with semi-structured questions 
is the major method of this research. Content and discourse analysis are used as the 
triangulation for the result of interviews. 
 
Chapter 8 is the longest chapter of this thesis, which analyses the results of the data 
collected from field research. In order to discuss the findings according to the mass 
communication process of encoding and decoding, the results of triangulation are 
placed in front of the findings of individual interviews. In the first section, the results of 
content analysis of the speakers and the news frames of Global Business (Africa) and the 
brief discourse analysis of the content of the special edition of the Grass Roots series are 
set out. The second section presents the results of the interviews.  
 
Chapter 9 summarises the findings in terms of the initial aims of the research and 
presents the contribution of this research to the field, including theoretical 
developments and empirical evidence. It also has a discussion of the extended 







Chapter 2 - China-Africa Communication and Media Studies  
 
China-Africa communication and media studies, as part of the wider sociological 
discipline of China-Africa studies, have only been flourishing for about a decade, when 
China started to focus strategically on China-African economic cooperation. This ‘has 
been particularly well illustrated by two events: the summit of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2006 and the annual meeting of the African 
Development Bank (ADB) in Shanghai in May 2007’ (Taylor and Xiao, 2009: 1). Although 
there is a rapidly increasing number of publications emerging in the field of China-Africa 
studies (Drummond and Liu, 2014), this field is still in its early stages of research and 
scholarship. Therefore, it is understandable that its structure is rather one-dimensional 
and lacks the multi-disciplinary perspectives compared to many other fields of media 
studies. However, with China’s involvement in Africa growing exponentially, along with 
China’s domestic economic transition to fit into the global capitalist economic system, 
the frame of China-Africa media studies needs to catch up with the speedy development 
of the complex and multi-dimensional background of the rapidly evolving and expanding 
China-Africa relations.  
 
This chapter aims to provide firstly a thematic review of China-Africa studies in general 
and then a focus on media studies. By mapping out this field of studies, it is expected 
that gaps will be noted to inform further research. Four main theoretical frames have 
been identified, as indicated in the following sections, which are ‘China-Africa Political 
and Economic Studies’, ‘China-Africa History, Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy 
Studies’, ‘China-Africa Soft Power Studies’ and ‘China-Africa Journalism Studies’. 
However, these four themes do, to some extent, overlap with each other. For example, 
discussions on the rather contested notions of alternative journalism provided by 
Chinese state media’s production of African content are often involved with the agenda 
of the Chinese government to promote its soft power (Wasserman, 2013; Yan, 2015; 
Zhang Y.Q., 2014). And studies about soft power are always closely linked with the 
existence of the hard power of China-Africa political and economic interactions and vice 
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versa (An, 2012; Oreglia, undated; Taylor and Xiao, 2009). But, by and large, the four 
themes listed in this chapter have distinguishable characteristics and key texts which will 
be set out and discussed separately.  
 
2.1 China-Africa Political and Economic Studies 
Despite the fact that multilateral interactions between China and countries in Africa have 
only been drawing global attention since the late 2000s, their formal diplomatic history 
can be traced back to the middle of the 20th century when China, as a member of 
communist camp in the Cold War, officially became Egypt’s international friend in the 
year of 1956 (Zhang C., 2013: 10). In his book The East is Black: Cold War China in the 
Black Radical Imagination, Frazier provides a detailed introduction and unfolds 
illustrations on how China and many African countries forged an ideological and political 
alliance against Western imperialism through ‘travel and the production of literature, 
newspapers, newsletters, pamphlets, radio, film documentary, and critical pedagogy’ 
(2015: 3). Unfortunately, as the ‘near-successful completion of the globalization process’ 
of American neoliberalism ‘neatly veiled within modernity’s rhetoric of progress, 
democratization’, ‘the prospect of the Chinese government as an alternative ‘route’ to a 
progressive world formation’ has evoked scepticism (Frazier, 2015: 218). However, as 
China has adjusted its economic strategy since the late 1970s and integrated into the 
global system, the growth of its economic success has again drawn attention from 
developing countries in Africa, which seemed unlikely to further advance their social 
change following the Western pathway. Accordingly, series of studies on China-Africa 
political and economic interactions are therefore emerging, arguing the realities and 
prospects from various perspectives (Alden, 2007; Gadzala, 2015; Gonzales and 
Gonzales, 2014; Strauss, 2009, among others).  
 
Many books on the topic of China in Africa have flooded into the public domain in the 
past decade and a few of them take the ethnographic angle to depict the complicated 
truth of increasing Chinese business activities in African countries. One specific example 
is the book, China’s Second Continent, published in 2014 by Howard French, which is 
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described by the Economist as a ‘riveting’ piece of work revealing the failed reality of 
China spreading its ideology in Africa. French interviewed many local African as well as 
Chinese workers that he met in Africa and expressed his concern for the economic 
expansion of China in Africa through the words of his interviewees. Such concerns are 
not just his. Hostile comments towards China are common in a few media platforms – 
and not just associated with the Western journalism. As shown in the book China: The 
New Imperialists & Neo-Colonialists in Africa? published in 2016, Kwame Insaidoo, a 
Ghanaian author, asserts the ‘evil’ nature of Chinese civilization towards Africans by 
quoting a story he read during his study in Missouri State University in the United States: 
‘the (Chinese) emperor wrote … to wipe out the entire black race’ (Insaidoo, 2016: 
Introduction). Despite such radical voices pushing for a distorted and historical 
inaccurate discussion of China in Africa, there also exists an increasing number of studies 
and publications telling the other side of the story.  
 
Ian Taylor, as one of the main academics who has studied the economic engagement of 
China in Africa, sets out in his articles and books to explain the new role of China as an 
economically important partner to Africa. In his 2006 book China and Africa: 
Engagement and Compromises, Taylor brought in a historical perspective to unfold the 
origin of China’s engagement with Africa after the Second World War. Based on historical 
facts and theoretical analysis, Taylor aims to answer ‘how successful Beijing has been in 
“bridging the gap” between the ambitions and the realities of Beijing’s foreign policy 
through involvement in Southern Africa’ and ‘how important Chinese rhetoric regarding 
‘anti-hegemonism’ has been as a device to manage the PRC’s external affairs’ (2006: 5). 
In another book China’s New Role in Africa, Taylor proceeds to address the current 
engagement of China in Africa (2010). In the opinion of Taylor, the role of China in Africa 
is not fundamentally different from powerful Western countries. Taylor reinforced his 
opinion in the co-written article ‘A Case of Mistaken Identity: “China Inc.” and its 
“Imperialism” in Sub-Saharan Africa’ with his colleague Yuhua Xiao. They wrote in the 
conclusion of that paper: ‘Abandoning the idea of a China Inc. hell-bent on some sort of 
colonial rampage across Africa would be a start in developing a more realistic 
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consideration of Sino-African relations’ (2009: 723). In his recently published book with 
his colleague Zhangxi Cheng as the co-author, the myth of China’s aid to African countries 
has been revealed (Taylor and Cheng, 2017). 
 
Another well-known scholar on China-Africa economic studies is Deborah Brautigam - 
possibly the most widely accepted work by a foreigner on China-Africa political and 
economic relations in China is her book, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in 
Africa, published in 2011. In this book, Brautigam provides a rational, systematic and 
detailed explanation of the status quo of China in Africa, with abundant materials and 
evidence she collected during years of interviews and research in Africa. In contrast with 
some of the scholars who regard China as just another capitalist player on the continent 
of Africa, Deborah focuses on how China differentiates itself from the Western countries. 
In her 2015 book Will Africa Feed China? by ‘sorting fact from fiction’ (2015: 10), 
Brautigam countered a popular rumour in Western media about Chinese peasants 
settling in Africa and conquering the latter’s farmland to feed the Chinese population 
(2015: 2). The works of Brautigam brings a new trend to China-Africa political economic 
studies, and more rational illustrations are therefore contributed by scholars and 
researchers with more open mind and more mixed cultural backgrounds.  
 
The newly published The Next Factory of the World: How Chinese Investment Is 
Reshaping Africa (2017) written by Irene Yuan Sun is another such example. With 
experience of living in China, the United States and Namibia, Sun is able to notice 
nuances that are invisible to many others. And in her new book, Sun mixed her personal 
knowledge about China, Africa and Western societies with the ethnographical 
observations she conducted on Chinese factories in Africa and created ‘a critical frontier 
with potentially profound impact’, as noted in a review by Mukhisa Kituyi, the Secretary-
General of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.  
 
A few other scholars also see the increasing China-Africa political economic interactions 
from a different theoretical perspective. Ching Kwan Lee expressed her critical 
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understanding about the status quo of Chinese state investors in Zambia in her article 
‘The Spectre of Global China’ (2014). As with Taylor, Lee thought that although the 
interests of Chinese state corporations are not all directly driven by profit, their essential 
logic to achieve goals are the same. She observed that ‘Chinese state capital is thus every 
bit as adversarial as global private capital when it comes to labour’s demands’ (2014: 50). 
Therefore, in her opinion, even though the Chinese companies are behaving similarly to 
the other international investors in Africa, the local working class is still the most 
exploited people in the global capitalist system. Adrian Hadland also described China as 
a ‘modern, post-Westphalian capitalist state’ (2012: 482), and he disagreed with the 
opinion of Taylor and Xiao in terms of encouraging the weak African countries to bargain 
for their own benefits as it ‘is an unrealistic set of demands that fails to acknowledge 
either the imbalance of financial, trade, and power relations between Africa and China’ 
(2012: 482). African scholars such as Sam Moyo argued that the economic expansion of 
China and many other emerging economies in Africa represents a new round of scramble 
for Africa (2012). Such concerns and critiques are based on the critical tradition of the 
dependency theories and imperialism theories mostly championed in what was 
described during the Cold War period as the Third World countries and critiquing 
Western exploitation of the global South. However, the non-Western and (ex)socialist 
status of China adds up the complexity of the China-Africa dynamics.  
 
Though holding a similar theoretical lineage of critical studies on global capitalism, 
Hairong Yan and Barry Sautman created a new paradigm to think about the presence of 
China in Africa (Yan and Sautman, 2013). In their latest published book China in Africa: 
Discourse and Reality, Yan and Sautman claimed that the difficult realities of China in 
Africa are the dilemma of the global economic system of capitalism (2017: 117-145). 
They pointed out the complexity of China in Africa, which can neither be depicted as a 
‘win-win’ situation nor a nightmare in the eyes of Western media (2017: 118). Therefore, 
Yan and Sautman suggested to transfer the focus from arguing whether China is doing 
capitalist expansion to exploring the different approach manifested in the practices of 
Chinese companies in Africa, because the latter is possibly the alternatives which may 
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bring the global system a new pathway to future development (2017: 111).  
 
In their previous works, both Yan and Sautman have also highlighted the importance of 
the African public’s perception of China and Chinese companies in Africa (Yan and 
Sautman, 2009; Yan, 2013). In a Chinese article published online in 2013, Yan used 
various data sources to argue that the general impression of African locals on China is 
very positive and she wrote: ‘it is of vital importance for China to know how the Africa 
public think of China in order to acquire accurate understanding about its position in 
global system’ (2013). It is to say, although Yan is deploying critical approach to analyse 
the role of China in global capitalist system and also in Africa, she and Sautman are 
putting their focus on seeking for an alternative development pathway.  
 
Very few academic works of China-Africa media studies choose to discuss the topics of 
China-Africa political and economic interactions or how such relations relate to the 
media structure or practices of China in Africa. One Master’s degree dissertation from 
London School of Economics and Political Science titled ‘A Comparative Analysis of 
Chinese, Western and African Media Discourse in the Representation of China’s 
Expansion of Economic Engagements in Africa’ deployed discourse analysis to examine 
the differences of four different media origins, Chinese, British, Tanzanian and South 
African, in terms of representing the China’s economic engagement in Africa (2015). The 
author of the dissertation reached the conclusion that African countries are not entirely 
under the domination of Western stereotypes towards China’s engagement in Africa, 
and large sections of African media have shown interest and willingness to encourage 
the economic cooperation with China (2015: 27-28). However, research on China-Africa 
media studies from the perspective of political and economic analysis are still in their 
early stages of development, and therefore room is reserved in this field to be further 
explored. 
 
2.2 China-Africa History, Foreign Policy and Public Diplomacy Studies 
Another major branch of China-Africa studies is the focus on the history and public 
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diplomacy between China and a few African countries. As mentioned in the introduction 
of this chapter, it is not always easy to draw a clear boundary between different strands 
of China-Africa studies as they overlap with each other all the time, especially in the field 
of China-Africa studies on history, foreign policy and public diplomacy. Therefore, this 
section is aimed to generally introduce the outstanding works of this field, especially 
those ones involving the dimension of media studies. 
 
One of the most renowned Chinese scholars on China-Africa studies is Anshan Li who is 
now a professor at the Peking University. His seminal book ‘A History of Overseas Chinese 
in Africa to 1911’ which was originally published in 2000 then translated into English in 
2012 is a magnificent reference on the history of Chinese diaspora in the continent of 
Africa. Li is also the chief editor of a series of ‘Annual Review of African Studies in China’ 
(2012b, 2013, 2014, 2015). Besides his extraordinary contribution to the cultural, 
anthropological and historical African studies in China, Li also published several articles 
on the subject of China-Africa relations from the perspective of realist international 
relations. For example, Li published two Chinese papers in 2006 talking about the change 
of China-Africa relations and foreign policies in the era when China is rising economically 
(2006a; 2006b). And in another paper, Li also provided advice on how the Chinese 
government could promote its public relations initiatives in Africa (2008). He suggested 
in that article that the Chinese state media should counter a ‘demonized’ image of China 
by paying more attention to the manners, content and approach of public diplomacy 
(2008: 6-14). In the papers published in 2009 and 2016, Li Anshan introduced the 
panorama on the studies on China-Africa relation in the past 30 years and the tendencies 
in the 21st century, which are valuable references for all researchers on the discipline of 
China-Africa studies. 
 
In 1982, another Chinese scholar, Jinyuan Gao, visiting the University of London at the 
time gave a talk about the history of China-Africa over the past few centuries which was 
later published in the journal African Affairs. Gao generally surveyed the history between 
China and Africa in the past 2,000 years and he emphasized the positive side of the story 
 
by describing the minor problems of China-Africa relations as ‘a negligible spot on a solid 
white jade’ (Gao, 1984: 250). Along with the growth of China-Africa political and 
economic interactions, studies on the historical dimension of China-Africa relation are 
growing larger and larger. In a recently published 22-page article, Helen Siu and Mike 
McGovern traced the history of China-African encounter back to the Tang dynasty and 
unfolded the whole picture through introducing the milestones during post-colonial, 
socialist and contemporary stages and telling stories of people from the anthropological 
perspective (2017). There are also many other works on the history of China-Africa 
relations or the anthropological stories in both countries (Larkin, 1973; Snow, 1988; 
Shinn and Eisenman, 2012; George, 2014). 
 
The analysis of China-Africa relations by many other researchers is usually from the 
perspective of realist international relations (Kofigah, 2014; Michael, 2013). One widely-
cited report on China’s foreign policy towards Africa is written by Yun Sun in 2014. In that 
report, Sun conducted systematic analysis on the status quo of China-Africa relations in 
several aspects such as ‘China’s interests in Africa’, ‘Africa in China’s Foreign Policy’, ‘The 
Making of China’s Africa Policy’ and ‘Challenges in China’s Africa policy’ (2014: iii). Yun 
Sun reached a similar conclusion with that of Ching Kwan Lee that ‘China’s Africa policy 
lacks a comprehensive, long-term, strategic vision’ (2014: 30). Ian Taylor reached to a 
similar conclusion, in his article ‘Governance in Africa and Sino-African Relations: 
Contradictions or Confluence?’ published seven years earlier, that ‘China’s engagement 
with Africa is multifaceted and … full of inconsistencies’ (Taylor, 2007: 143).  
 
In the eyes of some researchers, the complexity of China’s Africa policy includes both 
good and bad features, as for example Emma Mawdsley concluded in her paper ‘China 
and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the Geographies of Power’: ‘For different Africans 
and African countries, China brings a range of benefits as well as problems, and China 
will undoubtedly become an ever more important factor in the continent’s future’ 
(Mawdsley, 2007: 417). Daniel Large proposed a new approach to studying China-Africa 
relations in his paper ‘Beyond ‘Dragon in the Bush’: The Study of China-Africa Relations’: 
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‘A potentially more rewarding approach to studying China-Africa ‘relations might be to 
pursue this within a wider framework of African-Asian relations’ (Large, 2008: 61).  
 
Instead of sticking to the tone of Western mainstream opinions, there is also an 
increasing number of African scholars who are trying to establish their framework to see 
China-Africa relations (Adarkwah, undated; Nunoo, 2017, among others). The newly 
published book, Africa-China Partnerships and Relations: African Perspectives is such an 
example (2017). Kwesi Prah and Vusi Gumede as the editors of the book along with many 
other native scholars contribute to the non-Western discourse of interpreting China-
Africa relations from an African perspective. Similarly, in a book published in 2015, the 
editor Aleksandra Gadzala and the contributors, including Joshua Eisenman, Ian Taylor, 
Iginio Gagliardone and Barry Sautman, chose to privilege the voices of the African people: 
‘African agency in relations with China’ and ‘Africa’s emergent civil society’ (2015: 
preface). Just as Hairong Yan and Barry Sautman emphasized in their book, the 
importance of the general population either as the working class or the individual agents 
must be recognized and therefore systematically studied (2017: 111). Adams Bodomo’s 
work ‘Africans in China: A Sociocultural Study and Its Implications on Africa-China 
Relations’ has contributed to the studies on the common population of African 
communities in China (2012). In this book, Bodomo conducted a long period field 
research based in sic major cities in China to depict and picture the panorama of African 
residents who are living in China for various reasons. As one of the book’s reviewers 
wrote about it: “its theoretical and methodological novelty among the studies about 
Africa and China places it as an outstanding resource not only for cultural contact studies 
but also for sociology, linguistics and anthropology” (Rodríguez, 2013: 198). 
 
On the other hand, Chinese perspectives are also in need of being highlighted in the 
discourse of China-Africa studies. Limited by the weak voice in the global system of 
expression and the early stages of studies, Chinese studies on China-Africa foreign 
policies are not as influential as many other studies conducted by Western scholars. 
Nevertheless, it is by no means to suggest that the Chinese scholars are not contributing 
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to this discussion. Apart from the few renowned historians introduced above, there are 
also other scholars dedicated to this field of study (see, for instance, Chen, 2013; Cheng, 
2013; Ma and Wang, 2013). For example, Wenping He has been disseminating her 
opinions and knowledge about China and Africa through various media and official 
channels, with publications analysing the new multipolar world order, with China and 
Africa as the emerging powers (He, 2000, 2010). And other scholars also make great 
efforts to enrich the context of Chinese studies on China-Africa relations (Li Q., 2009; 
Tang, 2015). Tang Xiaoyang has provided abundant empirical material in his book China-
Africa Economic Diplomacy and Its Implication to the Global Value Chain to discuss the 
possibility of developing a ‘win-win’ strategy for China and Africa based on the 
economics of market (2014). Both Chinese and African scholars are contributing to the 
establishment of a non-Western, but at the same time a global discourse, in which the 
voice of developing countries can be heard. 
 
Such efforts are also noticeable in the field of China-Africa media studies. The 
exponential growth of China-Africa relations has drawn attention from many scholars of 
media studies. One special issue published by African Studies Quarterly on the topic of 
‘China-Africa Relations: Political and Economic Engagement and Media Strategies’ 
provides discursive and abundant discussions to the field. Lianxing Li in his paper ‘The 
Image of Africa in China’ talked about the background of the formation of the image of 
Africa in the minds of Chinese and how the booming social media platforms such as 
WeChat contribute to the new presence of Africa in China (2016: 149-160). In another 
article of the special issue, Michael Leslie focused on the strategies implemented by 
Chinese government to save its damaged image in Africa such as accelerated publicity of 
the enhanced collaborations through Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 
promoted educational projects by Chinese university such as Communication University 
of China (CUC) and expanded media organizations in Africa such as China Central 
Television (CCTV) (2016: 161-174).  
 
How to rationalize the influence of Chinese media and policies on China-Africa relations 
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has become one of the hottest topics in recent years, covered with distinction in the 
recently released book Mediated China-Africa Relations by Shubo Li. Such a perspective 
is also reflected in another new book edited by Kathryn Batchelor and Xiaoling Zhang – 
China-Africa Relations: Building Images through Cultural Cooperation, Media 
Representation, and Communication (2017). In this book, contributors along with the 
editors talk about various activities including China’s technical assistance to East Africa 
(Shi et al., 2017), China’s digital public diplomacy towards Africa (Madrid-Morales, 2017) 
and Confucius institute in Africa (King, 2017). As the editors claimed in the introduction 
chapter, what they want to discuss in this book is not the ‘perceived image’ of either 
China or Africa but the ‘projected image’ which is manufactured by the states and 
governments in order to ‘change or generate public perception’ (Batchelor and Zhang, 
2017: 5). In other words, the research focus is on exploring the agenda of China’s macro 
strategy to build up influence in African countries. Researches of this kind are often 
classified in another frame as well, which is China-Africa soft power studies.  
 
2.3 China-Africa Soft Power Studies 
Soft power study is a relatively wide range covering various topics from education, 
commercial products to media exposure. Therefore, there are numerous publications 
relating to the topic of China’s soft power in Africa (Zhang and He, 2015; Zhang, 
Wasserman and Mano, 2016; Li and Masiitwa, 2017, among others). However, in this 
section we will review only the literature in this field which is particularly relevant for 
this project. 
 
In relation to education, increasing China-Africa educational cooperation is arousing the 
interest of many scholars. In the book China’s Aid and Soft Power in Africa: The Case of 
Education and Training, Kenneth King explains how educational aid from China to Africa, 
such as short-term training, scholarships for African students and Confucius Institutes 
are the manifestations of China’s grander strategy to promote China-Africa ties and its 
soft power on the continent (2013). Over a decade ago, the growing activities of China-
Africa higher education projects were drawing attention. A report published by The 
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Observatory on Borderless Higher Education in 2006 pointed out that an increasing 
number of African students were going to China to study and more Chinese universities 
were opening African languages courses (2006: 1). The report revealed that the funding 
from Education Minister Forum in China was granted by the central government to ‘train 
African personnel in key sectors including education, science and technology’ and to 
promote multilateral communication (2006: 1).  
 
Data on the website of Peking University about the programme for African students 
living in China shows that from 2008 to 2012, the number of African students coming to 
China grew from 8,799 to 27,052 (Peking University, 2015), and about 12,000 of them, 
nearly 50%, were sponsored by the Chinese government (Allison, 2013). According to an 
article on the history of China’s educational aid to Africa, since 2008 Chinese government 
has spent more than 500 million RMB on projects sponsoring African students studying 
in China (Liu, 2015). Such behaviour is regarded as an effort made by Chinese authority 
to fix China’s image in Africa (Allison, 2013). It is believed that such interactions would 
‘increase mutual understanding and friendship between two peoples and particularly 
between the younger generations’ (Tarrósy, 2015).  
 
In addition to studying in China, there are more and more chances provided by the 
Chinese government for African students staying in their own countries. The first 
Confucius Institute in Africa was established in Kenya in 2005 and by 2010 there were 
10,000 registered students in many African countries (Sa, 2011: 13-14). With more and 
more Chinese companies moving to Africa, skilled and educated workers are highly in 
demand to participate in China-Africa economic cooperation. Therefore, according to 
Gao, by 2013, 37 Confucius Institutes and 10 Confucius Halls were established to 
cultivate valuable employees (Gao, 2014: 144-147). Inevitably, there are some negative 
voices about such cultural strategies:  
 
‘Confucius schools are therefore nothing but China’s vehicles for global dominance, 
effected in the cultural sphere through the promotion of the Chinese language, 
 
tastes, education, architecture, music, food, movies, beliefs, banks, dressing, art, 
history and lifestyle, to be continued until such a time that these would have 
supplanted existing cultural precepts and raised local agents who would become 
the defenders of the new imposed order themselves’ (New African Magazine, 2015).  
 
Falk Hartig has published a series of articles and book discussing how Confucius 
Institutes (Cis) relate to the macro strategies of China to promote its soft power globally 
(2010; 2011; 2012; 2015a, 2015b). Based on his study of the Confucius Institute in 
Germany, Hartig concluded that although Cis cannot sustain the claims ‘non-intervention 
by the government’, it is still ‘not appropriate to label CIs as propaganda tools when 
propaganda is understood in the negative common sense’ (2010: 11). On the specific 
case of CIs in Africa, Hartig admitted the value of them in terms of educational aid to 
Africa, but he also noticed that insufficient academic and cultural communication 
between China and Africa make the CIs in Africa less effective than expected (2015b: 94-
110). The governmental influence of Confucius Institutes in Africa is also evident in their 
promotion for instance of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative,’ China’s major global 
infrastructure projects (Nanfeng Chuang, 2017), making such strategy rather 
controversial in the eyes of many Western critics. However, beyond the Cis there are 
many other cultural and communication as ties specifically aimed at the African 
populations, including the mass media to expand and strengthen the Sino-African ties. 
 
China’s companies are moving into the local markets of Africa with all kinds of products 
and goods. Although not all of them are impressive (Chinese goods are known in Africa 
for cheap prices and poor quality), the image is changing and there are certain brands 
becoming appealing to the local consumers (Gariba and Ying, 2016). Especially in the 
technology industry, Chinese companies are doing very well in many African local 
markets. Iginio Gagliardone said in an interview with CNBC that China was ‘definitely the 
only player’ in Ethiopia, with Chinese investment in the country’s technology sector 
totalling $3 billion as of 2012 (Crabtree, 2017). Chinese smartphones are popular 
especially among the younger generation of Africans, and Chinese companies such as 
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ZTE are localizing their products rapidly, attempting to dominate the African markets of 
digital products (Nandagopal, 2015). Besides, another big Chinese technology company 
Huawei provides training for local workers and set up research and development centres 
all over the continent of Africa to make its products localized, and it is believed that it 
shakes off ‘the longstanding negative perceptions of Chinese business in Africa’ (Rukato, 
2016).  
 
Telecommunication companies such as ZTE and Huawei are not just selling smartphones 
but also building infrastructure in many African countries. By meeting the demands of 
the local societies for developing infrastructure, China is building bridges to solidify its 
relations with African countries and to enhance its soft power (Foster et al., 2009: xv). 
The most direct influence on the local people’s perception of Chinese culture would be 
the media products made by StarTimes. With ‘10 million subscribers across 30 countries’, 
StarTimes is ‘now one of Africa’s most important media companies’ (Olander, 2017). This 
Beijing-based media company has achieved great success by providing pay-TV on a much 
cheaper price which beats the previous dominator MultiChoice’s DStv especially in East 
Africa (Mohammed, 2015). In 2012 and 2013, the Chinese TV drama ‘The Beautiful Age 
for Daughter-in-Law,’ which was broadcast on the channel provided by StarTimes, 
achieved unprecedented popularity amongst the local African audience (People.com, 
2013). It was reckoned as a great example to follow to either explore new markets for 
Chinese media products and to promote the ‘charm offensive’ of Chinese modern life. 
 
Besides education and brand influence of products, media exposure is equally important 
in terms of boosting the soft power of China in Africa. In the report ‘China in Africa: A 
New Approach to Media Development?’ co-written by Iginio Gagliardone, Maria 
Repnikova and Nicole Stremlau, the entire background of Chinese media and Chinese 
journalistic professionalism interacting with the African local media structure is depicted 
and explained (2010). The authors declared their concern for the success of China’s 
initiatives to promote their soft power through investing heavily into their overseas state 
media and they suggested that more in-depth studies should be conducted in the 
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receiving countries to draw a clearer picture of such agenda (2010: 17). Due to the 
exponential growth of China-Africa economic and political interactions, the suggestion 
proposed by Gagliardone and his colleagues has come true. An increasing number of 
academic publications on the subject of the image and soft power of China has emerged 
rapidly during the past few years. In an article written by Xiaoling Zhang in 2013, she 
analysed several thematic frames that frequently appear in the media discourse of 
Chinese state media and she reached the conclusion that ‘China is trying to build up its 
challenging power, but no substantial content can be found from the discourse of a state 
media as an alternative to the West’ (2013: 28). However, in the comparative research 
conducted by Vivien March on CCTV-Africa and BBC World News TV, the differences 
between Chinese approach and Western or British approach as manifested in their 
journalistic practices and media content are quite prominent (2015; 2016). 
  
In the paper ‘China in Africa: presence, perceptions and prospects’ published in 2014, 
Fei-Ling Wang and Esi Elliot analysed and depicted the image of China in the eyes of 
African people from eight sub-Saharan African countries, and they found ‘a great 
dichotomy in African perceptions about China’s presence’ (2014: 1022). On the one hand, 
China is viewed as the new hope for Africa’s future development. On the other, the 
opportunistic behaviour of Chinese companies in Africa irritates the local people. Wang 
and Elliot also found that in different African countries, the image of Chinese differs 
slightly as well (2014: 1024-1029). Additionally, based on their case study in Uganda, the 
work of Goretti Nassanga and Sabiti Makara analyses how the perceptions of most 
Africans on China are influenced by the local media (2014). Nassanga and Makara 
reached a less negative conclusion, at least for the Chinese government, that ‘Despite 
increasing unease about China’s ‘go global’ strategy, China globally enjoys a positive 
image’ which are majorly contributed by two African nations ‘Nigeria with 82% and 
Kenya having 77%’ (2014: 10). Lauren Gorfinkel and her colleagues also contributed to 
the profiling of African audiences and analysing how they perceive the ‘new voice’ of 
Chinese media, and found ‘a slightly greater interest and awareness by white audiences 
in Kenya, and a … lack of awareness or sustained interest by black Kenyans’ (2014: 86).  
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However, to what extent the image of China in the eyes of Africa is influenced by the 
efforts made by Chinese media in Africa remains a very significant, though not 
thoroughly answered, question. An increasing number of academic publications of 
various perspectives are contributing to the discussion of this question. Chinese scholar 
Yan Chengsheng published an article introducing how structurally speaking the Chinese 
television is doing in Africa (2015). Yan’s main focus was on CCTV, commercial media 
company StarTimes and China Network Television (CNTV), and he provided detailed 
information about the media organizations and broadcasting techniques (2015). 
Research of wider scope is also emerging. As the editors, Xiaoling Zhang, Herman 
Wasserman and Winston Mano, along with the contribution of all the other authors, 
provided an interesting collection of opinions and observations in the book China’s 
Media and Soft Power in Africa: Promotion and Perceptions (2016). For example, Daya 
Thussu talked about how the emerging Asian countries are trying to penetrate into the 
African market of media and communication (Thussu, 2016), Winston Mano picked the 
topic of local perceptions of China in Zimbabwe (Mano, 2016) and Gary Rawnsley 
discussed the general theoretical frame of how to define and conduct soft power studies 
(Rawnsley, 2016).  
 
In a paper written by Yu-Shan Wu from South African Institute of International Affairs, 
Wu provided a thorough map of the increasing engagement of Chinese media in Africa, 
signalling the ‘outward movement project’ of China (2010: 24). Regarding the influence 
of Chinese media in Africa, Herman Wasserman unveiled a rather unpromising reality 
for Chinese foreign focused media in the South African case. Wasserman conducted 
analyses based on the coverage, norms and practices, Chinese media as original source 
of African media, and found out that Chinese media is neither credible enough to be 
sources nor localised enough to really root its agenda into the ground in African societies 
(2015: 11). He then reached the conclusion that ‘although Chinese media maybe a 
potentially useful vehicle to disseminate Chinese perspectives to global audiences, the 
messages carried by these media cannot be assumed to have a direct effect on local 
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audiences’ (2015: 11).  
 
The dilemmas faced by the soft power studies of China’s state media can be concluded 
in what Sergio Grassi summarized in his report on China’s media in Africa:  
 
‘So far, China cannot offer any really attractive alternatives to hip-pop music, 
Hollywood films and European football. Unsurprisingly, this affects the acceptance 
of Chinese newscasts. A major disadvantage for Chinese foreign media is the 
negative image of the Chinese domestic media landscape … China’s media offensive 
in Africa illustrates that there are limits to what soft power can achieve when it is 
driven solely by actors. According to Joseph Nye, genuine soft power comes from 
civil society, the private sector and individuals, not from governments: ‘the best 
prop-agenda is no propaganda’’ (2014: 6). 
 
While too many people are focusing on the impact of the unprecedented economic 
growth of China to the rest of the world, such as what Joshua Kurlantzick described the 
economic diplomacy of China as charm offensive (2007), few are admitting the admitting 
the realistic problems faced by the wish of China to promote an alternative model either 
for mass media communication and for economic development. Like what Shi Anbi 
illustrates in his paper, ‘Chinese Dream’ can replace the global domination of ‘American 
dream’, and thus charm offensive of China should be replaced by charm defensive (2015). 
Therefore, in the field of international media studies, it is far too early (or never 
appropriate) to deploy the soft power and propaganda theories which are based on the 
examples of developed countries to the developing country of China and its external 
media system. 
 
2.4 China-Africa Journalism Studies 
Along with the exponential growth of China’s global influence and its increased discourse 
in Africa, the presence of Chinese media in Africa and its different approach to covering 
the continent is being increasingly noticed by international news organizations and 
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scholars of international media. Many Chinese media in Africa, such as China Daily, China 
Radio International, Xinhua News Agency (Xin, 2009) and CCTV, have become the key 
research subjects in the field China-Africa media studies. The positive tone of these state 
media on reporting the affairs in Africa has drawn huge attention from global academia. 
An increasing number of research projects have been and are being conducted to fill the 
existing void in the field of media studies.  
 
The positive reporting style has been drawing attentions along with the expansion of 
Chinese media into African market. Igonion Gagliardone brought up the question about 
the Chinese style of reporting in his article ‘China as a Persuader: CCTV Africa’s first steps 
in the African mediasphere’ asking whether it is political rhetoric or reality (2015: 32). 
He accurately predicted that ‘Positive reporting may challenge certain established 
notions of the Western liberal model of journalism in the medium to long term’ (2015: 
33). No long after Gagliardone’s prediction, a new trend in the China-Africa journalism 
studies arises. The terminology of ‘positive reporting style’ of Chinese media is replaced 
by a much more professional term – ‘constructive journalism’ – a term originated from 
a particular approach of journalistic practices based on the critique of negative reporting 
style first appeared in Danish Broadcasting Corporation in 2007.  
 
Chinese scholar Zhang Yanqiu and South Africa-based Kenyan scholar Bob Wekesa first 
deployed this approach of Chinese journalism in a paper titled ‘Live, Talk, Faces: An 
Analysis of CCTV’s Adaption to the African Media Market’ (2014), and Zhang developed 
this conception in her report presented at the international conference of ‘China and 
Africa Media, Communications and Public Diplomacy’ (2014). Zhang wrote in that report 
the constructive journalistic practices of Chinese media in Africa, especially reflected in 
the discourse of CCTV-Africa, are the symbol of a new wave of New World Information 
and Communication Order (NWICO) (2014: 2-3). She further unfolded her illustration on 
this innovative conception in the co-written article ‘A New Representation of Africa? The 
Use of Constructive Journalism in the Narration of Ebola by China Daily and BBC’ 
published in 2016. Zhang and Matingwina claimed that constructive journalism not only 
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‘contribute to positive change in the lives of media users’ but also ‘moves further to place 
the emphasis on possible solutions’ (2016: 23-24). They believe that not only the 
constructive journalistic approach is deployed by Chinese media in Africa but also 
gradually being adopted by Western media such as BBC (2016: 33), which, they argued 
is ‘the next mega trend’ of international journalism (2016: 23). Although such narrative 
is arousing wide and various discussions on the essence of Chinese journalism, there 
have not been much theoretically mature and methodologically rigorous work 
contributing to the topic of constructive journalism of Chinese media in Africa.  
 
How China is presented in the media by African media practitioners is another area of 
research of great importance. Chang Jiang and Ren Hailong’s article examined ‘how 
native cultural value influence African journalists’ perceptions of China’ (2015). Chang 
and Ren conducted in-depth interviews with local journalists in Uganda and examined a 
wide range of literature and references, and they concluded four major findings about 
the image of China in the eyes of local journalists from the collected data: 1. China as 
sharer, not predator; 2. Authoritarianism and dictatorship; 3. The Chinese who do not 
blend in; 4. Obedience in journalism practice (Chang and Ren: 2015: 6-10). Obviously, 
there is no consistent image about China in the discourse of local African journalists. In 
the article titled ‘Framing of the Sino-Africa relationship in diasporic/pan-African News 
Magazines’, the author Tokunbo Ojo examines the representation of China-Africa 
relations in the coverage of local African news magazines (2015). The frame analysis of 
the news in two local news magazines shows that the tone of different media is 
influenced both by its editorial traditions, such as ‘Afrocentric journalism practices’ or 
‘pan-Africa orientation’, and the demographic features of its readership (2015: 14). 
Therefore, Ojo drew a similar conclusion with other researchers that concerning the 
‘multidimensional complexity of China’s presence in Africa’ (2015: 14).  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In addition to the literature reviewed in the sections above, there are also many other 
researchers and studies about the China-Africa dynamics discussing various topics 
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including peace and security (Alden et al., 2018; Benabdallah, 2016; Saferworld, 2011), 
morality and culture (Chan, 2013), building infrastructure in Africa (Corkin et al., 2008; 
Foster et al., undated) and non-governmental organizations in Africa (Long and Chen, 
2013). The future of China-Africa is destined to grow closer, and accordingly the related 
academic research is going to develop stronger as well. Nevertheless, there remain a lot 
of topics in the field of China-Africa studies which continue to be vastly understudied.  
 
As we can see from the reviewed literature above, most media studies are focusing on 
the aspects of public diplomacy, soft power or journalism, and their theoretical 
foundations remains rather narrowly defined. Both public diplomacy and soft power 
studies are mostly based on realist international relationship theories, and journalism 
studies basically lack consistent or systematic theoretical paradigms. However, as the 
review in the section 2.1 shows there are rather diverse theoretical perspectives in the 
field of China-Africa political-economic research. The emerging studies of Yan and 
Sautman on the discourse of China in Africa are paving a new approach for China-Africa 
media studies to develop in innovative ways. Furthermore, as we can see in the section 
2.3 and 2.4, very few researchers study how the media messages of Chinese media in 
Africa are received by the local audience. Therefore, for the purpose of advancing 
theoretical development and to enrich empirical materials, there is sufficient space for 
this research to contribute to this emerging field.  
 
This research on China-Africa media studies is aimed to focus on the reception study of 
Chinese media in Africa from the theoretical perspective of critical political and 
economic studies. In order to establish a solid theoretical foundation for this research, it 
is necessary to systematically review the theoretical paradigms of international 
communication studies with a focus on the audience reception which is the main 
content of the following chapter.  
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Chapter 3 - Audience Studies in International Communication 
 
The origin of international communication studies as an established discipline of modern 
scholarship can be traced back to the two World Wars when the emerging new media of 
radio and then later television ‘were demonstrated by their use for international 
propaganda as well as recognition of their potential for socio-economic development’ 
(Thussu, 2006: 1). Generally speaking, the field of international communication studies 
‘is conventionally divided into three, and sometimes four, distinct phases’ (Sparks, 2007: 
3). And in this thesis, the history of international communication studies is divided into 
three main phases. Despite all the different names which have been given to categorize 
these phases, the most widely recognizable names of these three historical stages are: 
‘development/modernization paradigm’, ‘dependency/imperialism paradigm’ and 
‘globalization paradigm’. It is the fact that these three phases ‘do not fit perfectly 
together’ as sometimes they theoretically and chronologically overlap and other times 
their topics are not very coherent, such as the different emphasis of the development 
paradigm and imperialism paradigm locally and globally (ibid: 4). But it is still necessary 
for us to review the linkage and shape of the intellectual history of international 
communication studies to forge a better understanding. 
 
Instead of portraying a general panorama of the academic flow of these phases, this 
chapter puts a specific focus on the aspect of audience research of those different 
paradigms, and on how the theories and practices of audience studies have interacted 
and evolved following the change of the comprehensive background of international 
communication studies. It is generally agreed that audience research, along with many 
other topics of communication studies, is heavily influenced by the dualistic divergence 
of the media effect studies between the administrative studies in the United States and 
the reception studies of the Cultural Studies school in Europe (Barker, Mathijs and 
Turnbull, 2015). This literature review does not discuss that dualism but instead looks at 
and aims to contribute to audience research based on the ‘increased reflexivity’ of the 
dialectical relation between media and audience (Alasuutari, 1999: 9).  
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3.1 Audience Research in the Development/Modernization Paradigm 
While the origins of the development/modernization paradigm lie in the two decades 
after the Second World War, theories of audience studies were developed to analyze the 
public effect of propaganda scientifically during both world wars (Ott and Mack, 2014; 
Cheng, M., 2011: 112) and were influenced by the model of the ‘hypodermic needle’ 
and ‘bullet’. The ‘hypodermic’ model of the media ‘was seen as having the power to 
‘inject’ a repressive ideology directly into the consciousness of the masses’ (Morley, 
1980: 1). As Katz and Lazarsfeld noted, ‘the image of the mass communication process 
entertained by researchers had been, firstly, one of ‘an atomized mass’ of millions of 
readers, listeners, and movie-goers, prepared to receive the message; and secondly … 
every Message [was conceived of] as a direct and powerful stimulus to action which 
would elicit immediate response’ (cited in ibid: 1). Accordingly, the audience was 
regarded as passive receivers of media messages. In the first three decades of the 20th 
century, the theoretical frame of mass media studies was embedded in that of social 
science such as psychology and sociology. The prevailing psychological theory, back then, 
was the ‘stimulus-response’ model (Guo, Q., 2009: 194). This model, ‘single message → 
individual receiver → reaction’, assumes that human beings are homogenous individuals 
who respond similarly to the same stimulus (McQuail, 1996: 338). Many established 
researchers of communication study, including Harold Lasswell, had been heavily 
influenced by this tendency. In his famous book Propaganda Technique in the World War, 
Lasswell wrote that ‘[p]ropaganda is likewise a passive and contributory weapon, whose 
chief function is to demolish the enemy’s will to fight by intensifying depression, 
disillusionment and disagreement’ (Lasswell, 1938: 214). By interpreting propaganda as 
the weapon, the power of mass communication was exaggerated to a point where the 
autonomy of audience was mostly neglected. In another of his widely cited articles The 
Structure and Function of Communication in Society, Lasswell brought up the well-known 
Five Ws communication model – ‘who says what in which channel to whom with what 
effect’ – which still pictures mass communication as one-dimensional indoctrination 
from media to public (Rogers, 2014: 206).  
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However, ‘[t]he decisive discarding of the hypodermic needle model resulted 
serendipitously from a classic study of the 1940 presidential election’ (Rogers, 1983: 272). 
The publication of Lazarsfeld and his colleagues’ research – The People’s Choice – on 
American people’s poll for the election of the president in 1940 further revealed the 
complexity of mass communication (1944). The limitation of media effect and the multi-
layered process of information flow had been discovered through a series of researches 
(Rogers, 1962). New models were brought up one after another. Lazarsfeld’s ‘two-step 
flow of communication’ model created the concept of ‘opinion leader’ who ‘pass on 
what they read and hear to those of their every-day associates for whom they are 
influential’ (Katz, 1957: 61). Later on, American scholar Rogers further replenished the 
one-dimensional model of mass communication in his book Diffusion of Innovations 
(1962) where he criticized the two-step flow model arguing that ‘the flow of 
communication in a mass audience is far more complicated than two steps’ (1983: 274). 
As shown in Figure 3.1, Rogers brought up a multi-layered communication flow model 
emphasizing the different individual influences between the different type of audience 









Figure 3.1 Diffusion of Innovations Model (Guo, 2009: 198) 
 
Until the 1960s audience-research studies were mainly conducted by scholars or 
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professional researchers who were funded by commercial or governmental 
organizations to find out how to maximize the media effect on the audience. And most 
of the sociologists who conducted those researches on mass communication were of the 
Chicago school, and their academic intuitions were always ‘administrative’ rather than 
‘critical’ (Lazarsfeld, 1941). Although the communication model had constantly been 
revised and updated, the mainstream theoretical paradigm on media flow remained 
one-dimensional. The focus of the one-dimensional model was always on ‘how media 
works on audience’ while neglecting the grander social background in which the 
individualities of the audience are embedded (Guo, 2009: 200). In the field of 
international communication study, the theoretical evolution of audience research had 
a similar experience. 
 
After the end of the Second World War, the world was dominated in a bipolar structure 
by the two superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union. Scientific 
development in America was like a ‘science of coercion’ due to the competitive Cold War 
background (Schiller, 1996: xiii). Driven by the ‘antipathy to the state regulation and 
censorship of the media by its communist opponents and its use for propaganda’, 
Western countries with rich media resources started a ‘free flow’ movement of global 
information: ‘the ‘free flow’ doctrine was essentially a part of the liberal, free-market 
discourse that championed the rights of media proprietors to sell wherever and 
whatever they wished’ (Thussu, 2006: 42). The political and economic purposes behind 
this movement were to spread Western democracy and to promote development in the 
underdeveloped countries. In the Middle East, efforts were made by the American 
government to strengthen and reinforce the expectation of the local public for social 
changes (Hintz, 2009: 58-60), which were based on the fact that many Westerners firmly 
believed that ‘[w]hat America is … the modernizing Middle East seeks to become’ (Lerner, 
1958: 79). Mass communication, since then, was seen more than just the exchange of 
information but the vital tool to deliver modernity to the less Westernized areas of the 
world. As Schramm put it: ‘the task of the mass media of information and the ‘new media’ 
of education is to speed and ease the long, slow social transformation required for 
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economic development, and, in particular, to speed and smooth the task of modernizing 
human resources behind the national effort’ (Schramm, 1964: 27).  
 
It was believed that social development starts from individual change, as Lerner put it: 
‘only insofar as individual persons can change their places in the world, their position in 
society, their self-image, does social change occur. Social change in this sense is the sum 
of mobilities acquired by individual persons’ (cited in Sparks, 2007: 24). Based on his 
extensive studies on the Middle East countries, Lerner found out that individual mobility 
is closely interlinked with the expansion of urbanization which is decisive to the process 
of modernization. With sufficient urbanization (10% of the population calculated by 
Lerner) and popularized literacy as the premises, mass media can then be educational 
(Lerner, 1964: 63). As one Iranian youngster told Lerner, ‘The movies are like a teacher 
to us, who tells us what to do and what not’ (ibid: 54). The advantage of mass media, in 
terms of spreading modern ideas, is that ‘the scale of the audience that mass media 
could produce meant that they could reach into the minds of vast numbers of people at 
the same time and for vastly less cost’ (Sparks, 2007: 23). Lerner also asserted that social 
change is correlated not only with media system itself but also with ‘changes in other 
key sector of the social system’ (Lerner, 1964: 56). For example, Lerner noticed that 
literate people are more likely to consume media products and accept modern ideas 
(ibid: 58). 
 
At the initial stage of international communication studies, the audience from the 
underdeveloped areas of the world was still put in the position of being a passive 
recipient that is longing for modern knowledge. The differentiation of the foreign 
audience was noticed at a very early stage: ‘there was a characteristic pattern of the 
spread of new practices and that the early adopters would tend to come from elite 
groups’ (Sparks, 2007: 26). It was expected that the scientific experts from developed 
countries could disseminate the modern knowledge through the educational system in 














Figure 3.2 The Preliminary Development Communication Model (Sparks, 2007: 27) 
 
As Thussu has noted, ‘this top-down approach to communications, a one-way flow of 
information from government or international development agencies via the mass 
media to Southern peasantry at the bottom, was generally seen as a panacea for the 
development of the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa’ (2006: 44). Many 
pieces of research on this subject were published and highly valued (notably, Lerner, 
1958, 1963; Pye, 1963; Rogers, 1962, 1969; Schramm, 1964). As indicated in Figure 3.2, 
Sparks summarized the general process of this top-down communication model with six 
main actors which are ‘state governments,’ ‘international agencies,’ ‘development 
experts,’ ‘education and media,’ ‘local elites’ and ‘general populations’ (2007: 27). This 
kind of over-simplified international communication model (from North to South) 
assumed that (the) audience is of the same ideological framework and ‘accepted existing 
social relations as a given’ while neglected ‘the context within which it had been 
developed’ (ibid).  
 
However, it was soon realized that the mutual trust between local elites and the general 
population was overestimated as in many societies these two groups of people have 










there was a severe information gap between general public and local governments in 
many underdeveloped countries (Schramm, 1967:23). And it was the time when the 
local social structure was included in the whole picture. To deliver tailored messages and 
information to the intended audience, with the awareness of the social distance 
between different foreign audience, Rogers said that ‘one must know his audience’ (cited 
in Sparks, 2007: 33). Therefore, the autonomy of the audience was taken into account 
when the international communication model was being modified. As indicated in Figure 
3.3, the participant of the intended audience was introduced to the model through the 
mechanism of ‘feedback’ between ‘development experts’ and the foreign audience: ‘the 
villagers’ needs, wishes, ideas and knowledge should enter into the transaction equally 












Figure 3.3 The Modified Development Communication Model (Sparks, 2007: 34) 
 
Despite the constant modifications of the communication model and the great efforts 
made by many global organizations, the development/modernization paradigm of 
international communication in the 1960s and 1970s turned out to be a failure as ‘the 
behavioural alterations that were supposed to follow did not take place’ (Sparks, 2007: 
39). According to the theoretical framework of the development/modernization 











the opposite of modern, and to modernize them was to brainwash them regardless of 
their original ideological framework and the social structure that they were identified 
with. On one hand, the ‘dichotomy of modern versus traditional’ is the internal logic flaw 
of the paradigm, on the other, the emphasis on the individual level of social change made 
the paradigm incapable of providing a comprehensive analysis based on the macro 
background of political-economic development (Thussu, 2006: 45).  
 
In the field of global audience research, the mainstream of communication studies in the 
three decades after the Second World War focused on media effects, and most of the 
research was administrative rather than critical. In the early stage of communication 
studies from the 1930s to 1960s, the effect of media was ‘credited with considerable 
power to shape opinion and belief, to change habits of life and to mould behaviour 
actively more or less according to the will of those who could control the media and their 
contents’ (McQuail, 1996: 328). The role of the audience in this phase was seen as 
passive and irrelevant. As McQuail (1996: 286) noted: 
 
‘… Audience was large and widely dispersed; its members could not know each 
other; its composition of its size and heterogeneity; it was governed by no rules; it 
appeared not to act for itself but to be acted on from outside; and just as its own 
internal relations were impersonal, so were the relations between any source and 
the mass audience also necessarily impersonal. For reasons of its great scale, the 
mass media audience cannot ‘talk back’ to its sources, and the technology of mass 
media distribution is not usually arranged to make this technically possible. The 
communicative relationship involved is typically calculative as well as being 
impersonal. There is also often a large social distance between the mass media 
audience and a more powerful, expert or prestigious source and thus an asymmetric 
relationship … This concept of the mass media is an ‘ideal type’ rather than a 
description of any reality ...’ 
 
This over-simplified definition of audience occupied the intellectual history of 
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international communication studies during nearly three decades after the Second 
World War from the 1940s to the early 1970s. In the paradigm of 
development/modernization, media audience research was focusing on the social 
functions of media effects instead of the local audience’s interpretation of media content. 
It was based on an assumption that the developing world is in need of social change 
towards Western modernization, without questioning the legitimacy of modernization 
itself. The then administrative media research underpinned the uncritical tone of this 
paradigm. However, with further political, economic and military expansion of the 
United States in the 1970s as one of the two polar powers during the time of Cold War, 
concerns were aroused among scholars from the developed and developing worlds 
about whether the hegemonic expansion of one particular nation-state would create a 
homogenized global village. Therefore, a new paradigm of critical theories emerged in 
the following decade to challenge some of the assumptions of the 
development/modernization paradigm.  
 
3.2 Audience Research in the Dependency/Imperialism Paradigm 
One major theorization of these concerns about global media and the cultural 
dominance of the United States was contributed by the Canadian scholar Dallas Smythe, 
who developed a new perspective on understanding the media industry and the essence 
of the media audience. ‘Traditional behavioural research (and its popular handmaiden, 
market research),’ argued Smythe, ‘is simply tangential, self-interested, and irrelevant to 
the complex dialectical processes of contradictions which are working before our eyes’ 
(Smythe, 1981: 22). Instead, basing his theoretical foundation on Marxism, Smythe 
advocated a critical view on ‘the effects of communication agencies regarding the 
policies by which they are organized and operated’ (Smythe, 1960: 564). ‘The capitalist 
system’, said Smythe in his influential book Dependency Road, ‘like other social systems, 
has its unique agenda which claims the attention of its constituent institutions and 
population’, and ‘for virtually all the people, all the time, the agenda which directs their 
attention is that which comes to them from the mass media segment of the 
Consciousness Industry’ (Smythe, 1981: 7).  
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Unlike other European or American scholars of critical media studies who were focusing 
on the abstract mechanism of mass media forging the mind of the public to maintain the 
dominant structure of the capitalist system, Smythe thought that ‘mass media and its 
artifacts should no longer be regarded merely as ideological apparatus’ (Jansen, 1983: 
422). In the controversial article ‘Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism’, 
Smythe wrote that ‘the Western Marxist analyses have neglected the economic and 
political significance of mass communication systems’ (Smythe, 1977: 1). The analysis of 
mass communication as the abstract and subjective process whose ‘principle product of 
the mass media’ is merely mental and idealist entities are not sufficient, because ‘there 
is a material base of work which people must do under monopoly capitalism’ (Smythe, 
1981: 23). To fill up this blind spot of lacking an ‘objective and realistic theory’, Smythe 
deployed an economic approach to reconsider the role of the media audience. In his 
opinion, ‘the principle product of the commercial mass media in monopoly capitalism’ 
is not media content but rather ‘audience power’ (ibid: 26). And similar to any labour 
power, ‘audience power is produced, sold, purchased and consumed’, so ‘it commands 
a price and is a commodity’ (ibid: 26). The commodity of media audience is ‘produced 
by mass media and priced and sold in oligopolistic markets to advertisers for whom they 
perform services which earn their keep’ (ibid: 27-8). And in this way, the consciousness 
industry ‘has become an integral part of the power structure of monopoly capitalism’ 
(Jansen, 1983: 422).  
 
Smythe also noticed that the commodification of audience in the media industry 
conditioned by the monopoly capitalism is not limited by geographical boundaries. In 
the introduction of Dependency Road, he claimed that Canada is a dependency of the 
United States which is ‘the center of the core of the capitalist system’, and 
communications institutions produce ‘the necessary consciousness and ideology to 
seem to legitimate that dependency’ (1982: ix). According to Smythe, ‘every commodity 
is in a sense a teaching machine’, which means that ‘every commodity suggests priorities 
for allotment of consumer time and energy’ (Jansen, 1983: 422). And because of the 
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popularity of American media products in Canada, Canadian audiences have been 
commodified to contribute to the American monopoly capitalism. In the 1980s, ‘70% of 
U.S. news in Canadian newspapers is written in the U.S. by Americans’; ‘Two U.S. firms 
control all newsstand distribution of magazines in Canada’ and ‘nearly all of the 
$200,000,000 box offices receipts from motion pictures shown in Canada are controlled 
by the U.S. film industry’ (Jansen, 1982: 421). And also because of Canada’s political, 
economic and military dependency on the United States, the late Canadian Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau said in 1968 that ‘Canada is no more independent of the United 












Figure 3.4 Imperialism, Local Elites and Developing Societies (Sparks, 2007: 95) 
 
Such dependency applies to the developing world to much greater degree. In his book 
Mass Communication and American Empire, American scholar Herbert Schiller provided 
a systematic analysis on how the global ‘electronic invasion’ by U.S. government and 
private media is involved with the dynamics of the evolving world economic order’. In 
Schiller’s opinion, the ‘electronic invasion’, which is of course rested upon its military 
force, facilitated America to imperialist expansion around the globe: ‘what lends 
sophistication to the still-youthful American imperial structure is its dependence on a 
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for the earlier, ‘blood and iron’ foundations of more primitive conquerors’ (Schiller, 1970: 
5). Equipped with the satellites and the advanced telecommunication techniques, the 
US government and its private media largely controlled the international broadcasting 
system in the 1970s and 1980s. And the international broadcasting of American media 
programmes facilitated ‘the spread of American system, the commercial model of 
communication, to the international arena’ (Schiller, 1970: 93).  
 
Particularly in the developing regions such as Latin America, due to their economic 
dependency on developed countries and their transnational corporations, developing 
countries are more likely to be ‘attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into’ 
the ‘modern world system’ to promote ‘the values and structures of the dominant centre 
of the system’ (Schiller, 1976: 9). The local telecommunication infrastructures in 
developing societies ‘were designed to favour disproportionately the interests of large 
companies, both domestic and foreign, and the needs of the ruling elite’ (Sussman, 1981: 
20-1; Hamelink, 1984: 80). As Figure 3.4 illustrates, media audiences in developing 
societies are not homogeneous but rather multi-layered. Instead of being ‘brainwashed’ 
by the direct effect from the imperialist media system, the public in the developing 
countries is usually influenced by the combination of the local elites and real-life 
pressures from the political-economic environment. The local elites are the group of 
people who are more likely to be attracted to the imperialist media system because ‘they 
possessed the wealth to be amongst the first individual purchasers of television sets, 
and they were more likely to have the linguistic skills, not to mention literacy levels, that 
permitted them access to the print media. To them, imperialist media made a seductive 
proposal’ (Sparks, 2007: 93). Moreover, according to Johan Galtung’s structural theory 
of imperialism (discussed further in chapters 4 and 6), as shown in Figure 3.5, the centre 
class (elite) of the centre countries (developed countries) and the centre class (elite) of 
the peripheral countries (developing/underdeveloped countries) are connected through 
a ‘harmony of interests’ as they are both benefiting from the global capitalism system 
(Galtung, 1971). And the ‘periphery-centre relationships are maintained and reinforced 
by information flows and through the reproduction of economic activities’ (Thussu, 2006: 
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51). Therefore, similar to the development/modernization paradigm, the local elite class 
















Figure 3.5 The Structural Theory of Imperialism (Galtung, 1971: 84) 
 
Many researchers in the late 1970s and early 1980s used the critical approach of the 
cultural and media imperialism paradigm, such as Tunstall (1977), Mattelart (1979), 
Smythe (1980), Guback and Varis (1982), Thussu (2006) and Sparks (2007), among others. 
Those researchers applied this to a variety of topics, such as ‘US cultural and media 
dominance as Hollywood’s relationship with the European movie market (Guback, 1969); 
US television exports and influences in Latin America (Wells, 1972); the contribution of 
Disney comics in promoting capitalist values (Dorfman and Mattelart, 1975); the role of 
the adverting as an ideological instrument (Ewen, 1976; Mattelart, 1991)’ and ‘the 
UNESCO-supported research on international flow in television programmes 
(Nordenstreng and Varis, 1974; Varis, 1985). There was a common assumption made by 
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mainstream media texts - of ‘dazzling skyscrapers, expensive clothes and automobiles, 
lavish settings, the celebration in the narrative of power and wealth and so on’ 
(Tomlinson, 2002: 46). However, there were not many analyses on how either the elite 
class or the public of developing countries interpret the media texts produced by the 
America-dominated international broadcasting system. As one commentator noted: 
‘There is an assumption that American TV imports do have an impact whenever and 
wherever they are shown, but actual investigation of this seldom occurs. Much of the 
evidence that is offered is merely anecdotal or circumstantial’ (Lealand, 1984: 36). 
 
In summary, the theory of global media flows in the age of the 
modernization/development paradigm and dependency/imperialism paradigm was top- 
down and North-to-South and the research mainly focused on the studies of media 
effects while ignoring the audience’s interpretation of the media content. However, with 
the evolvement of media technology and the growth of media market, the importance 
of the audience’s participation in conditioning the content production of mass media 
was gradually realized. Although the theoretical development of media effects research 
has never ceased to advance, there emerged other focuses of media studies such as 
media use and audience reception in the following paradigm of globalization. (Further 
discussion of the theoretical frame of cultural and media imperialism paradigm can be 
found in chapter 4). 
 
3.3 Audience Research in the Globalization Paradigm 
In the late 1960s, the field of audience studies witnessed a revival of the theoretical 
frame of ‘uses and gratifications,’ which originated in the 1940s, when a group of 
researchers conducted a series of studies to ‘discover motives and selection patterns of 
audiences for the new mass media’ (Ruggiero, 2000: 4). Those studies covered a wide 
range of topics from the habit of newspaper reading (Waples, Berelson and Bradshaw, 
1940; Berelson, 1949) to the usage of radio programmes (Cantril and Allport, 1935; 
Herzog, 1940, 1944). However, as it did not manage to break through as a theory in the 
1950s, this area of audience studies failed to develop (Guo, 2009: 182). In 1969, Denis 
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McQuail and colleagues’ analysis of TV programmes heralded a new age of ‘uses and 
gratifications’ research, as their studies uncovered four genres of ‘gratification’ which 
are ‘diversion’, ‘personal relation’, ‘personal identity’ and ‘surveillance’ (McQuail, 1972). 
The theoretical frame of ‘uses and gratifications’ explores the subjective needs of the 
audience to explain the patterns of their media use. ‘Media use,' wrote McQuail, ‘is most 
suitably characterized as an interactive process, relating media content, individual needs, 
perceptions, roles and values and the social context in which a person is situated’ (ibid: 
144). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, ‘uses and gratifications’ research was largely 
functionalist in relation to its essential academic focus. Katz et al summarized this kind 
of research as an approach to be concerned with ‘the social and psychological origins of 
needs, which generates expectations of the mass media or other sources which lead to 
differential patterns of media exposure (or engagement in other activities), resulting in 
need gratifications and other consequences, perhaps mostly unintended ones’ (Katz, 
Blumler and Gurevitch, 1974: 20). In the middle of 1970s, the ‘uses and gratifications’ 
research became more concentrated on ‘gratification sought’ instead of ‘media use’ as 
a whole process (Rayburn, 1996, cited in Ruggiero, 2000: 6). Much research focused on 
the psychological motives of the audience, whose media use and other behaviours are 
probably the consequences influenced by their social environment (Greenberg, 1974; 
Lometti et al., 1977; Palmgreen and Rayburn, 1979; Rosengren, 1974).  
 
In response, some scholars, such as McLeod, Bybee and Durall (1982), later clarified the 
difference between ‘gratifications sought’ and ‘gratifications received’ as ‘two different 
conceptual entities that deserve independent treatment in any future U&G research’ 
(Ruggiero, 2000: 7). Despite the proceeding development of the ‘uses and gratifications’ 
paradigm, as administrative research, it is still accused of ‘ignoring the everyday social 
context’ (Schrøder, 1999: 40). The same period saw the emergence of a new approach 
to audience research from the domain of Cultural Studies. In 1974, Stuart Hall published 
the well-known article Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse, which is 
regarded as the origin of audience reception studies. This new approach, which was 
‘historically preceded and later influenced by German reception theory developed in late 
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1960s literary criticism’, ‘carried on and readdressed the themes already raised in what 
was known as the ‘uses and gratifications’ paradigm’ (Alasuutari, 1999: 2).  
 
The focus of media reception research on audience interpretation was seen as ‘the build 
we have been hoping might arise between gratifications studies and cultural studies’ 
(Katz, 1979: 75). As ‘part of the wider debate within Marxism’ (Gray, 1999: 27), the 
theoretical foundation of the encoding/decoding model was derived from the 
epistemology of Capital, which sees the industrial production of broadcasting as ‘the 
‘labour process’ in the discursive mode’ (Hall, 2006: 164). Further, ‘the production 
structures of television originate the television discourse’ which constitutes an open 
system interacting with ‘other discursive formations within the wider socio-cultural and 
political structure of which they are differentiated parts’, and in this dialectical open 
system, the role of audience can be both the information ‘source’ and ‘receiver’ (ibid: 
164-5). The premise is that the meaning of the television discourse can ‘be transported 
into practice or consciousness (to acquire social use value or political effectivity)’. The 
encoded messages delivered by the discourse ‘can have an ‘effect’ (however defined), 
satisfy a ‘need’ or to be put to a ‘use’, but it must first be appropriated as a meaningful 
discourse and be meaningfully decoded’ (ibid: 165-6). The process of meaningful 
television discourse is shown in Figure 3.6. By integrating ‘text and audience studies’, 
‘Hall welcomed the opportunity for Cultural Studies to examine empirically how ‘the 
degrees of ‘understanding’ and ‘misunderstanding’ in the communicative exchange – 
depend on the degrees of symmetry/asymmetry (relations of equivalence) established 
between the positions of the ‘personifications’, encoder/producer and 
decoder/receiver’’ (Hall, 1980: 131). 
 
The emergence of the encoding/decoding model, as it is widely believed, ‘forms the start 
point for many accounts of the move into the “active audience”’ (Gray, 1999: 26). It 
‘moves away from a behaviouristic stimulus-response model to an interpretive 
framework, where all effects depend on an interpretation of media messages’ 
(Alasuutari, 1999: 3). Hall argued that the autonomy of a media audience, as the 
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individual members of society, is of great significance to ‘how social ideas arise’ (Hall, 
1983: 29). Because of their participation in signifying the media and social discourse, the 
audience is no longer regarded as the passive recipients of media flow but rather an 
indispensable part of the flow itself. The case of the populist Thatcherism in the 1970s 
analyzed by Hall was supportive of the theory of ‘active audience’. Hall argued that the 
‘swing to the Right’ in the political atmosphere in Britain beginning in the late 1970s was 
not a reflection of economic crisis but the ‘response’ to crisis, and this political and 
economic change formed ‘a new balance of forces, the emergence of new elements, the 
attempt to put together a new ‘historical bloc’ … a profound restructuring of the state 
and the ideological discourses which construct the crisis and represent it as it is ‘lived’ 













Figure 3.6 The Encoding/Decoding Model (Hall, 2006: 165) 
 
 
The ideological manifestation of the ‘moving right show’ was the populist Thatcherism, 
which was embedded in the British popular culture (Browne and Kreiser, 2009: 152-154). 
Audience or the British public’s acceptance of populist Thatcherism is not based on the 
dualism of audience as the recipient and media as the ideological dominant, and both 
Framework of knowledge 
 
Relations of production 
 
Technical infrastructure 
Framework of knowledge 
 







 Programme as 
  “meaningful”  






  Meaning  
structure 1 
 Meaning  
structure 2 
 
audience and media are embedded in the reality. Therefore, Hall’s new model ‘shift[s] 
attention away from an exclusive focus on the ideological and institutional determinants 
of media texts towards including a role for a possibly active, but hitherto ‘disappearing’, 
audience’ (Fejes, cited in Livingstone, 2008: 3). Further, the model also ‘signals the move 
from the over-determination of the dominant ideology thesis to the more complex 
notion suggested by Gramsci’s hegemony model’ (Gray, 1999: 27).  
 
It was realized by Hall and many other scholars of reception analysis that the audience’s 
interpretation of media content is not an independent process excluded from the 
outside social structure, and the patterns of audience’s interaction with mass media are 
far more diverse and dynamic. On how the audiences decode the encoded media 
messages, Hall developed four positions: ‘1) dominant or hegemonic code: connotative 
level of the messages are decoded in term of the dominant or preferred meanings; 2) 
Professional code: what the professional broadcasters employ when transmitting a 
message which has already been signified in a hegemonic manner; 3) Negotiated code: 
a mixture of adaptive and oppositional elements; 4) Oppositional code: a viewer 
perfectly understand both the literal and connotative inflection is given to an event but 
determines to decode the messages in a globally contrary way’ (Alassutari, 1999: 4). The 
oppositional interpretation code gave rise to ‘a focus on the resistant audiences, as part 
of the questioning of such hegemonic theories as the dominant ideology thesis 
(Abersrombie, et al., 1980), the cultural imperialism thesis (Hallin, 1996) and the political 
economy approach (Murdock, 1989)’ (Livingstone, 2008: 3).  
 
In the 1980s, an increasing number of audience researches were conducted to testify 
against the existence of media/cultural imperialism in the formation of people’s 
mindsets. The publication of Ien Ang’s research on Dutch audience’s reception on the 
American TV soap Dallas, which was regarded as the ‘byword for cultural imperialism in 
the 1980s’ (Tomlinson, 2002: 45), revealed an astonishing result. Ang’s research showed 
that ‘an opposing ‘anti-intellectual’ ideological discourse of ‘populism’ may allow the 
Dallas fan to refuse the ideology of mass culture as elitist and paternalist, and to insist 
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on their right to their pleasure without cultural ‘guilt’ (Ang, 1985: 113). Although the 
informal methodology was questioned, Ang’s research triggered many media 
researchers’ curiosities to dig into the audience’s interpretation of media content. Katz 
and Liebes also conducted a more formal and carefully designed audience research on 
Dallas (1985). The analysis based on fifty focus group interviews conducted by Katz and 
Liebes had a similar conclusion to that of Ang’s: ‘audiences are more active and critical, 
their responses more complex and reflective, and their cultural values more resistant to 
manipulation and ‘invasion’ that many critical media theorists have assumed’ (Tomlinson, 
2002: 50).  
 
The deconstruction on the cultural/media imperialism paradigm was also facilitated by 
the political and intellectual shift as ‘part of a much broader retreat of leftist ideas and 
movements during the 1980s’ (Sparks, 2007: 126). With the rapid growth of 
transnational companies facilitated by the global wave of economic neoliberalism, many 
believed that ‘there is emerging a world society in which the state is less and less a 
significant actor at all levels, the economic, the political, the cultural and so on’ (Beck, 
2000: 4). And along with the economic globalization, there was also a growing benign 
belief that ‘a new ‘global consciousness’ was emerging, as well as a physical compression 
of the world, in which cultures become ‘relativized’ to each other, not unified or 
centralized, asserting that globalization involves ‘the development of something like a 
global culture’ (Thussu, 2006: 61). And the emergence of the ‘narrative transparency’ 
theory, which can be defined as a ‘textual apparatus that allows audiences to project 
their indigenous values, beliefs, and rituals into imported media’ (Olson, 1999: 5), 
further dismantled the discourse of cultural imperialism. It is believed that ‘a cross-
cultural understanding of the text may take place because the audience interprets a 
foreign text using their own cultural beliefs and values’ (Chitnis et al., 2006: 133).  
 
However, the globalization paradigm was being heavily scrutinized by many critical 
scholars as the current reality did not reflect the assumptions of the paradigm (Robinson, 
2005; Sparks, 2007; Fuchs, 2010a). To systematically analyze the limits of the paradigm, 
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Sparks provided data, such as the ‘market share of global media products’ and 
‘comparison of the scale of major economies’, to get to the conclusion that ‘the problem 
with globalization [paradigm] is … that … it directs attention to certain phenomena and 
neglects others’ (2007: 149-88). It was argued that the idea of ‘globalization’ was ‘a 
blatant ideology evoked by ruling groups to justify capitalist globalization policies’ 
(Robinson, 2011: 12). Although many optimists believing in ‘a growing collective 
awareness or consciousness of the world as a shared social space’ which implies 
‘increasing freedom and equality’, ‘we [still] live in a world of global inequality’ (Fuchs, 
2010a: 216). Contrary to the wish that the dominant global structure is disappearing, 
the globalization of capitalism is bringing up a new wave of hegemonic dominance both 
economically and ideologically. And in this new wave, the emergence of a global ruling 
class or transnational capitalist class is going to replace the actors of nation-states due 
to the stateless tendency of the global economy (Robinson and Harris, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, in the digital age, audiences or users of global social media are still being 
exploited as free labour in relation to producing profitable media content (Fuchs, 2015), 
which echoes the illustration of audience commodity made by Dallas Smythe in the 
1960s. Apart from being exploited in the production relation of the capitalist media 
system, media audiences, though active indeed, are not thoroughly immune to the 
ideological influence of mass media. As a series of audience research conducted by the 
Glasgow Media Group show, there still exists a strong and powerful influence of media. 
And the narrative transparency theory, which is based on Hall’s ‘oppositional code’ 
model assuming that audiences can ‘create their own meanings’, is actually against the 
theoretical origin of reception studies for that the ‘polysemic texts’ of media content 
noticed by Hall does not mean ‘pluralist interpretation’ but rather the ‘preferred 
ideology’ encoded in the programme which can be well ‘fit’ and be accepted’ (Morley, 
1980: 159).  
 
Overall, especially after the global financial crisis in 2008, many scholars are starting to 
revisit and to revise the imperialism paradigm, detecting imperial ideological elements 
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within the globalization discourses. 
 
3.4 A New Paradigm of Critical Audience Research in International Communication 
It is interesting to notice that many academic books or chapters on the subject of 
reviewing the paradigms of a certain aspect of media studies always end with a chapter 
or section looking forwards ‘a new paradigm’ (Alasuutari, 1999; Livingstone, 2003; 
Sparks, 2007; Hardy, 2014). There have been many discussions on what the new 
paradigm of audience research is supposed to be (Alasuutari, 1999; Livingstone, 2003), 
and many on that of international communication studies (Sparks, 2007), but few 
discussions on which direction the transnational audience research is supposed to 
advance. This section is going to discuss the latest trends of the transnational audience 
research of international communication which are key to the formation of the new 
paradigm of audience studies of international communication. 
 
As reviewed in the above sections, audience research within the globalization paradigm 
has improved methodologically, with the development of reception studies and digital 
labour studies. However, it is still facing the dilemma of the dualistic divergence between 
political-economic media studies and Cultural Studies. There seem to be some unspoken 
intellectual barriers, such as ‘the absurd notion that the study of media entertainment 
is separate from the study of political communication’ (Curran, 2010, cited in Curran, 
2014: xix). As introduced in Section 3.2, audience research in political-economic media 
studies focuses mainly on the role of audience, either as the commodity of media 
industry being consumed by advertisers (Smythe, 1960) or the labour being exploited by 
the transnational media conglomerates (Fuchs, 2015). As introduced in Section 3.3, the 
reception research of Cultural Studies, based on the theoretical foundation of 
‘encoding/decoding’, focuses on the connection between the audience’s ideology and 
linguistic texts of media content (Hall, 1974). Therefore, there appears to be a gap of 
academic practices between the two approaches, as Fuchs put it: 
 
‘There are on the one hand critical discourse analysts who analyze ideology as texts, 
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without tending to think about the circumstances that ideology is produced by 
people working in specific contexts under specific conditions (in marketing PR) 
agencies, consultancies, media organizations, press agencies (etc.). On the other 
hand, the sociology of cultural labour tends to analyze working conditions of 
cultural workers without thinking about the ideological effects that many cultural 
products tend to have under capitalist conditions, how ideology influences work, 
and the economy in general. It is, therefore, important to theorize the relationship 
of work on the one hand and culture and ideology on the other hand’ (Fuchs, 2015: 
54). 
 
Despite their terminological, methodological even epistemological differences, ‘both 
media political-economy and Cultural Studies have much to contribute to each other’ 
(Curran, 2014: xix). And the merger of these two approaches can be noticed in the 
development of reception analysis in Cultural Studies. Influenced by anthropological 
studies, the methodology of reception research in Cultural Studies experienced an 
‘ethnographical turn’ in the 1980s. The ‘audience ethnography’ paradigm of reception 
studies concentrates on the usage of media in the audience’s daily life but ‘one does not 
try to explain a reception of a programme by probing into an ‘interpretive community’’ 
(Fish, 1979, cited in Alasuutari, 1999: 5). The emphasis of this paradigm is more on 
depicting the ‘field’ than on the audience’s reception of media content. The 
ethnographic approach mostly focuses on the patterns of audience’s consumption of 
media texts through qualitative contextual description (Silverstone, 1990). However, 
many scholars argued that audiences should not be excluded from the media discourse, 
as ‘media audiences are shifting constellations, located within varying multiple 
discourses which are never entirely outside of the media discourse themselves’ 
(Grossberg, 1988: 386). Therefore, the new paradigm of reception studies advocates a 
return from ‘field’ to ‘media,' from ‘media consumption’ to ‘audience interpretation.’ 
However, different from the uses and gratifications paradigm, the new agenda pays more 
attention to the sociology of the media system then to the psychology of audience 




‘One does not necessarily abandon ethnographic case studies of audiences or 
analyses of individual programmes, but the main focus is not restricted to finding 
out about the reception or ‘reading’ of a programme by a particular audience. 
Rather, the objective is to get a grasp of our contemporary ‘media culture’, 
particularly as it can be seen in the role of the media in everyday life, both as a topic 
and as an activity structured by and structuring the discourses within which it is 
discussed’ (Alasuutari, 1999: 6). 
 
To put the audience back into the bigger picture of contemporary culture is to reconsider 
the dialectical intercourse between the audience and media discourse conditioned by 
the social-economic structure. This review once again draws people’s attention on the 
formation of audience’s ideology which has been neglected in the field of media studies 
(Downey, Titley, and Toynbee, 2014: 2). In the increasing wave of the globalized media 
industry, it is clear that the hegemonic power of the media is still very influential. There 
is evidence  
 
‘… emerging in the Middle East about the important role of media PR in the “Project 
for the New American Century” now installed at the center of American foreign 
policy by the “neo-conservatives” in the White House – including the importance of 
American government-funded propaganda channels such as al-Hurra even if, again, 
its viewers do not always consume and interpret it in the ways that the U.S. 
government would wish’ (Morley, 2006: 105). 
 
Accordingly, an increasing number of researchers are discussing the role of the 
transnational social media, such as Twitter and Facebook which originated in the US, in 
the revolutions in the Middle East (Gerbaudo, 2012; Howard, et al., 2011; Khondker, 
2011). And the globalization of transnational media content makes people rethink what 
the ‘active audience’ actually means. It has been argued that the ideal model of the 
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global ‘public sphere’ is unlikely to happen because of the fact that the global media 
industry is closely interlinked to the global political-economic structure, and it is 
impossible for the media to operate impartially and fairly when the bigger picture of 
global reality is still suffering from political-economic hierarchy (Sparks, 2004: 145). No 
matter how transparent the narratives of media are theoretically supposed to be, or how 
active the local audiences really are, ‘it is still mainly North American programmes that 
people are busily ‘reinterpreting’ (Morley, 2006: 105). And even though the new global 
powers are rising, such as BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
(Nordenstreng, and Thussu, 2015), the model of the growth of their hegemonic power 
has been found surprisingly similar to that of the dominant Western countries in terms 
of political and economic coercion facilitated by the soft power of transnational media 
(Bond and Garcia, 2015).  
 
Accordingly, there is a trend in international communication studies to revisit the cultural 
imperialism paradigm (Fuchs, 2010b; Sparks, 2012; Nordenstreng, 2013). As Morley put 
it, ‘the fact that Schiller may have been wrong about how audiences consume media 
does not mean that he was wrong about everything else as well’ (Morley, 1994, cited in 
Morley, 2006: 105). However, as many researchers have noticed, the content of the 
cultural imperialism paradigm is not entirely applicable in some Asian countries (Chadha 
and Kavoori, 2000). And with the growing dynamic of the global political-economic 
structure, more studies are expected to be focused on the emerging power of such 
groupings as BRICS. Theoretically, there are still some doubts about the paradigm which 
need to be clarified (Sparks, 2007: 214-5). In the next chapter an attempt is made to 
revisit and re-formulate the cultural imperialism paradigm in the age of globalization.  
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Chapter 4 - The Cultural Imperialism Paradigm 
 
As one of the most important paradigms in the field of international communication 
studies, the ‘imperialism’ paradigm, based on the unequal flows of global media, is still 
applicable and instructive for the issues confronting contemporary global 
communication. As far as this thesis is concerned, understanding the nature of the 
political-economic structure behind the news flows from China to African audiences is 
essential to answering the main research questions. However, although the theories of 
the ‘imperialism’ paradigm are the theoretical foundation of this research, aspects of 
this paradigm remain problematic. Therefore, before the detailed case study on the 
question of Sino-African communication, this chapter reviews this paradigm and its 
problems, from the perspective of its history, theoretical origin and terminology.  
 
4.1 Cultural and Media Imperialism Paradigm 
The 1960s saw surges of anti-capitalist action taking many forms, mostly manifested in 
the global leftist students’ revolutionary movements globally, and these had a 
fundamental link with the wave of global de-colonization (spurred by the ‘Bandung 
Conference’ organized by developing countries in Indonesia in 1955 to signal ‘Third 
World solidarity’ and as precursor for the Non-Aligned movement) and the revival of the 
New Leftism in the 1950s ‘in response to the Suez and Hungary crisis in 1956 and … 
Nuclear Disarmament’ (Dworkin, 1997: 45). It is not surprising then that the emergence 
of the ‘imperialism’ paradigm in the field of international communication studies 
originated at this time, based on a Leninist approach that was articulated in his book, 
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, which summarized and revised the 
imperialism theories developed at the beginning of the 20th century by British economist 
John Hobson and Austrian Marxist Rudolf Hilferding (Lenin, 1917/1999). 
 
In the following decades, the ‘imperialism’ paradigm in the field of international 
communication studies went in and out of favour, according to the political context. 
After the end of the Cold War, in the late 1980s, the ‘imperialism’ paradigm was 
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overtaken by the ‘globalization’ paradigm, which was optimistic about cultural and 
democratic progress along with the expansion of global capitalism, such as the new idea 
of ‘Empire’ developed by Antonio Negri and Micheal Hardt ‘to define the new global 
form of sovereignty, and what they termed ‘the multitude’, as a ‘living alternative that 
grows within Empire’, a type of transnational network of counter-resistance, having the 
potential to bring global democratization’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2004, cited in Thussu, 
2006: 64-5). 
 
In contrast to the initial optimism of the theories of globalization, the evidence is more 
pessimistic. According to journalistic reports, the statistics in 2014 showed that ‘the 
wealthiest 1% will soon own more than the rest of the world’s population’ (BBC, 2015). 
And in the field of international communication, besides the worrying fact that the US 
is still the dominant global exporter of media products, the emerging indigenous and 
regional cultural hegemonies, such as Russianization in Eurasia or Sinicization in Eastern 
Asia, are also rather problematic (Appadurai, 1990; Thussu, 2007).  
 
However, the theories that the ‘imperialism’ paradigm was based on in the 1960s and 
1970s, such as dependency theory or imperialism theory, are now unable to thoroughly 
reflect the dilemmas being encountered today. Therefore, in order to connect theories 
with reality, it is important to revisit the ‘imperialism’ paradigm in this new global arena.  
 
‘Cultural Imperialism’ and ‘Media Imperialism’ are two theories which are frequently 
used as the equivalents of the ‘imperialism’ paradigm. Both of these two conceptions 
are based on the new imperialism theories and the dependency theories with a slightly 
different focus on the research objects. In the book Communication and Cultural 
Domination written by Herbert Schiller (1976: 9) cultural imperialism was widely defined 
as ‘the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system 
and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed 
into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and 
structures of the dominating center of the system’; while Media Imperialism generally 
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refers to ‘the process by which modern communication media have operated to create, 
maintain and expand systems of domination and dependency on a world scale’ (Fejes, 
1981: 281). These two approaches of the ‘imperialism’ paradigm are theoretically 
interlinked, and ‘it is difficult to see how one could theorize media imperialism without 
at least some concept of a wider cultural imperialism’ (Sparks, 2007: 97), which is to say 
that the development of the ‘Media Imperialism’ approach is largely included in that of 
‘Cultural Imperialism’.  
 
4.1.1 Development of the ‘Cultural Imperialism’ Paradigm 
The theory of ‘Cultural Imperialism’ was originally developed by Herbert Schiller, in his 
book Mass Communication and American Empire (1970). In this book, Schiller conducted 
a thorough analysis based on American media institutions and transnational 
corporations in Europe, and his conclusion was that the expansion of the American 
media industry was to serve the imperialist purpose of the US to retain its dominant 
position in the global information flows. In the 1970s, Dallas Smythe also brought up the 
idea of a ‘commodified audience’. Smythe argued that the real products of the 
capitalized media industry feeding on advertisements are not media content but the 
audience. The attention of the media audience is the product that the media industry 
produced and sold to the advertisers (1977). And in his classic book Dependency Road: 
Communications, Capitalism, Consciousness and Canada, he revealed the dependent 
relationship between Canada and America and claimed that Canada had become a 
cultural colony of the US under the impact of transnational corporations (1981). Besides 
the voices from North America, there were many scholars of political economy media 
studies in Europe who were also concerned with the imperialist phenomenon in the 
global media industry. Murdock and Golding accused the privatization of British culture 
industry of dispelling the public interest (Sussman, 1999: 86-87). British media 
sociologist Jeremy Tunstall wrote a classic book The Media are American using as the 
theoretical frame the ‘imperialism’ paradigm (1977). French scholar Mattelart 
conducted much research into Latin America which contributed to the mapping of the 
‘Cultural Imperialism’ theory in the Third World (Mattelart, 1979, 1994, 2000) while 
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many other scholars have contributed significantly to the development of this paradigm 
(Boyd-Barrett, 1977, 2014; Lee, 1980; Smith, 1980). 
 
Generally speaking, the formation of ‘imperialism’ paradigm, in fact, was the reflection 
of Western modernity’s incapability to bring development and equality to the newly 
independent world after the Second World War, and the failure was interpreted and 
asserted in a structural way where developed countries like America deliberately 
created a dominant global system politically and economically, such as the America-
centered international communication networks, in order to keep the underdeveloped 
world under control. Mass media, in this process, helped to form and to reinforce the 
dominant structure (Sparks, 2007: 81-103). This paradigm, different from the previous 
paradigms on the national level, was based on the ‘emphasis on global structure, 
whereby it is precisely the international socio-political system that decisively determines 
the course of development within the sphere of each nation’ (Nordenstreng and Schiller, 
1979: 7).  
 
The ‘imperialism’ paradigm became less prominent after the 1980s as post-modernist 
approaches tended to gain salience in media and communication studies. The paradigm 
was widely accused of ‘being either over-simplistic or out of date’ (Boyd-Barrett, 2014: 
8). Scholars of Cultural Studies argued that the paradigm was unable to see through the 
myth of global cultural inequality because it was itself rooted in the Western-centered 
discourse (Tomlinson, 1991: 04). Others argued that it largely ignored the audiences 
(Sinclair, 1999; Straubhaar, 2007, among others).  
 
4.1.2 Decline of the ‘Cultural Imperialism’ Paradigm 
The decline of the ‘imperialism’ paradigm was mainly caused by two main reasons. The 
first is the impact of political reality: the failure of the ‘New World Information and 
Communication Order (NWICO)’ campaign and the end of the Cold War dramatically 
weakened the opposing power, namely the Soviet Union and the Third World countries 
many of which were supported by the Soviet Union, to counter-balance the imperialist 
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ideology of Americanization (Sparks: 105-25); the second is its weakness on theoretical 
development: ‘yet while at the empirical level there has been much progress dealing 
with the concerns of media imperialism, such progress has not been matched at the 
theoretical level’ (Mosco and Herman, 1979; Subveri, 1979). The weakness of its 
theoretical development has at least two origins. One is that the imperialism’ paradigm 
was too concentrated on the international level of media and cultural flow while 
neglecting the inner structure of individual nations and the role of their national elites 
(Thussu, 2006: 50; Sparks, 2007: 115). The other reason is the misplaced object of 
critique. ‘The core of imperialism is a grossly coercive exercise of economic political and 
military power’ (Sparks, 2007: 212), and it is the media organizations not the culture 
itself represented by the media content that has the power, more or less, to shape the 
mind of the audience. However, the terminology of cultural and media imperialism 
indicates that there exists a specific type of hegemonic culture which can conquer and 
homogenize other cultures. And the culture which was being heavily criticized in the 
decades when ‘imperialism’ paradigm prevailed was American culture. Ironically, the 
conception of American culture also seems a pseudo-proposition because, according to 
Schiller, the diversity of American cultures was also the victim of overwhelming 
commercialization: ‘the failure to challenge commercial culture inside the USA meant 
that the outside world saw only a single ‘American Culture’’ (Schiller, 1970: 147).  
 
Therefore, although there have been many efforts made constantly by the scholars who 
have a firm belief in the ‘imperialism’ paradigm (Schiller, 1991; Boyd-Barrett, 1998, 2006; 
McChesney and Schiller, 2003), the paradigm was increasingly marginalized in 
international communication scholarship. However, in the past decade, the world 
financial crisis that originated in the US and the rising threat posed by the terrorism are 
like a startling warning bell reminding people that the harmonious global age of post-
capitalism has not yet come. Issues such as the wealth gap, inequality, hegemony and 
resistance are again on the global political agenda. Thus the ‘imperialism’ paradigm in 
various disciplines along with Marxism regained its importance. In the field of 
international communication studies, there has been a growing call to revisit the 
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‘imperialism’ paradigm (Fuchs, 2010a, 2010b; Sparks, 2012; Nordenstreng, 2013; Boyd-
Barrett, 2014).  
 
This second wave of ‘imperialism’ paradigm, so far, has some crucial characteristics that 
distinguish it from its predecessor: a) more complicated relations between centre and 
periphery countries and b) the emphasis on the dimension of political economy in the 
process of international communication. The first tendency is in the manifestation of 
the new emerging economies in the global era such as the BRICS with member countries 
of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and such groupings as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Such a situation of multipolar global economic powers, 
to some extent, recomposes the whole repertoire of the international communication. 
The other development in the political-economy approach of global media and culture 
flows is an important theoretical transformation for the whole field of international 
communication, which is to ground this within the frame of Marxist ‘imperialism’ 
theories. As Fuchs put it, ‘media and information do play an important role in new 
imperialism, but they are subsumed under finance capital and the continued importance 
of fossil fuel, which is a resource that motivates imperialist warfare … the imperialist 
character of the media within the new imperialism, but not of the existence of media 
imperialism’ (2010a: 56).  
 
Of course, scholars have different ideas about how to execute their intentions to revise 
the paradigm. Boyd-Barrett prefers to use the term ‘media imperialism’ instead of 
‘cultural imperialism’, in order to ‘focus on the political economy of the communications 
industries’ (2014: 8). Sparks advocates a focus on the competitive relations and the 
resulting cultural exchanges between developed nation-states (2012: 291), and Fuchs 
suggests revisiting Marxism and Leninism to scrutinize the whole theoretical frame of 
‘imperialism’ (2010b: 215). Despites their differences, they all have the common pursuit 
of reframing the ‘imperialism’ paradigm, arguing that the paradigm still retains a great 
deal of analytical and theoretical value. However, there is much work to be done to 
revise and revive the paradigm in order to make it suitable for contemporary discussions 
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on international communication. From the terminological point of view, the ‘cultural 
imperialism’ paradigm is constituted of at least two vital sub-theories which are ‘culture’ 
and ‘imperialism’. Before we look into the development and arguments of ‘cultural 
imperialism’ paradigm in the field of international communication studies, it is 
important to have a clear idea about the content of these two vital concepts.  
 
4.2 ‘Culture’ 
In the field of international communication studies, when scholars tried to explain the 
phenomenon of the proliferating popular cultural or media products of one or a few 
specific countries, they developed a set of theories about dominance and hegemony 
based on empirical researches (Boyd-Barrett, 1977; Burton and Franco 1978; Schiller, 
1970; Smythe, 1981), which are summarized as the ‘Cultural Imperialism Paradigm’. 
However, although the key notion in the paradigm, not many works has been done 
within the context of critical political and economic communication studies to provide a 
systematic and in-depth clarification about how exactly ‘culture’ is defined and used in 
this context. The British scholar of cultural studies, John Tomlinson, set out two general 
definitions of culture in the context of ‘cultural imperialism’: a) a sense of ‘complex 
whole’ of life and b) a sense of ‘signifying practices’ (2002: 6).  
 
In the first, culture exists as a dimension representing a complex totality of life, ‘culture 
permeated the whole social fabric and its role was so pre-eminent and determining that 
it might indeed be confused with life itself’ (UNESCO, 1982: 8, cited in Tomlinson, 1991: 
8-9). In this sense, the fear of cultural homogenization imposed by the ‘imperial’ nations 
and their cultural products, resulting in the dominance of one particular lifestyle, arose 
as one of the critical approaches of ‘cultural imperialism’ (Hamelink, 1983). This kind of 
substitution of culture as life, lacking analysis of the underlying mechanisms of the 
productive relations and social classes in the local context, reduces the critical approach 
of international communication studies to the realist and administrative international 
relationship studies (Melissen, 2005; Wang, 2011). Such distorted focus on the power 
competition between nation-states obscures the real problem of the dominant global 
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capitalist culture. Furthermore, along with the growth of anthropological studies in the 
field of media studies in the past few decades, the definition of culture in the field of 
cultural imperialism studies has become mixed up with that of ‘culturalism’ which is 
ontologically different from Marxism. ‘Culturalism’ refers to the idea that ‘individuals 
are determined by their culture, that these cultures form closed, organic wholes, and 
that the individual is unable to leave his or her own culture but rather can only realize 
him or herself within it’ (Eriksen and Stjernfelt, 2009). But to Marxist scholars, all human 
societies can be diagnosed by base and superstructure underpinned by human labour 
that is universal and cosmopolitan. Therefore, Paula Chakravartty and Yuezhi Zhao have 
advocated a ‘Transcultural Political Economy’ approach towards media studies to break 
such barriers of ontological differences (2008). 
 
In the second definition, the circulation of culture as ‘signifying practices’ is closely 
interlinked with the process which generates discourses because of the semiotic 
interpretation of both from the context of the Cultural Studies about language (Hall, 
1997; Fowler, 2003) and the Foucauldian theories about power (Foucault, 1981; Van Dijk, 
1995, 2003). Though not many research projects have been carried out under the 
theoretical frame of the ‘cultural imperialism’ paradigm, there are a few scholars who 
have dedicated themselves to developing this unique perspective of linguistic 
imperialism. One of those is Robert Philipson and his well-known work Linguistic 
Imperialism (1992). In that research, Philipson tried to explain the dominant situation of 
English in Africa by analyzing the language policies made by the colonial governments 
and by investigating the real situation of linguistic usage in the daily life of African 
audiences (ibid). Different from the scholars of the ‘cultural imperialism’ paradigm who 
used the term ‘culture’ in its first sense, scholars like Philipson have demonstrated 
theories of culture from the linguistic angle. However, the lack of a political-economic 
perspective on the ‘cultural imperialism’ paradigm makes the illustration of the 
phenomenon of dominant culture very vulnerable when it is being criticized for being 
idealistic about the decisive power of culture alone. The irony is that such criticism is the 
very opposite to the essence of ‘cultural imperialism’. 
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Raymond Williams developed a systematic theory about ‘culture’ within the frame of 
Marxism (Williams, 1977: 11-20), though the term ‘culture’ is believed to be as ‘one of 
the two or three most complicated words in the English language’ (Williams, 1983: 87). 
In the book The Long Revolution, Williams set out three definitions of the concept of 
‘culture’: ‘[a] the ‘ideal’, in which culture is a state or process of human perfection, in 
terms of certain absolute or universal values … [b] the ‘documentary’, in which culture 
is the body of intellectual and imaginative work, in which, in a detailed way, human 
thought and experience are variously recorded … [c] the ‘social’ definition of culture, in 
which culture is a description of a particular way of life, which expresses certain 
meanings and values not only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary 
behaviour (Storey, 1998: 48). The ‘social’ definition of culture as the representation of a 
particular way of life implies a theoretical turn of Williams in the early 1960s from 
‘Reformism’ to ‘Marxism’ (del Valle Alcal, 2010: 67).  
 
The 1960s witnessed the emergence of ‘Cultural Studies’ fueled by new-leftism in Britain 
(Steele, 1997, cited in He L., 2010: 59). During the new wave of revisiting Marxism, many 
new-leftist intellectuals, such as Raymond Williams, E.P. Thompson and Richard Hoggart, 
along with many academic journals, such as The New Reasoner, University and Left 
Review and New Left Review, contributed to the revision on the base and superstructure 
model of Marxism, which was later featured as ‘Cultural Marxism’ (He L., 2010: 59). 
‘Cultural Marxism’ redefined the term ‘culture’ as something ordinary rather than elitist 
and claimed its attribute of being a material existence (Dworkin, 1997). In the context 
of ‘Cultural Marxism’, the term ‘culture’ does not represent the idealist metaphysic that 
is opposed to materialism. ‘Culture’ was then no longer equal to the superstructure of 
human mind, it is believed that ‘culture’, as the complex sum of life itself, is decisive in 
the process of shaping and forming the state of human societies (Shu, 2012). ‘Culture’, 
according to the interpretation by Williams, is rather a dialectic process of social practice 
harmonizing both the trajectories of idealism and materialism (Peng and Lü, 2011): ‘to 
see the study of culture as the study of relations between elements in a whole way of 
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life … to replace the formula of base and superstructure with the more active idea of a 
field of mutually if also unevenly determining forces’ (Williams, 2005: 20).  
 
As we can see from above, the redefinition of ‘culture’ by Williams and Cultural Studies 
in the 1960s contributed to the materialist dimension of the critique of cultural 
imperialism on the political and economic realities of global capitalism. However, with 
the changes of time and political realities, such essential critical attributes were 
neglected and the paradigm of cultural imperialism studies endangered by all kinds of 
misunderstandings, mainly on the contradiction between the idealism of the word 
‘culture’ and the materialism of the term ‘imperialism’. The contextual change of the 
word ‘culture’ is part of the reason why the theoretical frame of ‘cultural imperialism’ 
paradigm becomes problematic. When Williams introduced the concept of ‘cultural 
materialism’, the illustration of ‘culture’ as a material existence was to revise economic 
reductionism of a Marxism corrupted by Stalinism. However, in the contemporary world 
which is no longer ‘haunted’ by Stalinism and the radical movements of the secular 
Second International, the idealist revision of the superstructure/base model has become 
more than just modification but rather an inversion of the model. Such inversion brought 
the tendency of the ‘ontology of culture’ which endangers the fundamental 
epistemology of Marxism regarding ‘matter as primary and consciousness as secondary’. 
The theoretical framework of such non-dialectical idealism is rather eclectic and tends 
to interpret the structure of human society as a sealed and closed system. However, such 
eclecticism does not help, if not obstruct, the development of critical and constructive 
perspective on the present capitalist world. On the contrary, it will lead to the illusionary 
thoughts of ‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992) or ‘the end of ideology’ (Bell, 
1960, 1968). Therefore, before we move to the next chapter of arguing an alternative 
approach to rationalize this paradigm, the following sections are aimed to provide a 
systematic review on the dynamics within the theoretical frame of ‘imperialism’. 
 
4.3 Imperialism Studies 
At the end of the 19th century, the growth of capitalism drove a new phase of 
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international colonialism, which led to a redefinition of the concept of ‘imperialism’, 
primarily by Marxist scholars from a political-economy perspective. Therefore, although 
the origin of the vocabulary of ‘imperialism’ can be traced back hundreds of years when 
the European countries started to expand their territories and colonize other continents, 
the widely-accepted meaning of ‘imperialism’ in the contemporary context remains 
largely Marxist. The development of the ‘imperialism’ theory was in clear stages. At the 
beginning of the 20th century, the revision of the term was driven by the global 
communist movement, the ‘Second International’.  
 
4.3.1 Imperialism of the Second International 
A key political leader in the Second International, Rosa Luxemburg first published her 
classic book about imperialism – The Accumulation of Capital in 1913. In this book, along 
with another publication Anti-Critique (1921), which Luxemburg wrote to reply to her 
critics, she argued that ‘capitalism cannot exist in a pure form, but only in conjunction 
with non-capitalist systems’ and ‘competitive pressures drive capitalist firms and 
capitalist states to trade with these ‘outside’ economies and ultimately to break them 
up’ (Brewer, 2001: 58-9). And different from other Marxists who talked about 
‘imperialism’ only from the perspective of power, politics and economy, her 
anthropological sensitivity also made her pay attention to the destructive consequence 
of ‘imperialism’ on the diversity of human cultures and civilizations (Le Blanc, 2010: 165). 
The importance of Luxemburg’s revision on ‘imperialism’ remained undiscovered for a 
few years after her publication of Accumulation of Capital. However, there are critiques 
on her dualist analysis on the structures of ‘capitalism’ and ‘pre-capitalism’, which had 
an influence on the later scholars of ‘Dependency’, ‘World-Systems’ and New 
Imperialism, although the pre-capitalism was then replaced by underdeveloped 
capitalism (He, 2014).   
 
Another critical and controversial figure in the Second International, Karl Kautsky also 
published a work on ‘imperialism’, one year after Luxemburg. In the article ‘Ultra-
Imperialism’ (1914) and also in the book ‘The National State, the Imperialist State and 
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the Alliance of States’ (1963), Kautsky brought up the controversial idea of ‘ultra-
imperialism’ claiming that ‘imperialism’ is not the externalization of financial capitalism 
but industrial capitalism, and ‘imperialism’ does not have to be a particular stage of 
capitalism although capitalism has different developmental phases. The conception of 
‘ultra-imperialism’, according to Kautsky, refers to an ultimate stage of harmony and 
peace when the whole world is fully occupied by capitalism and every country is in 
alliance with each other. Kautsky was heavily accused, by Lenin and Nikolai Bukharin, for 
his reformist and dogmatic stance, and his positive tone about ‘ultra-imperialism’ was 
regarded as the theoretical excuse for the political expansion of Nazi Germany in Europe. 
However, Kautsky’s economic interpretation of ‘imperialism’ as a relatively separate idea 
from ‘colonialism’ was rather inspirational for the proposition of ‘capital imperialism’ in 
the late 20th century (Fu, 2014). 
 
Finally, the most influential work on the revision of ‘imperialism’, in the age of the Second 
International, has to be the pamphlet written by Lenin in 1916, Imperialism: The Highest 
Stage of Capitalism (1999). Theoretically speaking, the content of the pamphlet ‘is slight 
and derives from [Rudolf] Hilferding, [Nikolai] Bukharin and [John] Hobson’ (Brewer, 
2001: 116). However, because of its comprehensive and blended feature, Imperialism: 
The Highest Stage of Capitalism can be rather representative for the mainstream views 
on ‘imperialism’ of the Second International. Lenin was greatly influenced by the 
previous theories on imperialism developed by the three theorists mentioned above. As 
a ‘bourgeois reformist’ economist, Hobson in his 1902 book Imperialism: A Study 
conducted a systematic analysis on the emergence of the domestic monopolistic 
phenomenon which leads to the consequence of imperialist expansion (Lenin, 1999: 25). 
In Hobson’s opinion, the concentration and over-accumulation of capital within one 
capitalist country contribute to the crisis of under-consumption in the domestic market 
and will inevitably lead to the expansion of the country’s capitalist market into the non-
capitalist area of the world (Brewer, 1990: 73).  
 
Hilferding, on the other hand, in his 1910 work Finance Capital, gave ‘a very valuable 
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theoretical analysis of the ‘latest phase of capitalist development’’ (Lenin, 1999: 33). The 
conception of ‘finance capital’ defined by Hilferding as the ‘banking capital invested in 
industry and controlling it either directly or indirectly’ (Ernest and Ernest, 1966), plays 
the crucial role in the process of one capitalist economy’s global expansion as the 
‘finance capital’ decides the necessity of exploring the external markets for the domestic 
industries. In contrast, Bukharin brought up a new perspective from the angle of global 
level. He emphasized on the international competition between capitalist rivalries and 
analyzed the mechanism of how the domestic concentration of capital would influence 
such global competition (Brewer, 1990: 110-34). In summary, Lenin redefined 
‘imperialism’ in terms of ‘monopoly capitalism’ (Lenin, 1999: 119): ‘The development of 
capitalism led to the formation of giant monopolies. The national borders are too narrow 
for the growth of these industries, and they are compelled to constantly acquire new 
markets, new sources of raw material, and new outlets for investment outside the ‘home’ 
nation’ (Jones, 2005).  
 
4.3.2 Dependency Theory 
The Dependency theory emerged in the late 1950s, alongside the process of 
decolonization in Africa and Asia, arising from the phenomenon of the dependency 
relationship between developed countries and underdeveloped countries. This theory 
was set out first by Hans Singer and then Raul Prebisch known as the ‘Prebisch-Singer 
Thesis’ and increasing attention was paid to it by various intellectual and public figures, 
especially in the developing world. In 1957, American Marxist economist Paul Baran 
published The Political Economy of Growth (1973), where he analyzed the then global 
economic situation from the angle of Marxist economics and aroused the interest in 
reviving the imperialism theories by saying that ‘There is hardly any need to stress that 
such independence and autonomy [of the underdeveloped countries] are little more 
than shame as long as the countries in question remain economic appendages of the 
advanced capitalist countries and as long as their governments depend for survival on 
the pleasure of their foreign patrons’ (Baran, 1973: 123). Baran’s Marxist point of view 
on the dominant global economy of America was soon picked up by the scholars from 
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the ‘third world’. And in 1976, the establishment of Instituto Latinoamericano de 
Estudios (ILET), ‘whose principal research interest was the study of transnational media 
business’, provided a new intellectual energy to the ‘Dependency’ theory (Thussu, 2007: 
46). In summary, ‘Dependency’ theory has three critical arguments: ‘a) the (capitalist) 
world system is divided into a centre and a periphery; b) the societies of the periphery 
are ‘dependent’, while those of the centre are not; c) dependency restricts or distorts 
development in the periphery in some harmful way’ (Brewer, 2001: 196).  
 
Generally speaking, there were three major traditions within the ‘Dependency’ 
paradigm. First was the structuralism tradition developed by the institution of Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) established in 1948. Its main scholars were Osvaldo 
Sunkel and Celso Furtado who focused on the structural inequality between Latin 
America and the US in terms of the unbalanced development of certain industries and 
technologies, and they believed that such structures of centre and periphery were 
inevitable, even indispensable for the development of human society as a whole (Yuan, 
1990: 1-11). The second is the Marxist tradition developed by scholars such as Andre 
Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and Immanuel Wallerstein (who were also the main 
contributors to the ‘world-systems’ theory). Marxist scholars remained critical of the 
dominant structure of the global economy and radical ones such as Frank believed that 
the only political solution was the direct revolution against the capitalism because they 
saw the existence of capitalism as the core cause for all the underdevelopment and as 
long as capitalism exists the problem of underdevelopment would never be solved (Yan, 
2003: 16-7). The third tradition was the stance between Structuralism and Marxism and 
is termed centrism in this research. Centrist scholars, such as Fernando Cardoso, Octacio 
Ianni and Florestan Fernandes, observed and interpreted the dependent phenomenon 
from the perspective of sociology. They disagreed with Marxists on the point that an 
underdeveloped area such as Latin America was being merely exploited and excluded by 
the global capitalist system. On the contrary, they believed that capitalism was 
happening in the underdeveloped area as well and they saw the structural dominance 
of global economy as something rather dynamic and open than closed and sealed 
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(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). 
 
The ‘Dependency’ theory was once the mainstream paradigm in the global academic 
world, especially in the Southern regions. But there were also many criticisms of it. In 
summary, 
 
‘Criticisms leveled against the dependency framework include allegations that it is 
nothing more than political propaganda, is tautological, and poorly conceptualized. 
Dependency is charged with being poorly defined, based on insufficient evidence, 
and inconclusive. Dependency theorists have also been charged with ignoring 
dependency relationships between socialist ‘metropoles’ and ‘satellites’. 
Furthermore, although dependency is essentially grounded in the Marxist paradigm, 
noted scholars have criticized dependency for its inconsistency with Marx’. (Farmer, 
1999: 25)  
 
Among all those criticisms, there was one that was particularly fatal for the further 
development of this paradigm, arguing that it lacked a systematic analysis on the intra-
structures of the dependency phenomenon (Roxborough, 1979). And it is because of its 
omittance of ‘the role of the national elites, especially in the developing world’, the 
‘Dependency’ paradigm failed to provide a constructive prescription for the social 
changes in the Third World (Thussu, 2007: 50). 
 
4.3.3 Structural Theory of Imperialism 
Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung published his highly regarded article about structural 
imperialism in 1971. In ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’, he conducted a systematic 
and comprehensive study on the issue of global dominance in almost every aspect, 
including economics, international relations, communication, science and technology, 
education and psychology (1971: 87). Galtung raised the idea of the two dimensions of 
imperialist structures as ‘vertical’ and ‘feudal’: ‘the ‘vertical’ interaction principle 
maintains that relationships are asymmetrical; that the flow of power is from the more 
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developed state to the less developed state while the benefits of the system flow 
upwards from the less developed states to the centre states. The ‘feudal’ interaction 
principle states that there ‘is interaction along the spokes, from the periphery to the 
centre hub; but not along the rim, from one periphery nation to another’’ (ibid: 89). To 
constructively explain the ‘vertical’ interaction between centre and periphery, Galtung 
developed the unique intra-structural perspective by bringing up the conceptions of 
‘centre of the centre’, ‘periphery of the centre’, ‘centre of the periphery’ and the 
‘periphery of the periphery’. Accordingly, he provided an intra-structural definition 
about ‘Imperialism’: ‘(1) there is harmony of interest between the centre in the Centre 
nation and the centre in the Periphery nation, (2) there is more disharmony of interest 
within the Periphery nation than within the Centre nations, (3) there is disharmony of 
interest between the periphery in the Centre nation and the periphery in the Periphery 
nation’ (Galtung, 1971: 83). The first feature of Galtung’s ‘imperialism’ is insightful on 
revealing the intra-structural connection between centre and periphery countries. And 
the visual look of this ‘harmony of interest’ is illustrated in Figure 3.5.  
 
Galtung depicted three phases in the history of imperialism which are termed 
‘Colonialism’, ‘Neo-Colonialism’ and ‘Neo-neo-colonialism’. In the first phase of 
imperialism – ‘colonialism’, the form of such imperialism is ‘occupation’: ‘[centre of 
Periphery] physically consists of [centre of Centre] who engage in occupation’; in the 
second stage of ‘Neo-Colonialism’, which, Galtung argued, was the stage that the world 
was experiencing in the 1970s, the form of imperialism is ‘organization’: ‘[centre of 
Centre] interacts with [centre of Periphery] via the medium of international 
organizations’; finally, Galtung predicted that in the third stage of imperialism – ‘Neo-
neo-Colonialism’, ‘communication’ will be the form: ‘[centre of Centre] interacts with 
[centre of Periphery] via international communication’ (ibid: 94). Also, Galtung 
concluded that there are five types of imperialism which are ‘economic’, ‘political’, 
‘military’, ‘communication’ and ‘cultural’ (ibid: 91). When illustrating the concept of 
‘communication imperialism’, Galtung was specific on the issue of the agenda-setting 
function of international news flow: ‘the core’s definition of news will be reflected in the 
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news in the peripheral nation … Information is transferred to the Southern elite in such 
a way that primary importance is attached to the same issues the developed world sees 
as important. The identity of interests between the centre of the centre and the centre 
of the periphery greatly influences the acceptance of an international agenda’ (Thussu, 
2007: 51).  
 
The influence of the theory of ‘structural imperialism’ from the critical perspective of 
political economy, along with the article ‘The Structure of Foreign News’ co-written by 
Johan Galtung and Mari Holmboein in 1965, was largely seen in the field of international 
communication studies in research on the agenda-setting function of international news 
flow. Therefore, most of the criticisms were on the topic of international news studies. 
This structural paradigm was accused of being inadequate in terms of its empirical object 
‘since it is not at all clear what kind of social process in the real world is being uncovered 
by the analytic use of the news factors’ (Hjavard, 2002: 94), and its methodology was 
questioned as well for lack of sufficient comparative cases of both extra-media and intra-
media (Rosengren, 1974: 146). And, finally, it was criticized on the grounds that the 
theory was based more on hypothesis and assumptions rather than empirical analysis, 
which led to contradictory hypotheses based on the same empirical data, and such a 
method was ‘unsuited for guiding research that aims at understanding the differences, 
variations, and historical developments in international news’ (Hjavard, 2002: 95). In 
addition, this paradigm was also unable to depict the whole picture of the dynamic 
global system, for its dichotomy of centre and periphery obscures the interesting 
existence of the countries in between which were termed as ‘Semi-periphery’ in the 
world-systems theory. However, ‘world-systems’ theory fills the theoretical gap on the 
subject of ‘Semi-periphery’ countries. 
 
4.3.4 World-Systems Theory 
In the same period of time in the 1970s, there was another school of thought named 
‘World-systems’ theory, which is sometimes regarded as the adaptation of ‘Dependency’ 
theory. Generally speaking, ‘there are three major intellectual building blocks of world-
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systems theory: the Annales School, Marxism, and dependency theory’ (Martinez Vela, 
2001: 2). As one of the key figures, Immanuel Wallerstein contributed greatly to the 
historical approach of ‘world-systems’ theory, under the influence of the Annales School 
mainly by Fernand Braudel (ibid: 3). The - methodological breakthroughs made by 
Wallerstein are its ‘focus on geo-ecological regions as units of analysis … attention to 
rural history, and reliance on empirical materials …’ (ibid: 3). The theoretical paradigm 
was also strongly influenced by the Marxist scholars from ‘Dependency’ theory tradition, 
such as Andre Gunder-Frank, Samir Amin and Giovanni Arrighi.  
 
Gunder-Frank developed the idea of a ‘metropolis - satellite’ structure of the global 
capitalist system, within which the periphery countries are dependent on the centre 
ones for economic development, and the phenomenon is called ‘the development of 
underdevelopment’, for that the structure-setting of the development in the periphery 
is to remain the periphery countries in the position of periphery so the centre countries 
can be centre (Brewer, 2001: 164). Samir Amin further explained the mechanism – the 
accumulation of capital of the centre countries – behind unequal global development, 
and he argued that: 
 
‘…the pattern of international specialization is determined by absolute cost levels 
(not by comparative advantage, as Ricardo thought), that cost levels depend on 
productivity and on wages … the centre developed capitalism earlier … got a huge 
lead in productivity … [when] wages were held down … This established a pattern of 
unequal specialization … After a certain stage of development, wages started to rise 
at the centre, while massive unemployment and the persistence of pre-capitalist 
modes of production held wages down in the periphery’ (ibid: 183).  
 
Giovanni Arrighi, known for the classic work on Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: 
A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia (1970), on the 
primitive accumulation in tropical Africa - provided a supplement to the Marxist 
approach of ‘world-systems’ theory in explaining the economy of the underdeveloped 
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world (ibid: 241-5).  
 
In summary, ‘a world-system is what Wallerstein terms a ‘world-economy’, integrated 
through the market rather than a political centre, in which two or more regions are 
interdependent with respect to necessities like food, fuel, and protection, and two or 
more polities compete for domination without the emergence of one single center 
forever’ (Goldfrank, 2000 cited in Martinez-Vela, 2001: 3). And the advancement of 
‘World-systems’ theory compared to ‘Dependency’ theory lies in two aspects: a) one is 
its Marxist economic perspective on the intra-structural relation and the indigenous 
situation; b) the other is its refining structure of the global system as three tiers of states: 
‘the core, the semi-periphery and the periphery’ (Brewer, 2001: 176). The recognition of 
the existence of ‘semi-periphery’ countries casts a light on the dynamic and diverse 
nature of the development of nation-states for that ‘semi-periphery states acts as a 
buffer zone between core and periphery, and have a mix of the kinds of activities and 
institutions that exist on them’ (Skocpol, 1977, cited in Martinez-Vela, 2001: 4).  
 
4.3.5 New Imperialism 
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, discussions about ‘imperialism’ tended to rise 
once again. Such a tendency was mainly caused by the end of the Cold War. In the 
following decades, the free market neoliberalism promoted by the super power of the 
US became predominant. However, in the late 1990s and early 21st century, the negative 
consequences of the neoliberalism of economics and politics started to emerge with 
such disastrous events as the South Eastern Asian economic crisis and extremism in the 
Middle East. And, accordingly, there were growing calls for revisiting ‘imperialism’ 
theories. A new political economy theory about the global flows of money and power 
was thus created, which is termed ‘new imperialism’ to distinguish it from, but also refers 
to the earlier Marxist theory of ‘imperialism’.  
 
Although the establishment of the ‘new imperialism’ theory was to respond to the reality 
in the 21st century, the embryonic form of ‘new imperialism’ was initially generated in 
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the 1950s when the world was still recovering from the horrors of the Second World War. 
In1951, German scholar Hannah Arendt published one of her most prestigious books 
The Origins of Totalitarianism (1973), in which she illustrated her idea about imperialism 
as the initial stage of totalitarianism. It is fair to say that Arendt was one of the earliest 
scholars who rediscovered and revived the value of Luxemburg’s work on ‘imperialism’. 
Thus, Arendt held a similar opinion towards ‘imperialism’ as a global capitalist system 
which is fed on the existence of non-capitalist systems, and both Arendt and Luxemburg 
believed that primitive accumulation happens not only at the beginning stage of 
capitalism but also throughout the whole process of the development of capitalism (Sun, 
2007). One insightful point Arendt provided is that she saw Soviet Union and the US as 
the new empires in the post-war age, and she predicted a new wave of a global scramble 
for territory and resources (Arendt, 1982: XIV-XV). However, Arendt’s illustration of 
‘imperialism’ focused exclusively on nation-states and her concentration was mainly on 
European countries rather than the new economic powers such as the US. Therefore, 
her contribution to the Marxist theory of ‘imperialism’ was merely to revitalize 
Luxemburg rather to bring up an innovative economic interpretation of the theory.  
 
In the very beginning of 21st century, the publication of the book ‘Empire’ (2000) by 
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt provoked fierce arguments about the topic of 
‘imperialism’ in the contemporary world. Žižek even regarded this book as an effort 
made to reclaim the The Communist Manifesto in the 21st century (2001). In this book, 
Hardt and Negri describe the process of global capitalism ‘as the transition from the 
nation-state to global Empire … in which hybrid masses of scattered identities developed’. 
Within this global capitalist system, the sovereignty of nation-states is declining while 
the sovereignty in the new form of global Empire has actually increased as: ‘Empire 
establishes no territory center of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. 
It is a decentered and de-territorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates 
the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xi-
xiii). However, different from many other leftist thinkers ‘who are struggling to limit the 
destructive powers of globalization and to rescue (what there is left to rescue) the 
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welfare state’ (Zizek, 2001), Hardt and Negri hold a rather positive attitude towards the 
process of globalization: ‘the passage to Empire and its processes of globalization offer 
new possibilities to the forces of liberation’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xv). And they see 
the alternatives to global capitalism lie beyond the area of economics: ‘we do not 
consider capital to be the exclusive axis of domination, and, hence, overthrowing 
capitalist rule is not, in our view, the only mode of revolutionary activity’ (Hardt, Negri 
and Harvey, 2009: 212-3). They believed in the power of resisting and fighting for global 
citizenship, the restraints on the lowest income and the right to redistribute instruments 
of production (Žižek, 2001). Therefore, although they claimed themselves as inheriting 
the very orthodoxy of Marxism, there are criticisms accusing them of abandoning 
‘Marx’s crucial insights’ on the decisive role of economics (Hardt, Negri and Harvey, 2009: 
211).  
 
On the other hand, another major theorist on ‘new imperialism’ David Harvey is a firm 
advocator of the determining role of capital. Different from the above theorists whose 
illustrations on the mechanism of ‘imperialism’ or ‘Empire’ were rather macro and 
general, Harvey followed the authentic Marxist tradition of focusing on economics as 
the key answer to questions. His interpretation of neoliberalism as ‘accumulation of 
dispossession’ is regarded as the renaissance of the idea of ‘primitive accumulation’ 
argued by Luxemburg as the cause for imperialism. But Harvey disagreed with 
Luxemburg that the economic crisis of capitalism is the result of under-consumption, 
instead, he sees over-accumulation of capital as not only the cause for the economic 
crisis of the capitalist system but also the motivation for territorial expansion or what 
Harvey himself called ‘spatial fix’ (2001). Generally speaking, Harvey provides a neo-
Marxist way of perceiving the contemporary global capitalist system as ‘capital 
imperialism’. His illustration is also based on the Marxist conceptions of the 
accumulation of surplus value. The accumulation of capital value will, at a certain degree, 
become a crisis if it fails to find an outlet for the capital to be reproduced, and 
accordingly the profit rate will decline. That is when the crisis of over-accumulation 
happens. To overcome the crisis, the capitalist system needs the labour and resources 
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from ‘outside’ to stimulate the system and to create continued accumulation of capital, 
which Harvey called ‘accumulation of dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003: 141).  
 
In the opinion of Harvey, there are three pathways that should be followed: a) the 
‘privatization’ of public assets can largely incorporate the commons into the capitalist 
system (Harvey, 2005: 181), b) the import of cheap material resources from the 
underdeveloped countries can increase the profit rate again by lowering the production 
costs and enhancing the surplus value (ibid: 150) and c) ‘devaluation of existing capital 
assets and labour power’ through regulations and policies can also reboot the 
accumulating machine of capital. Such solutions contribute to the consequence of 
‘spatial fix’: ‘a geographical reconstructing of capitalist activity’ (Harvey, 2001: 24). 
Harvey’s illustration is, however, criticized for ‘lack of appreciation of the structural 
nature of the centre-periphery contradiction in historical capitalism’ (Mayo, Yeros and 
Jha, 2012: 188), and Harvey is accused of being West-centrist, especially in his book The 
Condition of Postmodernity, in which he sees the solutions to the global crisis and the 
conditions to achieve postmodernism issues for the Western societies to adopt while 
neglecting the influence of the ‘outside’ systems such as socialist countries in shaping 
the structure of the West (Yan H., 2015). 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
From the above illustrations about the origins and the historical development of the 
terms in the ‘cultural imperialism’ paradigm, certain problems are therefore revealed. 
Firstly, the critical approach deployed by the ‘cultural imperialism’ paradigm was 
influenced by the emergence of ‘cultural Marxism’ which defines ‘culture’ as the total 
process of social life itself. Under the impact of theoretical changes in the field of 
international communication studies and changes in political realities, the ‘cultural 
imperialism’ paradigm gradually developed in two very different directions that meant 
neither of them inherited the genuine critique of the original paradigm. On the one hand, 
reinforced by the political and economic dimension of ‘imperialism’ critique, there is a 
school of ‘cultural imperialism’ studies, as reviewed in Chapter 3, that tends to analyze 
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the global cultural dominance from the perspective of economics. This approach is 
endangered by the economic reductionism which formalizes everything as a component 
of production. On the other hand, the ‘cultural imperialism’ paradigm is also endangered 
by ‘culturalism’ studies, which regard each culture as an isolated world and global 
cultural dominance as the victory of one or few cultures of certain civilizations. Thus, 
‘cultural imperialism’ became a critique based on realist international relations arguing 
which state is stronger than the other instead of focusing on the real crisis of the global 
economic system of capitalism, the problem about the modernization of human society. 
 
What needs to be clarified here is that this PhD research is not aimed to draw a line 
between Cultural Studies and political economy studies in the field of mass 
communication, but to try to deploy the epistemology of historical dialectic materialism 
and apply it to the specific topic in the studies of international communication. To 
achieve that, it is important to clarify the influence of specific historical realities on the 
generation of certain thoughts and theories. Nevertheless, besides dialecticism, what 
defines Marxism from its previous philosophical thoughts about subject and object is 
that Marxism, at least in the context produced by Marx himself, recognizes the reifying 
or alienating effect of objects towards subjects through labour, which is regarded as the 
significant supplement to Hegelianism (Yi, 1984: 14). To put it in the briefest way, quoting 
the original words from Marx, ‘it is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness’ (1859). 
Thus, to deconstruct the idealist tendency of ‘culturalism’ and to retain the dialectical 
materialist characteristics of critical ‘imperialism’ paradigm in the field of international 
communication, a different but relevant concept to replace ‘culture’ is needed to cast a 




Chapter 5 - From ‘Cultural’ to ‘Ideological’ 
 
In Chapter 4, it was argued that the ‘cultural imperialism’ paradigm of international 
communication and media studies requires some revision, especially in relation to the 
concept of ‘culture’. This chapter will contribute to this revision by introducing the 
concept of ‘ideology’ as a substitute for ‘culture’ and to revisit the cultural imperialism 
paradigm from culturalism which is ontologically divergent with the critical approach of 
an imperialism paradigm. Therefore, in Section 5.1, the difference between culture and 
ideology in the context of Marxism studies is briefly reviewed. Since the concept of 
‘ideology’ is being used as an alternative, it is necessary to have an overview of the 
theoretical development of this term. Thus Section 5.2 is a general review of the concept 
of ‘ideology’, and Section 5.2.4 introduces the definition of this concept based on the 
specific context of this research. Section 5.3 concludes the main argument of this 
chapter of moving from a ‘cultural’ to an ‘ideological’ perspective.  
 
5.1 ‘Culture’ and ‘Ideology’ 
In Section 4.2, the definition of ‘culture’ in the Marxist context of Cultural Studies in 
Britain was introduced. Therefore, this section aims to point out the difference between 
the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘ideology’ and how ‘ideology’ can substitute for ‘culture’ to 
provide critical studies of the imperialism paradigm with an alternative approach. 
According to Griffen, ‘The basis of the convergence between the two terms under 
examination is that they both embrace non-material aspects of human existence relating 
to the subjective realm of ideas, values, world-views, and cosmologies, the very stuff of 
human history’ (2006: 79). Given these similarities and importance to the discussion of 
the imperialism paradigm, a differentiation between the two concepts is clearly needed 
here.  
 
The most notable linking of the meanings of the two words ‘culture’ and ‘ideology’ 
within the Marxist discourse probably first appeared in the context of Gramsci and his 
coining of the term ‘cultural hegemony’. Gramsci ‘did not apply “ideology” to the Marxist 
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struggle since it clearly retained its connotations of false consciousness and 
manipulation – if the socialist struggle to transcend the capitalist phase of historical 
development was to be successful’ (Griffin, 2006: 87-8). Although Gramsci did not use 
the word ‘ideology’ directly to describe what he called ‘organic consent’, his theory on 
hegemony implies an ‘ideological unity between the bottom and the top, between the 
‘simple’ and the ‘intellectual’’ (Gramsci, 1971: 328-9). The general definition of ideology 
developed by Gramsci contributed to the overlap of the meanings of the two words and 
ambiguity in the meanings of ‘culture’ and ‘ideology’ remains in the works of the later 
scholars who were directly or indirectly influenced by him. Therefore, either in the camp 
of general theories or post-Marxist theories, there has not been much effort to 
systematically clarify the two words. Chapter 4 also discussed how culture was redefined 
in the wave of Cultural Studies mainly initiated by Raymond Williams in the 1950s and 
onward. In Culture and Society, 1780-1950, Williams (1958, xviii) defined culture as ‘a 
whole way of life’, ‘a mode to interpret all our common experience’, and, in this new 
interpretation, to change it. A ‘culture is not only a body of intellectual and imaginative 
work; it is also and essentially a whole way of life’’ (Williams, 1958, 325). In Keywords, 
Williams, according to his copious references to the word ‘culture’, noticed that ‘It is 
especially interesting that in archaeology and in cultural anthropology the reference to 
culture, or a culture, is primarily to material production’ (1983: 91). 
 
Stuart Hall provided a semiotic interpretation of culture, referring to a system of 
meanings produced through the circulation of language: ‘In fact, each of us probably 
does understand and interpret the world in a unique and individual way. However, we 
are able to communicate because we share broadly the same conceptual maps and thus 
make sense of or interpret the world in similar ways’. Indeed, this is what we mean when 
we say we ‘belong to the same culture’ … that is why ‘culture’ is sometimes defined in 
terms of ‘shared meanings or shared conceptual maps’ (Hall, 1997: 4; also see Du Gay et 
al., 1997). In the words of the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, the concept of 
culture ‘denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a 
system of inherited concepts expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men 
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communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life’ 
(1973: 89). While, in Marxism and Literature, Raymond Williams summarized three 
common versions of ‘ideology’ in the context of Marxism: ‘(i) a system of beliefs 
characteristic of a particular class or group; (ii) a system of illusory beliefs – false ideas 
or false consciousness – which can be contrasted with true or scientific knowledge; (iii) 
the general process of the production of meanings and ideas’ (1977: 55). The substance 
of the third is where the convergence of the two terms ‘ideology’ and ‘culture’ originates. 
 
Both culture and ideology in the manifestation of ‘language, ideas, values, beliefs, 
stories, discourse and so on’ should not be interpreted as the ‘superstructure 
independent from an economic base’ but rather something material themselves 
(McGuigan and Moran, 2014, cited in Fuchs, 2015: 12), because they are all created 
through the material production: ‘ruling classes would produce castles, palaces, 
churches, prisons, workhouses, schools, weapons, a controlled press, etc.’ (Williams, 
1977: 93). And their materialist essence as the representative of historical specificity 
makes it undeniable that ‘both ideology and culture are able to act as complementary, 
interconnected historical forces which are, according to specific historical contexts, 
either negative or positive, either replicable or innovatory, and hence either repressive 
or emancipatory’ (Griffin, 2006: 91). But clearly, there is an absolute difference between 
these two concepts. 
 
According to Griffin, the difference between culture and ideology is mostly about the 
positive or negative meanings the words represent: 
 
‘Their tendency to pull in different directions is reflected in their etymology. 
Whereas the relatively recent neologism ‘ideology’ was born of Destutt de Tracy’s 
liberal project of applying the Enlightenment tradition of analysis to the scientific 
study and demystification of ideas and systems of thought, ‘culture’ boasts a much 
more illustrious etymological heritage which lends it connotations of healthy 
organic growth and grandiose civilizing achievement. As a result the positive aura 
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that ideology can acquire when associated with culture as a force for distinctively 
human realms of achievement can easily give way to a negative one closer to the 
demystifying thrust of its etymology’ (Griffin, 2006: 86-7).  
 
But the real difference that enables the substitution of ‘culture’ by ‘ideology’ is their 
relationship with the economic base. As explained in Section 4.2 and above, the concept 
of ‘culture’ in the context of cultural studies and critiques of cultural imperialism in the 
age of Raymond Williams refers to the totality of life itself – the combination of both 
superstructure and economic base. That explains why culture has a materialist attribute. 
Instead, the relationship between ideology and the economic base is not inclusive but 
has a dialectical co-existence. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, ideology is the concrete 
manifestation of the superstructure which is conditioning and conditioned by the 
economic base of the whole social structure; culture, on the other hand, refers to the 
total process of social life which includes both parts of superstructure and economic 
base. And the reason to replace the concept of ‘culture’ with ‘ideology’ in the field of 





















As we have seen in Section 4.2 in the last chapter, the theoretical critiques of cultural 
imperialism paradigms are mainly about how to differentiate or rationalize the 
divergent ontologies that the two concepts ‘culture’ and ‘imperialism’ stand for. The 
former, after a series of changes in the field of critical media studies, is mostly 
understood from the perspective of ‘culturalism’, while the latter is generally criticized 
as the economic reductionism that resulted from the Stalinism of the Soviet Union. In 
order to go back to the authentic critique of the paradigm and revive the spirit of cultural 
Marxism, we should pay more attention to the historical context of the concepts we use 
to inform critical studies of the imperialism paradigm. Therefore, the advantage of the 
concept ‘ideology’, compared to the problematic term ‘culture’, is due to its clear stance 
of being the manifestation of superstructure. At least in this research, which is focused 
on the reception of television audiences, the research subject is the human mind. Indeed, 
the economic base is of vital importance in terms of forging and conditioning the human 
mind, which is also why the last chapter reviewed the various theories of imperialism 
studies, but the eternal question is about how the abstract subjectivities of these 
audiences respond to the environment. Moreover, as the following review of the 
concept of ‘ideology’ shows, the term is more likely to remain the critical spirit of the 
paradigm and resonate with the theoretical framework of imperialism studies. Given the 
importance to the argument of the concept ‘ideology’, it is necessary to review how it is 
defined in the discourse of Marxist political and economic studies.  
 
5.2 Marxist Theories of Ideology 
Most studies defining ‘ideology’ start by introducing Antoine Destutt de Tracey, who in 
1796 established the discipline of the ‘natural science of ideas’, which is supposed to be 
the origin of the theory of ‘ideology’ (Baradat, 2010; Eagleton, 1991; Rehmann, 2013; 
Thompson, 2005; Williams, 1977). His materialist epistemology led Tracey to believe 
that human ideas arose from stimulation by material objects (Baradat, 2010: 007), thus 
creating a material basis for ideology. The original context of this natural science was 
rather critical of idealist metaphysics such as religion (Rehmann, 2013: 16). However, 
because of political competition, Napoleon later devalued the theory of ideology as a 
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‘shadowy metaphysics’ halting revolutionary behaviors (ibid: 19-22). In contrast to the 
idealism of metaphysics, the term ‘ideology’ was initially introduced as representing the 
‘natural science of ideas’ which involved many abstract concepts from different 
disciplines such as psychology and linguistics (Williams, 1977: 57). Nevertheless, since 
the latter half of the 19th century, the widely accepted view of ideology was of its Marxist 
definitions and, in those definitions, ideology was generally interpreted as the 
mechanism of the conscious system of the human mind driven by the political-economic 
structure of human society. 
 
Generally speaking, there are two theoretical camps within the framework of Marxism: 
critical and general (Thompson, 1984: 3-4). However, the theories of some scholars 
cannot be easily categorized into these two camps. The thoughts enunciated in their 
theories have characteristics from both sides. It may sound unusual to categorize all 
theorists who have made great contributions to the theoretical development of 
‘ideology’ as Marxist scholars, but it is noticeable that most of their theories have a 
strong link with Marxism. But all these theories are based on the common ground of 
criticism on the ‘specularity /spectrality’ of capitalism (Griffin, 2006: 88). 
 
5.2.1 Critical Theories of Ideology 
The original critique of ideology can be found in the context of The German Ideology co-
written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: ‘consciousness can never be anything else 
than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their life-process’. If in all ideology 
men and their circumstances appear upside down as in a ‘camera obscura’, this 
phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of 
objects on the retina does from their physical life-process’ (1846: 14, cited in Williams, 
1977: 58). The metaphor of ‘camera obsucra’ indicates that to Marx and Engels ‘ideology’ 
became a polemical nickname for kinds of thinking which neglected or ignored the 
material social process’ (ibid). In this thinking, ‘ideology’ is perceived as an illusory belief 
system distorting and mystifying reality which is made up by the bourgeoisie in order to 
legitimize their dominance, and is widely regarded as the equivalent to ‘false 
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consciousness’ in the critical Marxist context. In general, ideology was regarded by Marx 
and Engels as ‘a projection of an imaginary world of the subjects’ with mystified essence 
in a distorted form of reality’ (EI Hassen, 1986: 50), which reflects the core principle of 
the historical dialectical materialist epistemology that Marx hold towards the 
interaction between subject and object. 
 
This definition was criticized for being economically reductionist, especially in the 1950s 
when the so-called new left in Western Europe brought a new wave of studying Marxist 
literature. Raymond Williams was one of the most predominant scholars in that wave 
and he provided a dialectical and idealist revision of cultural materialism (1977). The 
theory of ‘cultural materialism’ developed by Williams was dedicated to correcting the 
historical determinism and economic reductionism, which were believed to be the 
tenets of orthodox Marxism under the influence of Stalinism. Therefore, Williams argued 
that the progress of history is not fixed and culture does not have an inferior existence 
to material existence, instead, he argued, culture itself is a material existence. 
 
However, the term ‘false consciousness’ has a rather different and ‘converted meaning’ 
in History and Class Consciousness (1971) written by the Hungarian Marxist scholar 
Gyorgy Lukācs. The difference was based on Lukācs’s divergent understanding of 
‘thought and existence’. ‘Thought and existence’, wrote Lukācs, ‘are not identical in the 
sense that they ‘correspond’ to each other, or ‘reflect’ each other, that they ‘run parallel’ 
to each other or ‘coincide’ with each other (all expressions that conceal a rigid duality). 
Their identity is that they are aspects of one and the same real historical and dialectical 
process’ (ibid: 204). And the ‘barrier which converts the class consciousness of the 
bourgeoisie into ‘false’ consciousness is objective; it is the class situation itself’ (Lukācs, 
1971: 54). In his redefined concept of ‘false consciousnesses’, Lukācs provided a new and 
very Hegelian approach to reviewing the generation of ideology within the thinking of 
the dialectical relation between subjectivity of human beings and objective material 
social process. But he retained the critical approach that he inherited from the theory of 
‘commodity fetishism’ which Lukācs revised and called ‘reification’. For Lukācs, what he 
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really criticized about ideology is actually the ‘objectified subjective relations’. It is to say 
that the social relations between subjective humans have been haunted by the 
productive relations of objective materials, which Lukācs termed as ‘the phantom 
objectivity’. And it is the reified process of social relations which leads to the generation 
of ‘false consciousnesses’. Therefore, we can see that the biggest difference between 
Lukācs and Marx on ‘ideology’ is that ‘whereas for early Marx and Engels, ideology is 
thought to be false to the true situation, for Lukācs it is thought true to false situation’ 
(Eagleton, 1991: 104). But there are some disagreements about Lukācs’s interpretation 
of ideology as the ‘subjective product of the ‘will to power’ of different classes’ (ibid: 
100-1). Ideologies, in the opinion of Gareth Jones, are ‘objective systems determined by 
the whole field of social struggle between contending classes’. French Marxist 
philosopher Louis Althusser also questioned the concept of ‘reified consciousness’ for it 
‘pre-supposes some ‘human essence’ which then undergoes estrangement’ (ibid). 
 
In contrast to Lukācs, Theodor Adorno’s critique of ideology was not derived directly 
from the commodity fetishism but rather from the perspective of ‘exchange value’. To 
Adorno, the inequality between use value and exchange value of a product is the 
fundamental secret of ideology that ‘two commodities with quite different ‘use-values’ 
can be equally exchanged, on the principle that both contain the same amount of 
abstract labour’ (ibid: 125). The projection of such inequality on human social relations 
would be the illusion of false equivalence that everyone is equal in the system. And the 
illusionary system is structurally functioning to homogenize everyone and the diversity 
of subjectivities: ‘ideology for Adorno is thus a form of ‘identity thinking’ – a covertly 
paranoid style of rationality which inexorably transmits the uniqueness and plurality of 
things into a mere simulacrum of itself, or express them beyond its own borders in a 
panic-stricken act of exclusion’ (ibid: 126). The solution provided by Adorno is what he 
termed in one of his books – Negative Dialects (1973, 2004). He argued that to undo the 
ideological homogenization, as the consequence of the rationality brought by modernity, 
‘demands a ‘negative dialect’, which strives, perhaps impossibly, to include within 
thought that which is heterogeneous to it’, and for Adorno, ‘the highest paradigm of 
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such negative reason is art’ (Eagleton, 1991: 126). Therefore, Adorno’s critique on the 
culture industry indicates that the content of such ‘negative dialects’ is aimed at crushing 
the illusion of equivalence created by the capitalist system and to expose the true 
inequality between subjects and objects, and the concrete method to achieve it is to 
protect the elite culture which is believed as the nutrition for cultural diversity from 
being commercialized and reified (Wang, 2012).  
 
Adorno’s stance of seeing modern society as a coercive system and his utopian 
expectation to achieve non-identical plurality have had a great influence on the later 
Frankfurt School scholars, such as Jurgen Habermas. In the opinion of Habermas, 
‘ideology … is a form of communication systematically distorted by power – a discourse 
which has become a medium of domination, and which serves to legitimate relations of 
organized force’ (Eagleton, 1991: 128). Based on such theories, he brought up the idea 
of ‘public sphere’ which is regarded as the counter-balance to the domination of a 
homogeneous system (Mo, 2006: 144). In the book The Structural Transformation of 
Public Sphere (1991), Habermas systematically illustrated the process of how the domain 
of the public sphere has been transformed in a dialectical way in modern societies in 
terms of creating and manufacturing public opinion, though there are critiques on the 
theory’s inadequate ‘theoretical framework for understanding the structural 
transformation of the public sphere in late modern societies’ (Susen, 2011: 38). 
 
Generally speaking, the critical theorists of ideology such as Marx, Engels, Lukācs and 
Frankfurt School scholars such as Adorno shared a common view on the dialectic of 
ideology and non-ideology. As indicated in Figure 5.2, there is an antagonistic relation 
between ideology as the reversal of consciousness and non-ideology as the resistant 
potential of consciousness to free the subjectivity of humans haunted by the 
formalization of capitalism. In the context of Marx and Engels, ideology mainly stands 
for the distorted consciousness representing the inversion of reality which serves the 
bourgeois class in a capitalist society (Rehmann, 2007: 211-4), and non-ideology refers 
to the revolutionary power of the working class to create an alternative belief system 
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such as socialism and communism. To Lukācs, the terminology used to substitute 
ideology is ‘false consciousness’ which is the manifestation of the objectified subjectivity, 
and he regarded the awakening self-consciousness of the working class as the non-
ideological resistance to reified consciousness. And although Adorno disagreed with 
traditional Marxists on the definition of dialectics, in terms of defining the concept of 
ideology and searching for the outlet to ‘identity-thinking’, he expressed a dualist 
opinion on the relation of the ideology of homogenization and non-ideology of diversity 
in the cultural industry. Therefore, the dualism of ideology and non-ideology is regarded 






Figure 5.2 Critical Definition of Ideology and Non-Ideology 
 
5.2.2 General Theories of Ideology 
According to Terry Eagleton, ‘the revisionist Marxist Eduard Bernstein was the first to 
dub Marxism itself an ideology’ (Eagleton, 1991: 90), and since then the general Marxist 
theory of ideology became gradually predominant along with the critical approach. 
However, the most influential theory among the pioneering and general studies on 
ideology was developed by Vladimir Lenin: who ‘introduced the concept of a ‘scientific 
ideology’; the specificity of which was that it corresponded to ‘an objective truth’ (Lenin, 
1960-70: 136). Lenin concluded ‘that social relations are divided into material and 
ideological [relations]’ (ibid: 151), and he defined ideology as the non-economic 
 #$'&'%( Non-Ideology
 
superstructure (Lenin, 1990: 397). In his book What is to be Done?, Lenin classified two 
major segments of ideology as ‘bourgeois ideology’ and ‘socialist ideology’ (Lenin, 1902: 
23), and attributed socialism as ‘the ideology of struggle of the proletarian class’ 
(Eagleton, 1991: 90). Lenin’s general theory of ideology dissolves the antagonism 
between ‘bourgeois’ and ‘socialist’ ideology for he argued that ‘the working class could 
develop spontaneously only a trade-unionist ‘seed form’ of class consciousness, which 
was still subordinate to bourgeois ideology, because this ‘is far older in origin than 
socialist ideology, … more fully developed, and … has at its disposal immeasurably more 
means of dissemination’ (Lenin, 1960-70: 386). Philosophically, such generalization of 
ideology by Lenin also contributed to the dialectical materialist revision on the dualism 
between subjective consciousness and objective nature, highlighting the decisive role of 
experience gained from material nature in the process of motivating the spontaneous 
consciousness of the proletarian class. To Lenin, ‘ideology … [is] identical with the 
scientific theory of historical materialism’ (Eagleton, 1991: 90), and his empiricism-
critique on idealism indicates that, to him, there is no such ‘existence of something 
beyond, something transcending the bounds of ‘experience’ and knowledge’ (Lenin, 
1909: In Lieu of An Introduction). The generalization of Lenin on the study of ideology as 
a scientific approach to analyze ‘the fundamental laws of society and its thought 
formations’ responds to the initiation of de Tracey’s invention of ‘ideology’ as a ‘science 
of ideas’ (Eagleton, 1991: 90). And Lenin’s dialectical materialism contributed to remedy 
the sensualist essence of de Tracey’s ‘ideology’ regarding ‘sense-perceptions … [as] the 
only source for … ideas’ (Rehmann, 2014: 16). 
 
The general definition of ideology developed by the Italian radical Marxist Antonio 
Gramsci was mainly derived from his theory of ‘hegemony’ in which ideology was 
interpreted as ‘the complex of superstructure’ functioning along with intellectuals to 
create ‘organic consent’ (Gramsci, 1992: 12). Similar to Lenin, Gramsci was also against 
the ‘dualistic separation of the ‘material’ and the ‘ideal’, and in his translation of the 
‘Preface’ to ‘Critique of Political Economy’ of 1859, Gramsci inserted the term ‘ideological 
terrain’ to ‘avert the common misunderstanding of mere forms of consciousness from 
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the outset’ (Rehmann, 2014: 118). Gramsci believed that only the ‘philosophy of praxis’ 
could fully represent the dialectics of Marxism and to correct the idealist and materialist 
revision on Marxism (Gramsci, 1990: 76-77). He disagreed with the economic-
reductionist interpretation of Marxism and was against the definition of ideology as the 
distorted consciousness compelled by the reifying material. According to him, ‘ideology 
must be viewed as actively organizing forces which are psychologically ‘valid’, fashioning 
the terrain on which men and women act, struggle and acquire consciousness of their 
social positions’ (Eagleton, 1991: 117). Thus, Gramsci’s interest was mainly in analyzing 
‘the internal contradictions of ideology’ rather than criticizing the reifying effect of 
ideology (Rehmann, 2014: 117). It is noticeable that Gramsci’s definition of ideology as 
hegemony is not similar to Lenin’s definition of socialist ideology. The main difference 
lies in Gramsci’s rediscovery of ‘civil society’ in which exists the possibility of creating an 
‘ideology unity between the bottom and the top, between the ‘simple’ folk and the 
‘intellectuals’ (Gramsci, 1971: 328-9). While to Lenin, there is no such division of the 
superstructure, and the decisive elements lies absolutely in the material base through 
which the proletariat acquired the revolutionary consciousness (Bao, 2012).  
 
Hungarian scholar - Karl Mannheim also contributed to generalizing the concept of 
ideology. In Ideology and Utopia (1954), Manheim conjectured two types of ‘ideology’: 
one particular and one total (49). The particular one refers to a ‘more or less conscious 
disguise of the real nature of a situation’ and the total one refers to the collective 
thoughts of ‘an age or of a concrete historico-social group’ (ibid: 49-50). And the ‘total’ 
definition of ideology, which Mannheim termed as ‘Weltanschauung’, refers to ‘an all-
encompassing view of the world adopted by a given group, always reflecting the general 
ideas and thought-systems of a historical epoch’ (Freeden, 2003: 14). Mannheim further 
advocated that efforts should be made by independent intellectuals to detach 
themselves from any existent ideologies so that they can dedicate themselves to 
developing the whole new foreshadowing ideology which ‘constitutes a comprehensive 
view but not a final one’ and is ‘a ‘relative optimum’ for our time and our place’ (ibid: 
19). This approach is questioned by the suspicion on whether or not the ideology or the 
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development of ideology can be detached from the Marxist notions of class, and 
Mannheim’s approach to develop universal ideology also drew in the debates on ‘the 
end of ideology’ in the 1950s (ibid: 18-9).  
 
Influenced by Gramsci’s general interpretation on ideology within the context of 
‘hegemony’, Williams saw hegemony as something beyond ideology, that ‘hegemony’ is 
in the ‘recognition of the wholeness of the [social] process’ (ibid: 108-9), while ideology 
is ‘a system of meanings and values’ which expresses or projects the interest of ‘a 
particular class’ in a class society (ibid: 108). And the reason for ‘hegemony’ beyond 
‘ideology’ is that a social practice is a ‘realized complex of experiences, relationships, 
and activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits’, and ‘it has continually to 
be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limited, 
altered, and challenged by pressures not at all its own’ (ibid: 112). But Williams also 
admitted that when deploying the historical perspective to analyze the dynamic 
movement within a given epoch, it is necessary to abstract the ensemble of social 
process as a system ‘especially if it is to connect with the future as well as with the past’ 
(ibid: 121). Furthermore, Williams summarized three general and conclusive types of 
social processes: residual, dominant and emergent cultures. By ‘residual culture’, he 
referred to the ‘experience, meanings and values’ practiced in the ‘previous social and 
cultural institutions or formation’ (ibid: 122). The ‘dominant culture’ stands for the social 
system which is largely setting out the routine of people’s mind-sets and structurally 
serving the interests of the dominant classes. Finally, ‘emergent culture’ means the rise 
or the signal of the rise of ‘a new social reality’ (del Valle Alcala, 2010:74). These three 
forms of social systems are by no means separate but rather interlinked and 
interdependent. 
 
Another great contributor to the concept of ideology is Stuart Hall. He defined ideologies 
as ‘the mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of 
thought, and the systems of representation – which different classes and social groups 
deploy in order to make sense of, figure out and render intelligible the way society works’ 
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(Hall, 1986: 25-6). Similar to Raymond Williams, Hall agreed that ideology is not a 
singular existence. It is not ideology but actually ideologies that ‘ideologies do not 
operate through single ideas; they operate in discursive chains, in clusters, in semantic 
fields, in discursive formations’ (Hall, 1985: 104). Influenced by the ‘contradiction and 
over-determinism’ developed by Althusser, Hall was also strongly against the economic-
reductionist approach in explaining the formation of ideologies as the ‘necessary 
correspondence’ between fixed classes and their members: ‘‘ruling ideas’ are the ideas 
of the ‘ruling class’ – the class position of the latter providing the coupling and guarantee 
of correspondence with the former’ (Hall, 1986: 28). On the contrary, there is no 
guarantee for such necessary correspondence – ‘necessarily no correspondence’ (Hall, 
1985: 94). But what really distinguished Hall is that he broadened the content of the 
phrase ‘no guarantee’ which added another meaning that ‘also implies that there is no 
necessary non-correspondence … there is no guarantee that, under all circumstances, 
ideology and class can never be articulated together in anyway or produce a social force 
capable for a time of self- conscious ‘unity in action’ (ibid: 94-5). Therefore, Hall 
rediscovered an alternative to the structuralist interpretation of ideology within the 
context of Althusser himself – the concept of ‘double articulation’ between structure 
and practice’: ‘By ‘double articulation’ I mean that the structure – the given conditions 
of existence, the structure of determinations in any situation – can also be understood, 
from another point of view, as simply the result of previous practices’ (ibid: 96). 
Therefore, Hall provided a dialectical perspective on interpretation of the structuration 
of ideology by admitting its ‘real, material effects’ while denying the ‘misplaced 
concreteness’ of abolishing the mental character (ibid: 100). And to fully explain the 
origination and development of ideologies, Hall emphasized the subject of ‘language’ 
and ‘behavior’; that they ‘are the media … of the material registration of ideology, the 
modality of its functioning’ (ibid: 99). Thus, Hall bridged the theory of ideology and 
discourse-analysis by explaining how ideologies are calculated through the circulation 
of meanings created by languages (Hall, 1997: 1-12).  
 














Figure 5.3 General Definition of Ideology and Consciousness 
 
In summary, as indicated in Figure 5.3, theorists of the general camp tend to broaden 
the content of ideology from distorted/false consciousness caused by the material 
reality to organic consciousness necessary for mental construction for future 
development in a given historical stage. In the broader sense of ideology, there are many 
different but coherent variants co-existing. According to the analogy of Williams about 
cultures, these variants can be generally divided into three types: residual, dominant and 
emergent ideologies. For example, to Lenin and Gramsci, the dominant ideology is 
bourgeois and the emergent one is socialism. More importantly, the generalization of 
ideology was the effort made by many of the Marxist theorists to revise the dualism of 
‘ideal’ and ‘material’ in the critical theory of ideology and to convert ‘ideology’ into a 
rather dialectical concept in terms of epistemological theories and an eclectic term in 
terms of practical social activities. 
 
5.2.3 Post-Marxist Theories of Ideology 
Though, theoretically speaking, Althusser is not one of those post-modern Marxists, his 











post-modernist theorists, especially in relation to ideology. Althusser’s theory on 
ideology was mostly explained in his work Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses 
published in 1970. In that work, Althusser elaborated his point of view on ideology from 
the perspective of reproduction of labour-power. Influenced by Gramsci’s theory of 
‘hegemony’, Althusser also emphasized the role of the institutions of nation-states, such 
as schools and churches. But instead of merely regarding them as organic instruments, 
he discovered the function: to reproduce the ‘submission to the ruling ideology for the 
workers, and … the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology … for the agents of 
exploitation and repression, [and to] provide for the domination of the ruling class’ 
(Althusser, 1971: 5). But instead of sticking to the traditional Marxist analytical method 
of political economy by which ideology is usually studied as the juncture between 
subjectivity of ideal and objectivity of material, Althusser brought in a new disciplinary 
angle of psychology derived from the theories of imagination developed by Spinoza and 
Lacan (Rehmann, 2014: 160) which explained ‘ideological as an unconscious, ‘lived’ 
relationship and to illustrate the dynamic and active character of ideological subjugation’ 
(ibid: 149). Therefore, ideology for Althusser is not a question about the truth or 
falsehood of how the reality is represented to and by human minds (Eagleton, 1991: 18). 
To understand ideology as the unconscious ‘lived reality’, in the sense which Althusser 
established, is to understand ideology as the representation of the whole social structure 
which is the foundation of all human consciousness. The entirety of such definition 
makes ideology more than just instrumental, because it ‘in general [is] defined through 
the function of constituting concrete individuals as subjects’ (ibid: 155). The 
structuralism of Althusser on ideology confirms a non-historical existence of human 
unconsciousness through which the human subjectivity is ‘interpolated’ to be formed 
(ibid: 156). The ‘interpolation’ of subjectivity leads to the consequence of the anti-
human tendency of Althusser which fundamentally denies the autonomy of human 
beings as active players in their own history. The paradox in the context of Althusser’s 
work is quite obvious. Indeed, Althusser’s theory on ideology is derived from Marxist 
analysis of economic structure of production based on the epistemology of historical 
materialism by which ideology is defined as the representation of a given societal 
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structure at a given historical stage. However, Althusser’s further interpretation of 
ideology as the representation of an unhistorical structure raises the contradiction 
‘between the historically specific concept of ideological state-apparatuses and an un-
historically conceived ‘ideology in general’, and also leads to the ‘disintegration of 
Althusser School’ (Rehmann, 2014: 149).  
 
In spite of the inclination on his part to generalize ‘ideology’ as ‘an underlying 
omnipresent Lacanian (from the work of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan) 
concept of ‘eternal’ subjection’ (ibid: 233), Althusser’s theories on ideology still echoed 
in the works of his contemporaries. French theorist Michel Foucault, who is regarded as 
one of the pioneers of post-Marxism, was one of them. Foucault also held a similar 
‘ahistorical’ point of view towards ‘ideology’, but he further ‘equated it with his notion 
of discursive practice’ through which human ‘knowledge’ is formed (ibid: 197). Foucault 
further focused on developing the theory of ‘fictionalism’ defined by him as a ‘negative 
ontology of knowledge’ from a neo-Nietzschean perspective, in which ‘the ideological is 
dissolved into a negative ontology of ‘everything is fake’ (ibid: 199-200). In doing so, it 
seems that Foucault had combined the two theoretical traditions of studies on ideology 
by critically defining ideology as a distorted delusion of reality while admitting it as the 
representation of a constant structure of human rationality. However, like his 
interpretation on the universal existence of ‘power’, by claiming that everything is 
ideological, is actually deconstructing the existence of ‘ideology’, which makes the 
related arguments theoretically and methodologically impossible to continue.  
 
Another post-Marxist sociologist Pierre Bourdieu had also been influenced by 
Althusser’s ‘aristocratic thinking’ on ideology in a critical way (ibid: 221). Bourdieu 
advocated a dialectical way of understanding the process of ideological subjection ‘as 
the result of continuous interaction between field and habitus’ (ibid: 235) instead of 
reducing the ‘subjects to the mere effects of social structures and ideological 
apparatuses’ (ibid: 221). In his 1984 book Distinction, he criticized the ‘ideology of 
charisma’ which ‘regards taste in legitimate culture as a gift of nature’, and believed that 
 
‘all cultural practices … and preferences in literature, painting or music, are closely linked 
to educational level … and secondarily to social origin’ (Bourdieau, 1984: 1). Bourdieu’s 
exploration on the social origin of classes and states went directly back to the theory of 
‘the social division between mental and manual labour’ expressed in German Ideology 
by Marx and Engels (Rehmann, 2014: 224). Bourdieu created the concept of ‘field’ to 
describe the intellectual or religious domain functioning ideologically as the educational 
system which he believed is crucial to the emergence of classes and states. According to 
him, the individual subjectivity created by the educational system in the manifestation 
of certain social statuses will grow into certain ‘habitus’ that undergirds its structural 
positions. On the one hand, Bourdieu asserted that the ‘classified’ individuals who 
appropriate themselves through distinctive ‘vocation’ are unaware of such classification 
and both the obedience and resistance of classified individuals towards the system are 
products of the systems (Bourdieu, 1984: 482). On the other hand, he believed in the 
positive influence of ‘actions’ for that he ‘characterized habitus as a structuring structure’ 
and a ‘dynamic process creation by the subjects themselves’, thus it is possible for 
individual people to change their social positions (Rehmann, 2014: 237). Bourdieu’s work 
contributed to the regression of Western Marxism to the dialectical epistemology that 
was neglected by some of his contemporary Marxist theorists  
 
Slavoj Žižek, as one of the very active contemporary Marxist scholars, established his 
academic foundation in his 1989 book The Sublime Object of Ideology (2008). In that 
book, he was following the post-Marxist studies on ideology invented by Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe in the 1970s with the publications of Politics and Ideology in Marxist 
Theory (Laclau, 1977) and Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci (Mouffe, 1979). Žižek 
himself expounded, or more exactly summarized, Laclau and Mouffe’s theories on 
ideology deploying a Lacanian concept of future. Žižek illustrated that ideological fantasy 
as a support of reality ‘is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape insupportable 
reality; in its basic dimension, it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for 
our ‘reality’ itself: an ‘illusion’ which structures our effective, real social relations and 
thereby masks some insupportable, real, impossible kernel’ (Žižek, 2008: 45). Such 
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ideological fantasy is ‘to stitch up the inconsistency of our own ideological system’ (Žižek, 
2008: 49).  
 
To Žižek, ideology that is based on the ‘discordance between what people are effectively 
doing and what they think they are doing’ is not a ‘false consciousness’ but rather the 
reality itself (ibid: 27). He revisited the Marxian formula of ‘they do not know it, but they 
are doing it’, and revised it as ‘they know that, in their activity, they are following an 
illusion but still, they are doing it’ (ibid: 27-30). He explained such revision by declaring 
that in the post-ideological knowledge system, people become much more cynical and 
critical of the ideological truth such as ‘freedom or democracy’, but the ‘cynical distance 
is just one way … to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy’ 
because people ‘embodied in the ‘social relations between things’, and although the 
subjects of people no longer believe, ‘but the things themselves believe for them’ (ibid: 
30-1). Following the Lacanian tradition of psychoanalysis, Žižek also agrees on the 
unconscious dimension of ideology which is supported and represented by the symbolic 
or symptom order (Zhang, 2007: 15).  
 
Žižek explained the hidden mechanism of the production of ideologies from the 
perspectives of both economics (from Marxism) and psychology (from Lacan and Freud), 
and he developed a unique illustration on the relation between surplus-value and 
surplus-enjoyment. According to Žižek, the production of ideology is closely interlinked 
with fetishism: ‘in Marxism a fetish conceals the positive network of social relations, 
whereas in Freud a fetish conceals the lack around which the symbolic network is 
articulated’ (Žižek, 2008: 50). Fetishism of capitalism is based on the pursue of looking 
for an indefinite surplus value, and the objectified productive relations between 
members of the society and the according social structure, create a certain type of 
mental surplus enjoyment named by Žižek as ‘ideological jouissance’ which is essentially 
the ‘renunciation’ of meaning: 
 
‘Let us take the case of Fascism – the Fascist ideology is based upon a purely formal 
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imperative: Obey, because you must! In other words, renounce enjoyment, sacrifice 
yourself and do not ask about the meaning of it – the value of the sacrifice lies in its 
very meaninglessness; true sacrifice is for its own end; you must find positive 
fulfillment in the sacrifice itself, not in its instrumental value: it is this renunciation, 
this giving up of enjoyment itself, which produces a certain surplus-enjoyment’ 
(Žižek, 2008: 89). 
 
All in all, the main theoretical characteristic of the post-Marxist theories on ideology is 
basically manifested by their psychological approach to analyze the intercourse between 
subjects and objects and to explain the generation and function of ideology from the 
angle of sub-consciousness or unconsciousness. The prevailing Lacanian psychological 
analysis of ideology as the unconsciousness of the human ideal realm broadens, or to 
some extent, deconstructs the traditional Marxist studies on ideology as either the 
reified consciousness in the critical theories or a ‘belief system’ in the general theories. 
As indicated in Figure 5.4, in post-Marxism, ‘the concept of ideology would not have 
anything to do with the idea of a distorted or inverted reality … the question of ideology 
points towards the hidden foundations of discourse and the supposed rationality on 
which such discourses are based, which do not mask a foundational reality but a position 
of the enunciating subject who hides the material conditions of enunciation’ (Sloterdijk, 
2003, cited in Garcia and Aguilar Sanchez, 2008). In this sense, ideology ‘is less a system 
of acts per se (i.e. getting people to do things) than a system of ontological fantasy’ 

















Figure 5.4 Post-Modernist Definition of Ideology and Consciousness 
 
5.2.4 Defining Ideology  
The above introduction about the different theoretical camps within Marxism on the 
studies of ideology is only a very small portion of the numerous arguments on this 
subject. The dazzlingly abundant derivations of Marxist theories on ideology makes it an 
extremely difficult mission to draw a syncretic definition on it for ‘how one categorizes 
reality depends on one’s purposes, the questions one asks about it, and often prior 
dispositions and commitments to particular explanations of it’ (Hamilton, 1987:38, cited 
in Griffin, 2006: 79). Therefore, it seems more important to clarify a few essential 
questions about ideology to help construct the deployment of the concept in this 
research which is based on its empirical studies, instead of focusing on the taxonomy of 
ideology to fit into the frame of general, critical or post-Marxist theories.  
 
The first question to be answered is whether ideology is the equivalent or the 
component of consciousness. Or, whether it is the embodiment of unconsciousness. 
Ideological 
Jouissance Desires 
Ideology = Collective Consciousness 




Unconsciousness is the very hallmark that classifies post-Marxist theories on ideology 
from those traditional ones. According to Žižek, ‘what is crucial to ideology is not that it 
is an illusion that masks the real state of things, but that it consists of an (unconscious) 
fantasy that structures our own social reality’ (Žižek, 1992: 76). Indeed, Žižek defined 
unconsciousness as ‘the form of thought whose ontological status is not that of thought’, 
and ‘that is to say, the form of thought external to the thought itself – in short, some 
‘other scene’ external to the thought whereby the form of the thought is already 
articulated in advance’ (ibid, 13). Such ontology of ideology as the ‘unconscious illusion’ 
which structures people’s real and effective relationship to reality within the post-
Marxist term exaggerated the importance of ‘ideal, consciousness and spirit’, and the 
negative stance of such ontology on the dialectical relation between subject and object 
leads to the denial of the autonomy of subject and ‘the deconstruction of the final 
achievement of communism’ (Shen, 2011: 50-2).  
 
Furthermore, the post-Marxist ontological interpretation of ideology as the 
unconsciousness of the human mind posed the danger of dispelling the content of 
ideology, as one of the main founders of post-Marxism Ernesto Laclau in his 2006 article 
‘Ideology and Post-Marxism’ claimed that there are mainly two notions of ideology 
within the Marxist term that ideology as ‘false consciousness’ and ‘a necessary level of 
social formation’, but ‘both [of these notions] … should be rejected’ as the first notion is 
ruined by essentialism and the second ‘is too much linked to the notion of a naturalistic 
infrastructure being reflected in distorted ideas in the mind of people’ (Laclau, 2006: 
114). The remaining value of using this vocabulary ‘ideological’ no longer lies on its 
substance to represent the social and productive relations of a given epoch, but, 
according to Laclau, lies on its figurative meanings as metaphors of ‘as if’ for that ‘any 
‘closure’ [of ideology] is necessarily tropological’ (ibid). However, as far as this research 
is concerned, the definition of ideology by no means refers to any kind of ontology which 
ignores the deeper question about the dialectical intercourse between the ideal state of 
the human mind and the economic structure of human societies. 
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Now that we have repudiated the interpretation of ideology as the unconsciousness of 
the human mind, as far as this research is concerned, the second question would be 
about the relation between ideology and consciousness.  
 
As indicated in Figure 5.5, within the camp of the general theories on ideology, the 
content of ideology is basically equal to that of consciousness. And only the content of 
the term ‘dominant ideology’ shares a similar meaning with that of the term ‘ideology’ 
of the critical camp as the false or reified, and materialized consciousness. The general 
approach remains as an increasingly popular stance in Marxist studies on ideology 
nowadays especially due to its closely interlinking with the appearance of post-Marxist 
studies emphasizing on discourse and language. From what has been introduced above, 
it is decidedly relevant for us to consider that the generalization of the concept ‘ideology’ 
has contributed to a shift of focus from the criticism on the structural defaults of 
capitalist societies to the pursuit of finding alternative and constructing resistance to 
dominant social systems. Theorists and social activists following the general theories on 
ideology, such as Lenin and Gramsci, broadened the content of ideology to emancipate 
the proletariats to form resistant campaigns. However, by assimilating the content of 
ideology to that of consciousness itself, the general definition of ‘ideology’ contributes 





Figure 5.5 Relation of Consciousness and Ideology in General Definition 
 
In contrast, as indicated in Figure 5.6, within the camp of Marxist critical theories on 
ideology, ideology has always been defined as the opposite to the non-ideological part 
of the human mind. Ideology, as the reversed reality in the context of Marx and Engels, 
was frequently used as the equivalence to the ‘false consciousness’ which firstly 
appeared in Lukācs’s book History and Class Consciousness (1971). However, the 
falseness that Lukācs talked about was rather different from what Marx described with 
reference to the consciousness of ‘camera obscura’. For Lukācs, the falseness of 
ideology is defined by the falseness or the concreteness of reality: 
 
‘For only when his relation is established does the consciousness of their existence 
that men have at any given time emerge in all its essential characteristics. It appears, 
on the one hand, as something which is subjectively justified in the social and 
historical situation, as something which can and should be understood, i.e. as ‘right’. 
At the same time, objectively, it by-passes the essence of the education of society 
and fails to pinpoint it and express it adequately. That is to say, objectively, it 
appears as a ‘false consciousness’. On the other hand, we may see the same 
consciousness as something which fails subjectively to reach its self-appointed goals, 
while furthering and realizing the objective aims of society of which it is ignorant 
and which it did not choose’ (Lukācs, 1971: 50). 
 
Stuart Hall also explained in detail about the relation between the distortion of reality 
and the falseness of ideology in his article ‘The Problem of Ideology: Marxism without 
Guarantees’: ‘the ‘falseness’ … arises, not from the fact that the market is an illusion, a 
trick, a sleight of hand, but only in the sense that it is an inadequate explanation of a 
process’ (Hall, 1986: 36). Therefore, the criticism of ideology is actually about the 
concreteness of specific historical societies which inadequately explains the social 
reality. As Terry Eagleton wrote, ‘ideology is the product of the concrete social relations 
 
into which men enter at a particular time and place; it is the way those class-relations 
are experienced, legitimized and perpetuated. Moreover, men are not free to choose 
their social relations; they are constrained into them by material necessity – by the 
nature and stage of development of their mode of economic production’ (Eagleton, 
2006: 3). And that is also why Lukācs was so concerned with the importance of acquiring 
the consciousness of totality, or ‘self-consciousness’, because only by such actions, can 





Figure 5.6 Relation of Consciousness and Ideology in Critical Definition 
 
As far as this research is concerned, the term ideology should remain critical in order to 
focus on the structural defaults of capitalist societies – the phenomena of reification of 
human consciousness caused by historical concreteness. It needs to be further spelt out 
here about the essence of reification in order to have ‘a clear insight into the ideological 
problems of capitalism and its downfall’ (Lukācs, 1971: 84). The phenomenon of 
reification originated from the appearance of the commodity-structure of an economy 
within which ‘the relationship of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is 
presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between 
 
the products of their labour’ (Marx, 1887: 47-8). The development of the productive 
relation of labour ‘as a continuous trend towards greater rationalization’ progressively 
eliminates ‘the qualitative, human and individual attributes of the worker’ (Lukācs, 1971: 
88). Gradually, the ‘relations between people who takes on the character of a thing and 
thus acquire a ‘phantom objectivity’, an autonomy that seems strictly rational and all-
embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relations between 
people’ (ibid: 83). And only when such reified relations between people is understood 
as ‘the universal category of society as a whole’, it ‘become[s] crucial for the subjugation 
of men’s consciousness to the forms in which this reification finds expression and for 
their attempts to comprehend the process or to rebel against its disastrous effects and 
liberate themselves from servitude to the ‘second nature’ so created’ (ibid: 86).  
 
Therefore, we can conclude that ideology should be defined as people’s consciousness 
formed by the concreteness of the given economic structure which is necessarily 
produced by the ensemble of productive relations of a specific human society. Such 
consciousness, limited by the social reality of capitalism, obscures the fundamental 
mechanism of the society as a totality and blinds people to the alternatives to the 
dominant structure. However, it by no means says that ideologies are determined by 
economic modes. ‘The economic provides the repertoire of categories which will be 
used, in thought’, but it cannot ‘provide the contents of the particular thoughts of 
particular social classes or groups at any specific time’ (Hall, 1986: 43). Ideologies should 
not be over simplified as the homogenous content of certain fixed historical economic 
stages, such as slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism or communism, such as Marx 
deducted in his earlier years. Like the German philosopher Leibniz wrote in his letter to 
the mathematician and physicist Ludovico Casati: ‘for never will be found … two leaves … 
so similar that after an accurate inspection, a difference cannot be detected’ (cited in 
Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2012: 141), and so is the diversity of human societies and the 
accordingly diverse dominant ideologies. Ideology should be defined in a much wider 
sense as no country’s economic structure is the same as that of others. For example, the 
United States and Japan are undoubtedly both capitalist countries, but it would be 
 
economically reductionist to assert that the mainstream ideologies in these two 
countries are exactly the same. Ideologies in Japan and the US share very strong 
similarities in terms of industrial diversity and economic policies, but still there are many 
obvious differences determined by material elements such as geography, weather, 
population and the historical and dialectical social relations based on the material 
elements such as their respective history of wars and demographic features which are 
widely defined as culture.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The tendency of the ‘culturalism’ within the frame of ‘cultural imperialism’ has 
sabotaged the sustainability of this paradigm in the present epoch. As what has been 
specifically pointed out in section 5.1 and reviewed in section 5.2, it is clear to the 
researcher that the concept of ‘ideology’ is much more suitable than ‘culture’ for the 
theoretical framework of this research. There are mainly two reasons for the necessity 
for such substitution. The first is that the concept of ideology, as defined in section 5.2.4, 
strengthens the critical attribute and tradition of the ‘imperialism’ studies in the field of 
international communication studies. The second is that the revised framework of 
‘imperialism’ paradigm with the focus on ‘ideology’ draws a clear line between the 
existences of superstructure and economic base while highlighting the importance of 
both.  
 
Based on illustrations outlined earlier and above, it can be concluded that the ideological 
imperialism, in this research, refers to the international process by which the dominant 
collective consciousness of one society is being formed by the adaption of its economic 
transformation impelled by the global capitalist structure. There exist a variety of 
ideologies based on the specific political and economic structures of different societies. 
In the field of international communication, the dynamics of the political and economic 
interactions between different countries in different ages, involves different types of 
ideological processes. For example, if there exists the ideology of Americanization, then 
we could probably argue that the Americanization in the 20th century and the 21st 
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century are not the same ideology since international relations and global economic 
structures on which these ideologies based have changed. Similarly, among different 
countries, the ideologies of ‘Russianization’ or ‘Japanization’ are distinctive from 
‘Americanization’. Therefore, if we want to talk about the concrete manifestation of 
ideological dominance either within one country or between different countries, it is of 
vital importance to specify the political and economic realities within which such 
processes are located. As far as this research is concerned, it is designed to explore the 
dissemination of the prevailing ideology of China among the African people which is 
epitomized by the term Sinicization, and how this ideology is represented by the 
international news of China’s state media in Africa and perceived by the elite African 
audience – university students from various African nations studying in China. In the next 
chapter, the political and economic realities between China and Africa which underpins 
the appearance of the ideology of ‘Sinicism’ will be introduced in order to further unfold 
the discussion on the manifestation of such ideology in the content of Chinese media in 
Africa and on the reception of their ideological agenda among select African audiences. 
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Chapter 6 - Ideological Sinicization through CCTV-Africa 
 
The ideology of any society in a particular epoch, it was argued in the last chapter, is 
dialectically determined by the social, political and economic structure in which it is 
embedded. As far as modern China is concerned, there is a specific kind of dominant 
ideology, which is termed ‘Sinicism’ in this thesis. Sinicism, it is suggested here, is shaping 
China’s international interactions with other nations. To understand how the Chinese 
state media CCTV-Africa delivers the ideology of Sinicism to its African audience, it is of 
great importance to know the substance of the ideology. Therefore, this chapter aims to 
achieve two goals. First, to provide a definition of Sinicism, and the process of ideological 
Sinicization, through a comprehensive illustration of China’s political-economic reality as 
a semi-peripheral country and its political and economic interaction with the peripheral 
countries in Africa deploying the revised theoretical frame of structural imperialism 
developed by Johan Galtung. The second goal is to look into the mechanism of the 
process by which CCTV-Africa news programmes represent ideological Sinicization.  
 
6.1 Defining ‘Ideological Sinicization’ 
The origin of the term ‘Sinicization’ is derived from a trans-cultural phenomenon in 
Chinese history. It refers to the cultural integration between the Confucianism of the 
Central Plain area and the civilization of ethnic minorities in ancient China. It usually 
happened when an ethnic minority conquered vast tracts of the land or even the whole 
country and expected to stabilize their governance in the Central Plain area; such as with 
the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty and the Manchu Qing Dynasty (Chen Y., 1998: 30). There 
are five main features of the phenomenon of Sinicization: a) The representative of 
Central Plain culture that was widely accepted by the ethnic minority regimes was 
Confucianism which advocates Order, Hierarchy, and Rituals; b) Sinicization usually 
happened when the new ‘minority’ governors voluntarily reached out to learn 
Confucianism instead of being forced to do so; c) the acceptance and internalization of 
Confucianism with the ethnic minority was always a result of a top-down reform from 
the ‘minority’ rulers to their people; d) the civilizational transition was always from 
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inferior social structure to a higher one, such as from slavery to feudalism; e) the residual 
cultural customs of the ethnic minority would be reserved to some extent (Chen Y, 1998; 
Ho P., 1967, 1998).  
 
However, this term has been rediscovered and redefined by some scholars in recent 
years to describe a new tendency of international relations. According to Peter 
Katzenstein in his 2012 book Sinicization and the Rise of China, Sinicization refers to the 
recombination in China’s economic rise against the ‘reification of numerous civilizations 
into simple categories such as East and West [which] is widespread in everyday politics 
and common in policy and academic writings’ (Katzenstein, 2012: 2). To point out further 
the unique features of Sinicization, Katzenstein used a comparison between 
Americanization and Sinicization. While, on the one hand, Americanization refers to the 
‘the process of remaking a civilizational ‘Other’ to be more like the civilizational ‘Self’, 
either through total assimilation or by making ‘Other’ conform more closely to dominant 
civilizational practices’, and on the other hand, Sinicization refers to the ‘the process by 
which the ‘Other,’ through appropriating aspects of ‘Self’, exerts its effects on the 
civilizational center’ (ibid: 8). 
 
As far as this research is concerned, the concept of Sinicization is neither a historical 
phenomenon nor a new tendency of international relations. Sinicization, in my research, 
refers to a comprehensive international process of political and economic interactions 
between China and other countries, especially those less developed ones, and the 
dissemination of the ideology of Sinicism created during the process. As illustrated in 
Chapter 5, every ideology is underpinned by a certain form of economic base. To 
understand the substance of the ideology it is important first to understand the political 
and economic structure of the ideology. Therefore, Section 6.1.1 sets out in general 
terms the political and economic background of Sinicism, within a theoretical framework 
of a ‘semi-imperialism’, in which China is defined as a semi-peripheral country that is 
inevitably undergoing sub-imperialist expansion. Section 6.1.2 introduces the 
manifestation of the ideology of Sinicism in the case of Sino-African political and 
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economic relations and to illustrate how Sinicism, theoretically speaking, can be 
manufactured as ideological consent between the elite classes in China and those in 
African countries by the process of ideological Sinicization.  
 
6.1.1 The Economic and Political Base of Ideological Sinicization 
‘Your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production 
and bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into 
a law for all, a will, whose essential character and direction are determined by the 
economic conditions of existence of your class’ (Marx and Engels, 2015: 27). As far as a 
nation is concerned, its position or the class it belongs to in the world system determines 
the macro ideology the nation expresses when it is interacting with other countries. The 
unique political-economic status of China as a semi-peripheral country determines the 
substance of the ideological Sinicization. Thus, to know the substance of Sinicism, it is of 
vital importance to have a clear understanding of the concept of semi-periphery and to 
comprehend the mechanism of semi-peripheral countries’ semi-imperialist expansion 
from a critical perspective.  
 
In most cases, semi-periphery is regarded as the ‘euphemism’ of sub-imperialism (Bond, 
2015: 16). The terms ‘semi-peripheral country’ or ‘semi-imperialist country’ both refer 
to those states which ‘play a particular role in the capitalist world-economy based on the 
double antinomy of class (bourgeois-proletarian) and function in the division of labour 
(core-periphery)’ (Wallerstein, 1976: 462). Sub-imperialist countries ‘do not just transfer 
surplus value to imperialist centres but also succeed in appropriating weaker countries’ 
surplus value by displacing some of the contradictions specific to dependent capitalism’ 
(Luce, 2015). This is to say that semi-peripheral countries have to play double roles – one 
is the ‘supplier of natural resources and cheap labour’ for the centre countries, and the 
other is the ‘capitalist exploiter’ of the peripheral countries. Most of the rising regional 
hegemonies whose economies are growing fast within the global capitalist system are 
more or less playing a double role, thus the range of semi-peripheral countries is quite 
broad. According to Wallerstein, 
 
 
‘It includes the economically stronger countries of Latin America: Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, Venezuela, possibly Chile and Cuba. It includes the whole outer rim of 
Europe: the southern tier of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Grace; most of eastern Europe; 
parts of the northern tier such as Norway and Finland. It includes in Africa, at least, 
Nigeria and Zaire, and in Asia: Turkey, Iran, India, Indonesia, China, Korea, and 
Vietnam. And it includes the old ‘white’ Commonwealth: Canada, Australia, South 
Africa, possibly New Zealand …’ (Wallerstein, 1976: 465). 
 
Even though this list was written in the 1970s and situations in some of those countries 
have changed, it is still correct to categorize China as a semi-peripheral state. If China 
was counted as a semi-periphery mainly because of its association with the Soviet Union 
in the 1970s, then in the age of global capitalism China is still playing the intermediating 
role between centre and periphery. Although China has experienced dramatic growth in 
GDP in the past few decades, it is still not yet a fully developed country but rather a semi-
peripheral country which is struggling to squeeze into the centre of the world system.  
 
Based on the revived theoretical frame of sub-imperialism, which was originally set out 
by Ruy Mauro Marini in the 1960s, Mathias Luce in his recent article ‘Sub-Imperialism, 
the Highest Stage of Dependent Capitalism' summarized ‘five determining elements that 
make sub-imperialism's relatively autonomous expansionist policy possible through 
state action' (Luce, 2015: 33). Any country satisfying the five elements is capable of sub-
imperialist economic expansion, which are:  
 
1. ‘A dependent country’s accession to regional sub-centre status in response to 
global accumulation patterns through its transformation into a sub-centre of 
heavy industry with a particular domestic level of production and capitalist 
financial operation;  
2. Bourgeois unity through displacing internal contradictions;  
3. The formulation of a national sub-imperialist plan;  
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4. Formation of national capitalist trusts that tie the dependent economy to 
imperialism via state intermediation;  
5. The dependent economic condition that not only transfers value into imperialist 
economies but also appropriates the surplus value of weaker nations’ (ibid: 34).  
 
In the case of China, it matches the above features with slight differences. Firstly, China 
had indeed responded to the global accumulation patterns through its economic 
transformation since 1978 when Deng Xiaoping initiated the ‘open and reform’ policy 
(Harvey, 2010: 137). By constantly exporting capital to the less developed countries, it 
can be argued that China is trying to establish its own global financial order – ‘a new 
pattern of all-around opening up … economic system’ (The State Council, 2015; 
Kurlantzick, 2007; Jacques, 2009). But different from Luce and other Latin American 
scholars' analysis based on the case of South American countries such as Brazil and 
Mexico, the reality of China’s economic prosperity, which drives China to be the Asian 
centre, is based more on light industry rather than heavy industry. At the same time, the 
slowly progressive economic neo-liberalization in China enables the state to avoid 
becoming the passive recipient of imperialist countries’ financial ‘aid’ and being stuck in 
the centre-periphery trap through the ‘internationalization-internalization’ process of 
shock therapy (Luce, 2015: 35). That is to say, China acting as the arbitrator of its own 
state-run enterprises has managed to keep the domestic production and capitalist driven 
financial operations at a certain level to find room for negotiation with the leading 
Western countries in the world system. Only by retaining their political and economic 
autonomy, can countries like China transform from periphery to semi-periphery and 
maybe later progress to the centre. 
 
Secondly, ‘given the dimension of the disadvantages existing between the imperialist 
bourgeoisie and that of dependent countries, the latter find themselves lacking the 
conditions to negotiate directly with imperialism … Because of this they ‘opt for 
consolidating the national state as an intermediary’ (ibid). While, in the case of China, 
the relic of the so-called capitalist bourgeoisie, if there was still any left after 1949, has 
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long been vanquished, mostly during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960/1970s. 
However, since the ‘open and reform’ policy began in 1978, there has arisen a new round 
of ‘primitive accumulation’ conducted by the previous administrative staff in those state-
owned industries (He, 1998: 140-62).  
 
Thus ‘a new bourgeoisie appeared under the auspices of the Communist Party’ 
(Martínez, 2015: 137). In addition, the same group or class of people, whether they stay 
in the state-owned enterprises or establish private companies, are facing the same 
economic dilemma as the economy develops to a certain point. With ‘the Xi 
administration’s reluctance to commit to deep economic reform’, China along with its 
bourgeoisie class nowadays is faced with ‘several negative trends: over investment and 
over-capacity in several basic economic sectors, over borrowing by local governments, 
overstating of previous growth statistics, overvaluation of the Chinese yuan, and a 
coming demographic downturn’ (Godement, 2015: 1). The ‘new’ bourgeoisie and 
governmental officials are ceaselessly trying to find a solution to these dilemmas 
through either upgrading the domestic industrial structure or exporting huge amounts 
of capital to less developed countries. Furthermore, ideologically the new bourgeoisie 
class in China is unified by a new combination of gradualism and pragmatism, which is 
now called ‘new conservatism’. This tendency originated from Deng Xiaoping’s talks 
during the open-and-reform period that ‘development is the absolute principle’ and ‘no 
argument on different ideologies’ (Gao, 2013). 
 
Thirdly, in a speech titled ‘The Chinese Dream Will Benefit Not Only the People of China, 
But Also of Other Countries', President Xi Jinping said that ‘we will bring benefits to both 
the Chinese people and the people of the whole world. The realization of the Chinese 
Dream will bring the world peace, not turmoil, opportunities, not threats’ (Foreign 
Language Press, 2014: 62). By 2013, in a speech given by President Xi during his visit to 
Kazakhstan, he proposed to build the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ to provide ‘each other 
(neighbouring) Asian countries firm support on the central issues concerning interests 
such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and stability …’ (Foreign Language Press, 
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2014: 315-7). Such a proposal was regarded as the early stage of the later grand project 
of the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, which was officially launched by the National 
Development and Reform Commission of China as ‘a systematic project’ to ‘be jointly 
built through consultation to meet the interests of all, and efforts should be made to 
integrate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and Road’ (The 
State Council of PRC, 2015). With the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, mainly initiated by the Chinese government, there is little doubt that 
there is indeed a national plan for sub-imperialist expansion achieved through capital 
concentrated investment in less developed Asian or African countries. 
 
Fourthly, ‘the very nature of the phenomenon of peripheral capitalism lies in the transfer 
of a significant part of the labour value fund created by the population of a dependent 
nation, to the core countries’ (Dzarasov, 2015: 200). In the case of China, stable and 
sustainable cheap and skilled labour, or the high quality ‘human capital’ in the modern 
context of an economy (Chow, 2010: 47), has always been a comparative advantage. This 
advantage won China a position in the global economic system and distinguished China 
from other dependent countries (Arrighi, 2007: 351-67). Since the 1980s the export-
oriented industries in China mainly dominated by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and 
driven by foreign investment have always largely depended on the labour-intensive 
manufacturing and production assembly constituted of millions of Chinese workers 
migrating from the rural countryside (ibid: 356-7). However, the profitable payback of 
foreign investment in China is only achievable when the investment meets the central 
government’s purpose (ibid: 355). It is similar in the case of China’s outward investment. 
It is estimated that 88 per cent of China’s outward investment is from SOEs (Broadman, 
2007, cited in Su, L., 2012a). Although there have been some conflicts between the state-
owned companies and the Chinese government, mainly because of the complicated 
ownership of SOEs, it is widely admitted that the SOEs are always in line with the central 
government and will be the pillar of China’s economic development in the long term (Su, 
L., 2012b; Szamosszegi and Kyle, 2011). There is indeed also an increasing number of 
private Chinese companies going abroad but they are all under the restriction of China’s 
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overseas investment policies, and the overseas investments of private companies are 
still incomparable to that of the SOEs. Therefore, in a state capitalism structure like China, 
the role of the Chinese government is more than just as an intermediary. Instead, in most 
cases, the function of the state in the manifestation of SOEs is the capital trusts 
themselves, who are the largest financial trusts nationally.  
 
Finally, the growing role of China as an investor with vast capital in many less developed 
areas is becoming increasingly evident. Earlier in 2001, there was a grand project 
launched by the central government to encourage Chinese companies, both public-
owned and private, to go abroad (Salidjanova, 2011: 10). Since then the outward direct 
investment from China has increased dramatically. China's investment in Africa has 
grown significantly in line with this policy, although even in the early 1990s China was 
already beginning to regard its role in Africa with considerable importance. According to 
David Harvey’s theories of new imperialism, over-accumulation of capital in capitalist 
countries at a certain degree will cause a crisis if the capital cannot be reproduced 
profitably. Therefore, the capitalist system needs the cheaper labour and resources from 
the ‘outside' or ‘less developed area' to stimulate the system to create a continued 
accumulation of capital, which Harvey called ‘accumulation of dispossession’ (Harvey, 
2003: 141). China’s outward investment follows the same economic logic especially 
under the status quo that China’s GDP growth slows down.   
 
As illustrated above, the economic model of China demonstrates the characteristics of 
sub-imperialist expansion. Therefore, China's economic relation with underdeveloped 
countries can be analyzed under the theoretical framework of sub-imperialism as well. 
In the next section, the concrete manifestation of Sinicism in the case of Sino-African 
political-economic interactions will be introduced and discussed. 
 
6.1.2 Dynamics between Semi-Peripheral China and Peripheral Africa: Revising 
Galtung’s ‘Harmony of Interest’ Model  
According to Johan Galtung’s structural theory of imperialism, ‘periphery-centre 
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relationships are maintained and reinforced by information flows and through the 
reproduction of economic activities’ (Thussu 2006: 51). While the centres of the 
Periphery and the Centre are connected through ‘harmony of interest’, the peripheries 
of the Centre and the Periphery are separated by the ‘disharmony of interest’ (Galtung 
1971: 84). This Centre-Periphery model is ‘highly protective of the centre as a whole’ 
(Galtung 1971: 82), so the very existence of the disharmony of interests between 
peripheral groups makes sure that the vertical peripheral groups will never be united to 
resist the union of the central groups. Therefore, the key to the maintenance of the 
structural dominance of the Centre-Periphery model relies on two aspects: One is the 
establishment of the harmony of interest between centres through political-economic 
alignment and ideological propagation. The other is the constant cultivation of the 
disharmony of interest between peripheries.  
 
In Galtung’s revised model of imperialism, while the Centre and the Periphery (with 
capital ‘C’ and ‘P’) indicate the interstate structure of the world economic system, 
centres and peripheries (with lowercase initials) should be understood, as Cox (1987) 
and others noted, as social rather than geographical categories per se that ‘denote 
location in the transnational social structure’ (Robinson 2004: 73). More specifically, 
although it makes sense to establish for example a metaphorical alliance between Beijing 
and Washington, it is theoretically difficult to fully unfold the complicated dynamics 
between the two powers. As Edward Soja once argued, Core and Periphery could be 
understood as ‘the spatial expressions of the same underlying relations of production 
which define bourgeoisie and proletariat’ (1980: 222). From this perspective, Galtung’s 
theory of structural imperialism is exactly an attempt to incorporate the analytical lens 
of class into the imperialism paradigm, which strives to situate transnational class 
interests within the interstate system. The function of the media and information flows 
from the Centre to the Periphery, therefore, is to manufacture and reinforce the 
ideological consent between the ruling classes in both the Periphery and the Centre: ‘the 
centre in the Centre nation has a bridgehead in the Periphery nation. This is established 
as such that the Periphery centre is tied to Centre centre with the best possible tie: the 
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tie of the harmony of interest’ (Galtung 1971, 83). 
 
In Galtung’s words, the harmony of interest should be defined as a situation, where 
dominating stratums are pursuing compatible goals (Galtung 1971, 81). In the case of 
China and African countries such compatible goals can be understood and interpreted 
as a transnational elites’ understanding of the ‘win-win’ strategy to promote economic 
development both in China and Africa. And the official language of the Chinese 
government has always been very pro-active in arguing that there is a bond between 
Africa and China. For example, as the former Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen said, 
‘As developing regions that … once suffered the oppression and exploitation of 
imperialism and colonialism, China and African countries … easily understand [one 
another’s] pursuit of independence and freedom and ... have a natural feeling of 
intimacy’ (Qian, Q., 2005: 200).  
 
However, as Appadurai noted, ‘The new global cultural economy has to be understood 
as a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order, which cannot any longer be understood in 
terms of existing centre-periphery models […] The complexity of the current global 
economy has to do with certain disjunctures between economics, cultural and politics 
which we have barely begun to theorize’ (1990: 296). Apparently, China is not yet part 
and parcel of the developed Centre, but remains within the Semi-Periphery, which 
‘transfers value into imperialist economies but also appropriates the surplus value of 
weaker nations’ (Luce, 2015, 34). In this regard, the case of Sino-Africa relations cannot 
be properly captured by Galtung’s original model of structural imperialism, from which 
the position of the Semi-Periphery was absent. By adding this new dimension, a revision 
of the model appears in Figure 6.1. In this triangular structure, centres/ruling classes of 
the Centre, the Semi-Periphery and the Periphery are all connected through the 

































Figure 6.1 Revised Model of ‘Harmony of Interest’ between Centre, Semi-Periphery and 
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However, when attempting to address any form of transnational capitalist alliance, we 
should always be aware of the following questions, as noted by Amin and some others, 
whether it is ‘a group of associated classes that delineate a globally dominant historic 
bloc’ or ‘a group of classes with differing nationalities amongst other things who are 
conscious of their shared interests yet are still in competition with each other’ (2011). 
William Robinson, who has gone the furthest in terms of arguing for the emergence of a 
transnational capitalist class (TCC), argues that there is never a single TCC that all 
capitalists belong to, instead there are ‘multiple, overlapping, and competing forms of 
capital around the world’ (2004: 47). Therefore, what needs to be made clear here is 
that the harmony of interest (Hcp) between the Centre and the Periphery is not the same 
as the harmony of interest (Hsp) between the Semi-Periphery and the Periphery. In other 
words, transnational corporate complexes/transnational capitalist associations between 
the Centre and the Periphery are different from those between Semi-Periphery and 
Periphery, which is the core point of this revision. And this distinction could be further 
dissected by Galtung’s theory of a ‘Conflict of Interest’. In the original definition provided 
by Galtung:  
 
‘There is conflict, or disharmony of interest, if the two parties are coupled together 
in such a way that the LC [living condition] gap between them is increasing; there is 
no conflict, or harmony of interest, if the two parties are coupled together in such a 
way that the LC gap between them is decreasing down to zero’ (1971: 82). 
 
Galtung’s approach implies that there is not a bipolar or dichotomous relationship 
between harmony and disharmony, but the analytical capacity of unveiling ‘degrees of 
harmony and disharmony by measuring the angle between the two trajectories’, and 
more specifically, of comparing and contrasting ‘weak and strong harmony and 
disharmony’ (Galtung 1971, 82). In this regard, differences between Hcp and Hsp need 
to be situated back into the structural hierarchies of the world capitalist system and 
understood with regard to the distinctive attributes between Centre – Periphery 
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relations and Semi-periphery – Periphery relations, which indicates the nexus between 
distinctive characteristics of transnational capitalist alliances and the interstate structure 
of global capitalism. 
 
As far as the semi-periphery country is concerned, it ‘transfers value into imperialist 
economies but also appropriates the surplus value of weaker nations’ (Luce, 2015: 34). 
This in-between position of semi-peripheral countries makes their goals in the peripheral 
countries different from that of the central countries. The dependency theory, which 
emerged in the 1960s, argued that the developed countries manage to keep the 
underdeveloped countries underdeveloped to secure their central positions in the world 
system – ‘in other words, to make conditions suitable for ‘dependent development’ 
(Thussu, 2006: 47). It, however, by no means implies that the economic reform brought 
by the developed centre to the periphery has no enriching impact on the latter. But, in 
the words of Galtung, what matters most is the ‘gap’ – the difference between the living 
conditions of Centre and Periphery determines whether there exists the imperialist 
expansion or not (Galtung, 1971: 87-88).  
 
However, in the case of the interactions between semi-periphery and periphery, such 
dependent development becomes less significant as it has been replaced by a much 
more dynamic process involving a longer-term objective. In the previous model of 
Centre-Periphery, the dualistic positioning is relatively static. The group of centre 
countries, mostly Western nations, gained their central status through their colonization 
of other countries centuries ago or benefited from the new world order set in the two 
World Wars. In the 20th century, it seemed incontestable to assert that there did exist a 
global North that was much stronger than the global South. In the 21st century, however, 
the landscape has changed for obvious reasons. With the booming growth of big 
economies like India, China and Russia, the boundaries between strong North and weak 
South becomes increasingly vague. Instead, a much more global and dynamic system 
rises with new influential players and trans-national groupings such as BRICS. Therefore, 
as semi-peripheral countries, the goals of countries such as BRICS in the less developed 
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areas of the world are slightly different from that of the developed ones. This point can 
be proved in the case of Sino-African political-economic interactions.  
 
6.1.3 Manifestation of Sinicism in China-Africa Relations 
As a semi-peripheral country that is exporting semi-imperialist expansion, China’s 
international interactions with other countries are shaped by the economic realities of 
the country. Martínez summarized the dilemma faced by China: ‘we see then that 
Chinese economic growth has been checked by the following limitations: the first 
consists of the population’s resistance to the model of over-exploitation and deprivation, 
and the consequent demonstrations; the second is the health and other problems 
arising from pollution; and the third is the genuine lack of hydrocarbons and other 
strategic resources’ (2015: 138). These problems lead to the two major demands of 
China: labour and resources. This section will talk about the expression of Sinicism in 
Sino-African relations from the perspective of labour.  
 
In terms of labour, China’s achievement benefits mostly from the binary, urban versus 
rural, structure of China’s society which created a huge population of cheap labour 
(Arrighi, 2007: 351). According to the economist Arthur Lewis, the dual-sector economic 
structure in the countries with a large population is capable of producing an unlimited 
supply of labour (Lewis, 2000: 402). The case of China is even more complicated as the 
rural residents own their farming land while the urban residents do not. When the cities 
and other urban areas became marketized and rich, there appeared a huge number of 
immigrating rural residents who play the role of new proletarian class (Shen, Y., 2006). 
However, the reason the skilled labour has been very cheap in China is that, according 
to Marxist economics, immigrant workers from the rural areas are not thoroughly ‘free’ 
because they still own the means of production. ‘Double freedom’ means that ‘workers 
must be ‘free’ to sell their labour-power and they must be ‘free’ from the means of 
production’ (Marx, 1990: 874-5). Therefore, immigrant workers in China can stand the 
low wage because they hold a dual loyalty to land and factory (Burawoy, 1985: 103, cited 
in Shen, Y., 2006). This is what is called the ‘accumulation without dispossession’ based 
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on ‘peasant economy’ that immigrants in urban areas can always go back to their land 
in the countryside if they cannot survive in big cities (Yao Y., 2009).  
 
However, Arthur Lewis also predicted that there will be a turning point: ‘even if no 
legislative restriction were placed upon the flow of cheap labour, it seems inevitable in 
the long run that the early current of cheap labour should dry up, and that a reverse 
current should set in, with capital flowing to the lands of cheap labour’ (cited in Hobson, 
2013: 6). And ‘since 2004, there has been a growing shortage of rural labour in the 
coastal area of South-East China … at the same time, the cost of labour in China, in 
general, has increased constantly … during 1991-2009, the growth rate of average wages 
in the manufacturing industry has increased to 14.7 per cent’ (Zhao, Y., 2010). Therefore, 
the capitalist system in China needs the labour and resources from the ‘outside’ system 
to stimulate the internal system and to create continued accumulation of capital, which 
Harvey called ‘accumulation of dispossession’ (Harvey, 2003: 141). 
 
According to the dependency theory briefly introduced in Section 4.3.2, peripheral 
countries in Africa have grown dependent economically on China as many of these 
peripheral countries ‘remain economic appendages of the advanced capitalist countries 
and as long as their governments depend for survival on the pleasure of their foreign 
patrons’ (Baran, 1973: 123). China wants from Africa cheap natural resources as well as 
sustainable cheap skilled labour to move in due course to the ‘centre’ of the global 
system. However, the reality is that many Chinese factories have to hire Chinese workers 
from China because the labour in many African countries is neither cheap nor as skilled 
as the Chinese labour (Wonacott, 2014). China, once the biggest ‘sweatshop’ in the 
world, has constantly been providing this kind of labour for the Western world for 
decades. Although it is not very easy to duplicate the unique social structure of China in 
other countries, it is still of great importance for China to find a similar transmitting 




There are interesting similarities between China and countries in Africa: Like China, 
Africa also has dual-sector economic models based on the rural-urban structure of 
African societies. For example, in South Africa, which is another semi-peripheral country 
of BRICS, there exists a rural-urban system which also produces a lot of labour, similar to 
the situation in China (Knight, 2007: 8). But in South Africa, immigrant workers were 
protected by the trades unions. Thus, although the rural workers in South Africa were 
less skilled their wages were higher, and it leads to the consequence that while China is 
suffering from labour scarcity, South Africa is suffering from unemployment of skilled 
workers (ibid: 2). In addition, the fast urbanization in Africa, from 15% in 1960 to 40% in 
2010 (Freire, Lall and Leipziger, 2014: 1), creates the demands of factories in cities for 
more labour, so the immigrant workers from the countryside have the potential to 
become the new working class in the cities. And finally, the political status quo in most 
African countries is also similar with that of China as both believe that ‘development has 
to come first before democracy’ (Mensah, 2012).  
 
In the case of Sino-African interactions, despite the fact that China is indeed profiting 
more from trading with African countries for natural resources, Africa in return has also 
benefited from the huge capital import from China (He W., 2012). And China apparently 
is expecting more than just a peripheral country with cheap resources from Africa. To 
accomplish the transition from semi-periphery to centre, China needs a much deeper 
economic transition. China is now facing many severe financial and demographic 
problems which align with the typical symptoms of a developing ‘capitalist’ country; such 
as over-accumulation of capital, rising price of domestic labour. President Xi has 
expressed the determination of the Chinese government to implement economic 
reforms in several speeches (Xi, 2012, 2013, 2014).  
 
One of the main changes of Xi’s economic policy noted by Francois Godement is ‘the 
move to make China a capital-exporting country’ which ‘offers an outlet for the primary 
industry and state infrastructure sector whose further domestic development in China 
is no longer desirable' (Godement, 2015: 5). To obtain sustainable natural resources and 
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cheap skilled labour from African countries, China is expecting African countries to 
become more modernized and better governed. In order to secure its massive 
investment, China is also seeking for political stability through the soft power of the 
‘China Model, or Beijing Consensus’ which proves that ‘economic development and 
political stability can triumph over the need for a sound democratic system’ (Sun, Y., 2014: 
12). A modernized society with political stability is also the pursuit of the centre class of 
many African countries. As the President of Gabon, Ali Bongo Ondimba, said in an 
interview on CCTV-Africa’s programme ‘TALK AFRICA’, African countries like Gabon want 
a real win-win strategy and Gabon invites anyone who ‘really wants to come to Africa, 
to make money and (to) help us develop our countries’ (14th August 2013). In 2013, a 
white paper on ‘China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation’ was officially published 
by the Chinese government, in which six important points were made. As far as the Sino-
African economic relationship is concerned, China is expecting: 1) to promote 
sustainable development of trade; 2) to improve the level of investment and financing 
cooperation; 3) to strengthen cooperation in agriculture and food security; 4) to support 
African infrastructure construction; 5) to stress African people’s livelihood and capacity 
building and 6) to promote cooperation under the multilateral framework (The State 
Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2013). Three of these points 
of are worthy of more attention: China’s focus on agriculture, infrastructure and the 
importance of the African peoples’ capacity-building abilities. The economic logic behind 
China's particular emphasis distinguishes it from the Centre countries.  
 
Therefore, the definitive content of Sino-African centres’ harmony of interest can be 
summarized in the possible simplest ways as two primary points: 1) sustainable 
economic development of African societies, and 2) political stability of African 
governments. These two points are also the concrete content of the ideology of Sinicism 
manifested in the case of Sino-African relations. In order to manufacture and reinforce 
this ideology, the Chinese state-controlled media CCTV-Africa has been programmed to 
produce the media content which represents the values of Sinicism with a particular 
target on the elite class of the African audience. 
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6.2 The Role of CCTV-Africa in Delivering the Ideology of Sinicism 
Marx and Engels said in the famous pamphlet of ‘Communist Manifesto’: ‘the ruling 
ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class’ (Marx and Engles, 2015: 
31). And in modern societies, the production and dissemination of the ruling classes’ 
ideas are mostly contributed by mass media and its wide audience. As illustrated in 
Chapter 5 where the concept of ideology was reviewed, the ideology of a society has a 
dialectical intercourse with the system of representation of mass media. If ideology 
‘legitimated a social world characterized by inequality’, then the role of media is to 
construct consent to structural inequality to reinforce and disseminate this ideology’ 
(Downey, Titley and Toynbee, 2014: 2-3). And when it comes to the concrete process of 
how the ideology is represented by the media to achieve a certain degree of influence 
on the public, the differentiation of the various media systems regarding their operating 
mechanism on an audience needs to be recognized and clarified. For example, in some 
Western societies where the mainstream value is the ‘freedom of the press’, the credit 
of ideology is actually grounded in the meta-ideological practices of media institutions 
which are ‘independent of the direct play of political or economic interests, or of the 
state’ in this claim, ‘is not wholly fictitious’ (Hall, 1988: 86). However, the case of China’s 
state media is quite a different story. 
 
China’s state media has long been argued as the manifestation of propaganda model 
manufacturing consent discipline and mute the herd of public (Herman and Chomsky, 
1988). However, the five filters of editorial bias, which are ‘ownership’, ‘advertising’, 
‘source’, ‘flak’ and ‘anti-communism’ (Chomsky, 2013), implemented by the propaganda 
model are not entirely applicable in the case of CCTV in Africa. Not only CCTV in Africa is 
a transnational media with foreigners of other nationalities as audience, but also the 
news content of CCTV-Africa is rather positive messages instead of negative ones which 
increase the fear of public to make them dependent on governments. Therefore, in the 
field of international communication media studies, the propaganda model which used 
to be deployed to analyse China’s state media needs to be revised to cater to the 
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dynamics and complexes of contemporary research purposes. And in order to have a 
clearer understanding about the true nature of CCTV as a state television, the following 
Section 6.2.1 is going to provide a brief introduction to the development of China Central 
Television and its English news channel CCTV- Africa with a focus on African programmes. 
The introduction is aimed to depict a general outline of CCTV and CCTV-Africa as the 
state-controlled media of the Chinese government. After the explanation of the 
broadcasting mechanism of CCTV, section 6.2.2 introduces the African audience and the 
rationale for the selection of African students in China, who are also part of the audience 
of CCTV-Africa as the research subjects of this thesis.  
 
6.2.1 China Central Television and CCTV-Africa 
It is generally believed that:  
 
‘critical theorists of the neo-Marxist and political economy traditions had little 
interest in explanations of the role of the media in relation to society, since the 
critical paradigm offered a clear message that the established, mainstream media 
were inevitably on the side of an unjust social order and a fundamentally flawed 
institution. Theorists and researchers worked at revealing the class bias and 
ideological character of media content and the general tendency toward hegemony’ 
(Christians et al, 2009: 14).  
 
It can be argued that the main mechanism of all the capitalist media systems is 
consistently to manufacture ideology which reinforces the hegemonic social structure. 
However, different media systems of different societies work differently to produce 
various types of ideologies, even though all those ideologies are based on the same 
economic base of capitalism. Therefore, it is fair to say that ‘the press always takes on 
the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates. 
Especially, it reflects the system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and 
institutions are adjusted’ as expressed in the famous book Four Theories of the Press 
(Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm, 1984: 1-2). The typology of the Four Theories of the 
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Press has been criticized and revised for ‘it defines the four theories from within one of 
the four theories – classical liberalism’ (Christians et al, 2009: 4). But it is feasible to have 
a clear understanding of the differences of various media systems in the current global 
view especially when it comes to the particular example of the system of China’s state-
controlled media, which is largely different from many other media systems in the world.  
 
Generally speaking, there are also four types of media systems which are ‘authoritarian, 
paternal (‘an authoritarian system with a conscience’), commercial, and democratic’ 
(Christians et al, 2009: 8). A simplified definition is provided by Watson and Hill: ‘The 
first (authoritarian) indicates a total monopoly of the means of communication and 
control over what is expressed. The second (paternal) is … authority with Values and 
purposes beyond those concerning the maintenance of its power. The third (commercial) 
relates to control by market forces: anything can be said, provided that you can afford to 
say it and that you can say it profitably. Democratic control is the rarest category, 
implying active involvement in decisions by the workforce and, indeed, the readership 
or audience’ (Watson and Hill, 2015: 177).  
 
China’s media system is a combination of ‘paternal’ and ‘commercial’. With the growth 
and booming of the Chinese economy embracing global liberalization since 1978, China’s 
media industry has undertaken many significant transformations (Xin, 2006). Although 
driven by liberal economy and reformist advocates, messages delivered by Chinese 
media like Chinese television ‘considered as the most promising medium to be 
internationalized or globalized’ (Xin, 2006: 03) is still clearly branded as the mouthpiece 
of government due to its distinct ideological content (Zhao, 1998: 181-94). Therefore, 
the commercial liberalization of media in China is limited to the area of apolitical media 
content production, while the eternal censorship is still in the hands of the central 
government. The development of China Central Television is a typical example of this 
mixed type of media system of China.  
 
China Central Television (CCTV) was founded in 1958, but it was not until two decades 
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later when China started to embrace the world under the open-and-reform policy 
introduced by Deng Xiaoping, that CCTV finally launched itself into a new era of 
development and became a popular medium (Ju, 2009). Following the usual traditions 
for China’s media, in the late 1950s, CCTV was a propaganda tool used to promote and 
to advocate the political machinery in China. After it changed its name from ‘China 
People’s Television Network’ (or China’s Peking Television) to ‘China Central Television’ 
in 1978, CCTV – or rather the Chinese leadership – took action to boost the country’s 
new media industry, which was lagging behind world standards (ibid). CCTV was at the 
top of China’s four-tier television pyramid that constituted national, provincial, county 
and city television stations (Zhu, 2012: 4). As the primary national media institution, 
CCTV was a powerful and driving force in championing the neo-liberal campaigns of the 
1980s. 
 
Although in terms of economic development, China has become much more neo-liberal 
due to rapid industrial marketization, the control on national media such as CCTV has 
never loosened. Since the day CCTV was born, it was under the administration and diktat 
of two of China’s state information organizations, the Communist Party’s (CCP) 
propaganda department and the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television 
(SARFT). The former looks after ideological guidelines and issues directives on ‘clear 
thinking and following Party policy’ while the latter edits or censors all the daily content 
CCTV produces in case there are any sensitive topics (ibid). In exchange for this restrictive 
surveillance from China’s Communist Party, CCTV enjoys many privileges such as the 
‘must carry’ rule that other regional TV stations must supply news resources to CCTV 
and must rebroadcast the 7.00 pm CCTV News programme at the same time every day 
(ibid: 197); add to that the CCP provides CCTV with first-hand information about national 
policies and instructs all the local media, both broadcast and print, to use them with a 
name check to the main media source in Beijing. Due to the further marketization of the 
media industry, CCTV along with other state media has undertaken many institutional 
transformations to cater to its growing audience and to survive the increasingly fierce 
competition (ibid: 218). But CCTV still is, and will be for a rather long period, the 
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dominant player in China’s television broadcasting market because of its unshakable 
political status (ibid: 3-7).  
 
In 2001, the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin along with the SARFT administration 
jointly launched the trail-blazing ‘Going Out’ venture, which was directly aimed at ‘taking 
the PRC’s voice to the world’ by making China’s TV and radio channels accessible 
overseas (ibid: 169). This ‘going out’ project was actually first kick-started from the late-
1990s with only ‘industrial and trade enterprises’ involved back then (Xin, 2009: 363). 
But even before that, to follow the instructions given by the central government to have 
an international approach and to become more effective in the market economy, CCTV 
established its own commercial company ‘China International Television Corporation’ 
(CITC) in 1984 and CCTV started to produce programmes with a foreign perspective or 
characteristics. In the 1980s, a programme called ‘Follow Me’ was produced, aimed at 
helping the Chinese public learn English and, in 1986, another English language 
programme was launched called ‘English News’ (Jirik, 2008). However, until 1995, when 
the management in CCTV started to expand the English programme team, ‘English News’ 
was just a fifteen minutes daily bulletin, which was basically a series of brief items 
translated from the main content of the then CCTV News (Xinwen Lianbo), which was a 
national news programme (Jirik, 2008: 82).  
 
Four years later, CCTV’s Overseas Service Center (OSC) was further developed to support 
and manage the foreign language channels better. Finally, in 2000, CCTV-9, was elevated 
from being three daily, half-hour bulletins on CCTV-4, to an independent English-
language channel, which was the predecessor of the current CCTV-News. The 
establishment of CCTV-9 was incorporated and launched with the unprecedented 
enthusiasm and ambition of CCTV’s leadership: ‘A media manager involved in the ‘Going 
Out’ policy told one visiting researcher in 2003 that the aim of CCTV International was 
to be ‘China’s CNN, only cleverer’. According to CCTV management, the first time they 
heard the term ‘China’s CNN’ was in a meeting with SARFT and the Chinese government’s 
Propaganda Department in 2001 when Xu Guangchun used it to describe the role of 
 
CCTV-9 in the context of the ‘Going Out’ project. The first step in realizing this goal had 
been the launch of CCTV-9’ (Jirik, 2008: 84).  
 
One month after its first broadcast in the new format in September 2000, CCTV-9 was 
instructed by the management to become a cable TV deliverer. Through cooperation 
with foreign media outfits, such as AOL-Time Warner and News Corporation, the channel 
obtained access to the foreign television market. Until then, CCTV-9 had faced a long 
journey in its goal of becoming a fully professional news channel in the sense that might 
be understood by CNN, Fox, Sky or the BBC, although it did offer a comprehensive service 
with programmes like ‘Learn to Speak Chinese’ and ‘Travelogue’ slotted into the prime 
time. The Chinese government leadership soon realized its shortcomings, and three 
years later in 2003 official instructions were issued by the then party Politburo’s member 
Li Changchun insisting that CCTV-9 was mandated to ‘present a Chinese perspective on 
issues that interest the world and that the channel must report world news in a timely 
fashion’ (cited in Jirik, 2008: 103). This instruction led to a revamp within the channel 
with a significant adjustment to the broadcasting order of the programmes. More news-
oriented programmes could now be seen at prime times, and also across the weekend 
broadcasting schedule. However, after the restructuring there was no instant or 
noticeable effect, essentially because the basic content of the channel was almost the 
same: a mixture of informational, educational and entertainment programmes. 
 
This situation continued until April 2010 when CCTV-9 was re-launched with a brand-
new name ‘CCTV-News’, and a fresh structure of programmes introduced, aiming to 
make it a professional international news channel. After a series of constant 
improvements since the channel was first set up, this final ‘revolutionary’ revamp was 
reckoned to be a major issue. CCTV-News, now with two main bureaux, or hubs - in 
Nairobi and Washington, both began broadcasting in late 2012 - is now the most 
recognizable face of China’s official international TV channel and also ‘the first 
international media to dedicate more time to Africa through CCTV Africa programmes 
such as Africa Live, Talk Africa and Faces of Africa’ (Zhang, Y.Q., 2014). Compared to the 
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media operation in Washington, CCTV’s African media centre in Nairobi seems more 
influential and dynamic. At the time, there was considerable worldwide interest in this 
move and the Financial Times newspaper wrote that the channel was launched to 
counteract what the Chinese government saw as a negative image of China spread by 
the Western media. Dong Tiance, a journalism professor at Jinan University in 
Guangzhou in southern China observed: ‘The big Western news agencies dominate 
about 80 per cent of the news flow and if China wants to strengthen its soft power, it 
must speak through its own media. The strengthening of (China’s) international 
broadcasting allows the world to understand us more thoroughly and increase our 
influence.’ CCTV News Programming Director Zhuang Dianjun said, ‘CCTV's African 
bureau marks another step in strengthening diplomatic relations between China and 
African countries. I am convinced that CCTV's increased coverage of Africa will provide 
Chinese viewers with a chance to understand better Africa … The permanent secretary 
of the Kenyan Information & Commercial Ministry said, China has become a very strong 
partner in Kenya, any of the flyovers you see in Nairobi Chinese are building, any of the 
laying of fiber that is being done, Chinese are doing it, together with Kenyans we need 
to continue with these partnerships’ (Zhang, N., 2010).  
 
Apparently, China’s long-term investment in Kenya helped in getting support for its CCTV 
bureau plans from the Kenyan government, and made it easier for Chinese media to 
penetrate into the indigenous society and ‘dig out’ more valuable news compared to 
what CCTV’s reporters and presenters can achieve in its Washington hub. ‘Some of the 
most familiar and talented (local) anchors were recruited to present the three 
programmes which marked the launch of CCTV Africa: ‘Africa Live’, an hour-long 
newscast on current affairs, business and sports, airing daily at 8 pm Eastern Africa Time; 
‘Talk Africa’, a weekly talk-show discussing important events of the week; and ‘Faces of 
Africa’, a programme dedicated to remarkable figures in African history and to ordinary 
Africans who accomplished the extraordinary’ (Gagliardone, 2013: 30). To local people, 
what CCTV was doing there perhaps meant far more than just reporting the news. 
According to Mark Masai, the Kenyan anchor of CCTV’s show ‘Africa Live’, the Chinese 
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media was dedicated to ‘tilting the scale and ... Showing the potential and the solution 
to these [problems] and not just pointing out blatantly the bad side, the problems and 
the crisis that [Kenya] has’, and the mission of his programme ─ ‘Africa Live’ ─ is to change 
the narrative about Africa (McKenzie, D., 2012).  
 
Galtung wrote that ‘we all know that the major agencies are in the hands of the Centre 
countries, relying on Centre-dominated, feudal networks of communication’ (Galtung, 
1971: 93). However, in the case of CCTV-Africa, the reality is that it is currently technically 
and structurally incapable of competing with international media institutions like CNN, 
BBC, Fox or even Sky. Although China has been trying to penetrate and integrate into the 
local news industry in Africa for a few years, the mainstream of African journalistic 
professionalism remains highly Westernized. And Western media, though with different 
agenda-settings role, such as those of CNN and BBC, are far more influential than 
Chinese media in many African countries (Gorfinkel et al, 2014: 86). Thus, despite the 
fact that the theory of structural imperialism fits the reality of Sino-African relations on 
the political and economic level, it does not fully explain the particular situation of how 
Chinese media is paving its way in the African news market and manufacturing 
ideological consent among its target audience among the elite. However, understanding 
the ideological consent underpinned by the harmony of interest between Chinese and 
the African centre class is the key to revealing the mechanism of the structural sub-
imperialist media flow from semi-peripheral to peripheral countries. Therefore, the 
process of manufacturing such ideological consent needs to be further discussed 
through the particular case study of the Africa-focused programmes produced by CCTV- 
Africa. 
 
As discussed in the last section, the structural imperialism theory of Galtung tells us that 
the maintenance of the dominant global structure relies on the harmony of interest 
between the centre of Centre and centre of Periphery. The particular kind of harmony 
of interest between Chinese elites and African elites, as introduced in Section 6.1.2, has 
cultivated a specific form of ideology which is defined as Sinicism in this research and is 
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observable in the representation of the media content of CCTV-Africa. It has been 
noticed that the elite and official speakers are the major figures in the media coverage 
of Ebola report of CCTV-Africa (Marsh and Xiang, 2016). And the general media content 
of CCTV-Africa has been focused on the topics of ‘solutions’, ‘social harmony’ and 
‘stability’ (Marsh, 2016). These studies suggest that the aim of CCTV-Africa is to target 
the elite class of the African audience instead of the whole public to build ideological 
consensus for elite cooperation.  
 
6.2.2 African Students as Target Audience of CCTV-Africa 
As the first English news channel established by China Central Television, it is said that 
CCTV-news channel, previously CCTV-9, now covers 98% of the earth’s surface through 
six satellites, and it has an audience of 40 million across Asia, Europe, and America (Yan 
and Ke, 2009: 70). However, there have been few further surveys to testify whether that 
40 million audience exists or not. CCTV-news channel is accessible in many countries 
indeed, but little effort has been made to conduct methodologically reliable surveys, 
whether by academics or media practitioners, to identify its real overseas audience. The 
producers of CCTV-News do have a very general idea of who they are producing 
programmes for in the global English-speaking audience (Jirik, undated: 7).  
 
One consultant of CCTV-news interviewed by Jirik described a more accurate target 
saying that ‘the channel should be directed at the foreign audience, particularly overseas, 
and in particular at ‘opinion makers’’ (Jirik, 2008: 241). In reality, it seems that their goal 
has been partially achieved. Research conducted by Guo and his colleagues in 2005 
indicates that about 77% of CCTV-News’ foreign audience are from the middle or even 
higher class and their occupations include ‘entrepreneurs, educators, politicians and 
technology developers’ (Guo, Wang and Sang, 2005: 4). This profile of CCTV-News’s 
target audience has been reconfirmed by other audience research. For example, one 
survey conducted by CCTV Golden Bridge International Media Group (CTVGB) shows that 
CCTV-News is not only targeting the oversea elite class but also the domestic opinion 
leaders as well (CTVGB, undated). And the data collected and analyzed by Guo and his 
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colleagues shows that, as indicated in Chart 6.1, the Chinese audience in China and the 
foreign audience outside China are the majority of the audience of CCTV-news. 
Therefore, instead of producing the news programmes for the public of a particular 
nation-state, CCTV-News is aiming its content for the global elite class. 
 
While in the case of CCTV-Africa, the same principle applies: Gorfinkel and her colleagues 
noted that it could be quite difficult sometimes to tell whom the CCTV-Africa is 
programming for. With the slogan of ‘Introducing Africa to the world’, it seems that the 
‘African audiences are not intended’, and ‘occasionally programming appears to target 
primarily Chinese audiences’ as well (2014: 83). However, it could be less confusing if 
the audience of CCTV-Africa can be analyzed as different classes instead of a 
homogeneous unity. As illustrated in the above sections, the Chinese and African centre 
class are united in the harmony of interest which is mostly manifested in the political 
and economic alignment between Chinese and African governments. And there is little 
doubt about asserting that the state-owned CCTV-News, especially under the restricted 
administration of Xi's media policy, is adequately representing the direct interest of the 
Chinese government exclusively. Therefore, CCTV-Africa with the particular focus on 
African issues is naturally programmed to facilitate and to promote the harmony of 
interest of Sino-African centre classes through continuously manufacturing and 
reinforcing the ideological consent on the subjects of economic development and 
political stability. The question remains though how this ideological consent is cultivated 





Chart 6.1 Audience Profile of CCTV-News (Guo, Wang and Sang, 2005) 
 
 
The audience profile of CCTV-Africa in African countries is not very clear due to the 
shortage of related research. It is assumed that CCTV-Africa, in general, is still not very 
appealing to the African audience, though it is said that Chinese TV soaps are enjoying a 
certain degree of popularity in some African countries (Tao, 2015). However, a 
questionnaire conducted by a Chinese scholar among the African students (professionals) 
who were participating in a training programme organized by the State Administration 
of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television of China from June 2013 to June 2014, 
indicates that 92% of the 358 participants watched the programmes produced by CCTV, 
though not CCTV-Africa particularly, and 23.5% voted CCTV as one of their top three 
favourite international televisions next to the BBC (40.2%), France 24 (36.9%) and CNN 
(24%) (Yan, C.S., 2015). Clearly, there are different viewing habits among African 
audience due to their different social status. The demographic characteristic of African 
students who are studying at universities in China indicates they have the potential for 
being or becoming the elites of many African societies.  
 










to the age of Mao when China was following the principles of international communism 
to aid the colonized third world countries (Liu, 2013). After the establishment of the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, there has been a noticeable 
increase in the number of the scholarships offered by the Chinese government for 
African students, ‘from 2000 awards in 2006 to 4000 awards by 2009 and to a total of 
6000 by 2015’ (King, 2013: 69-75). The actual number of the scholarships varies. 
According to an article in The Guardian, in 2013, there were an ‘estimated 12,000 African 
students studying in China with the support of the Chinese government’ (Allison, 2013). 
Despite the difficulty of establishing the number, it is doubtless that Chinese government 
is definitely making more efforts to boost the China-Africa educational cooperation in 
order to ‘increase mutual understanding and friendship between our two peoples and 
particularly the young generations’ as the former president Hu Jintao once said in an 
opening ceremony of a summit (Tarrósy, 2015). The logic behind the project seems quite 
understandable. ‘Almost all the scholarships (for African students) are awarded at post-
graduate level; the idea is to get people who are already well-educated and established 
in their home’ (Allison, 2013). It is believed by the Chinese government that the ‘African 
students who return to their homelands have played positive roles in their nations’ 
politics and economics as well as cultural development respectively’ (King, 2013: 68). 
Therefore, there are increasing higher education institutions in China, either supported 
by the governmental policy or encouraged by the profit of international students’ 
markets, are recruiting students from all kinds of countries from the continent of Africa. 
And there is also an increasing number of training projects specially designed for 
journalists from Africa to deepen “their journalistic knowledge on China’s development 





Chart 6.2 The Increasing Number of African Students Studying in China (Liu, 2013; 
Rowe, 2017; Breeze and Moore, 2017; ASKCI, 2017) 
 
 
Thanks to the promotion of the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 and China’s national 
scholarship project, there is an increasing number of African students coming to China 
for education as shown in Chart 6.2 (Liu, 2013). It is estimated that by 2013, there were 
roughly 30,000 African students studying in China and 18,000 of them were self-funded 
(Allison, 2013). As part of the important component of African diaspora in China, African 
students studying in China are like the bridge between China and their original countries. 
As described in Adams Bodomo’s book ‘Africans in China: A Sociocultural Study and Its 
Implications on Africa-China Relations’: “African communities are really “working as a 
political, economic, cultural and linguistic link between Africa and China, bringing added 
benefit to the already existing connections” (Rodríguez, 2013: 198).  
 
The foreign students’ project has always been seen as a strategy for the Chinese 
government to enhance its soft power and to improve its image. However, how powerful 
or effective the ‘soft’ power is regarding influencing people’s minds is difficult to 
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fundamentally conditioned by the economic base. As one African student expressed in 
an interview: ‘We are influenced by our time here (China), but that does not mean we’ll 
be totally in favour of them. It’s not like a father and child. We are the future leaders of 
our countries, and we’ll look for the future benefit of our countries. We know what we 
are doing’ (ibid).  
 
However, despite the conflicting interests of different nation-states, a unified global 
ruling class has emerged in recent decades (Robinson and Harris, 2000). It is true to say 
that the unprecedented progress of economic globalization has, to some extent, 
increased the nationalism of different nation-states (Held, 2002: 123-9). However, 
according to the structural theory of imperialism, the ideology of nationalism is the 
barrier for the peripheral class of both centre and peripheral countries to unite to resist 
the dominant global structures. The members of the global ruling class, despite their 
different nationalities, have more harmony of interests than disharmony of interests, 
such as the Sino-African centre class as illustrated in section 6.1.2. And it is widely 
realized that ‘within the next couple of years, many of these (African) graduates are 
going to be in positions of power and influence’ (Allison, 2013). As the future elites of 
their countries, African students who are studying in China satisfy every requirement of 
being CCTV-Africa’s target audience: well-educated and part of current or potential elite. 
Their roles as future leaders in Africa also means that they are a ‘captive’ future audience 
for CCTV, and China’s cultural messages. They are also the group of people who are key 
to the dominant structure of global capitalism.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
In summary, as indicated in Chart 6.3, the ideology of Sinicism is produced due to China’s 
semi-peripheral status in the global capitalist system. This particular condition pushes 
China to export sub-imperialist economic expansion to less developed countries to 
survive the competition and to work towards getting into the list of centre countries. On 
the other hand, the less developed countries also want to grow as a dependent economy 
on China to transfer from a peripheral country to semi-peripheral state. In the case of 
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China’s political-economic interactions with African nations, the concrete manifestation 
of Sinicism has two dimensions. One is the pursuit of neoliberal economic development. 
The other is to maintain the political stability in African countries. These two points are 
the substantial content of the ideological consent shared by both Chinese and African 
elite classes, and which are being represented by the CCTV-Africa news programmes. By 
consistently delivering this ideology of Sinicism to the African students in China who are 
defined as the future elites of African countries, CCTV-Africa can reinforce the harmony 
















Chart 6.3 Sinicization of China into Africa 
 
 
Therefore, exploring how the African students in China perceive this ideology of Sinicism 
delivered by CCTV-Africa is of great importance for us to truly understand the 
mechanism of mass media to build up the connection between social reality and human 
perception.  
Global System of Capitalism 
China’s Growing Participation in Africa with  
Sub-Imperialist Characteristics 
Harmony of Interest of Transnational 
Centre Classes between China and Africa 
China State Media 
in Africa 
(CCTV-Africa) 
African (Potential) Elites 
(African Students in China) 
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Chapter 7 - Methodology and Methods 
 
This chapter explains the research design, introduces the research questions, hypothesis 
and research methods of this thesis and illustrates the necessity of deploying a critical 
research method combining both qualitative and quantitative aspects. There are three 
main research methods deployed for the field research: an online questionnaire, 
individual interviews, and content analysis. Each is used to collect different data and 
materials for this research.  
 
There have been two online questionnaires, which were conducted in 2014 and 2016 
separately. The 2014 questionnaire was conducted at the very beginning of the research, 
which collected general information about the perceptions and viewing habits of foreign 
students in China. The results of that 2014 questionnaire were the empirical basis for 
assembling and shaping the final research questions and hypothesis. The 2016 
questionnaire, on the other hand, was a pre-screening procedure to select the 
appropriate interviewees for individual semi-structured interviews in the summer of 
2016. In order to provide solid research results endorsed by scientific proof, the third 
main research method – content analysis - was deployed as a triangulation to the 
qualitative research of individual interviews. The content analysis is based on a business 
news programme on CCTV-Africa called Global Business (Africa). Besides the quantitative 
content analysis, the triangulation also contains a focused discourse analysis of a special 
edition of the business news programme. Therefore, both the main method and 
triangulation are comprised of qualitative and quantitative dimensions, which is also the 
methodological pursuit of this research.  
 
This chapter is constituted of three main sections. The first is a brief review on the origins 
and characteristics of different research approaches. Through analysing the differences 
of these methods, it provides the rationale for deploying a mixed-method and critical 
approach for this research. The second section sets out the research design with detailed 
and systematic discussions on the necessity of deploying appropriate research methods 
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for each step; and especially in the sub-section of research questions and hypothesis, 
the empirical results of the 2014 questionnaire will be used as support for the 
formulation of the research question. The third section examines the limited validity of 
generalization of the methods deployed in this research with a brief conclusion directing 
attention to the numerous findings of the next chapter. 
 
7.1 A Brief Review on Quantitative, Qualitative and Critical Methodologies and 
Methods 
The original research question which attracted the researcher to conduct the following 
research is based on the previous study by the researcher on CCTV-News and the ‘going 
out policy’ of the Chinese media. The curiosity of the researcher was aroused on the 
perception of foreign audiences of CCTV-News, which is a global Chinese government 
supported media platform aimed it foreign publics. Therefore, the initial research 
question is aimed at finding out how the foreign audiences of CCTV-news interpret and 
understand the agenda of the broadcasting organisation. In order to set up the 
foundation of methodology and to ascertain the most suitable methods to conduct 
scientific social research to answer the question accurately, a brief review of the current 
mainstream methodologies and related methods is necessary.  
 
The concept of ‘social research’ refers to the ‘academic research on topics relating to 
questions relevant to the social scientific fields, such as sociology, human geography, 
social policy, politics, and criminology’ (Bryman, 2012: 4). The methodology deployed by 
the researcher reflects the fundamental ontology and epistemology of the social 
research. It is usually accepted that ontology is about people’s ‘beliefs about the nature 
of the social world’, and epistemology is about the ‘nature of knowledge and how it can 
be acquired’ (Snape and Spencer, 2003: 2). There have always been divergences between 
different schools of epistemology and ontology in the field of social research. As shown 
in Table 7.1, the differences between qualitative research and quantitative research, 
regarding epistemological and ontological orientations, are that the research 
methodology of the former is usually objective and positive, and the latter is 
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constructive and interpretive. Moreover, unlike qualitative research which is mostly 
conducted to generate a new theory based on the knowledge acquired from ground, 
quantitative research, which follows the natural science model, is more likely to 
mechanically follow the structures of theories: either for or against. But it does not 
necessarily mean that these two research traditions are always in opposition to each 
other.  
 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
Principal orientation to 
the role of theory 
Deductive testing of 
theory 
Inductive; 
generation of theory 
Epistemological 
orientation 
Natural science model, in 
particular, positivism 
Interpretivism 
Ontological orientation Objectivism Constructionism 
 
Table 7.1 Fundamental Difference between Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Strategies (Bryman, 2012: 36) 
 
As illustrated in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2, the methodology of media audience research 
combines both the ethnographic method of anthropology and the scientific method of 
modern sociology. The former is usually qualitative, and the latter is mostly quantitative. 
Many scholars of media audience studies have advocated combining these two methods 
to get the maximized beneficial result from both. The difficulties of deploying a mixed 
research method are various, such as the ontological and epistemological divergence, 
inconsistency of research designs and so on. Therefore, to find out an applicable mixed 
method with both qualitative and quantitative natures, it is of great importance for us 
to first have a general idea of the definitions and practices of these two methods.  
 
7.1.1 Quantitative research 
The most common definition of quantitative research is that it is ‘a formal, objective, 
systematic process in which numerical data are used to obtain information about the 
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world’ (Burns and Grove, 2005: 23). As we can see from Table 6.1, quantitative research 
is always regarded as positivist. The origin of positivism can be traced back to 1637 when 
the French philosopher René Descartes wrote a book called Discourse on Methodology 
‘in which he focused on the importance of objectivity and evidence in the search for 
truth’ (Snape and Spencer, 2013: 9). In the following century, many scientists and 
philosophers, such as Isaac Newton, Francis Bacon and David Hume, were in approval of 
the epistemology that ‘knowledge about the world can be acquired through direct 
observation’ and the observation should be collected in an ‘objective and unbiased way’ 
which are ‘key tenets of empirical research’ (ibid). The emergence of sociology in the 
late 17th century was closely interlinked with the development of positivism: 
 
‘Sociology was characterised … as ‘an attempt to create a method of historical and 
political science in a form dependent on a pre-elaborated philosophical system, that 
of evolutionist positivism … It became a philosophy of non-philosophers, an attempt 
to provide a schematic description and classification of historical and political facts, 
according to criteria built up on the model of natural science. It is therefore an 
attempt to derive ‘experimentally’ the laws of evolution of human society in such a 
way as to ‘predict’ that the oak tree will develop out of the acorn’’ (Gramsci, 1971: 
426).  
 
Indeed, the widely-recognized founding father of sociology, Aguste Comte, ‘asserted that 
the social world could and should be studied in much the same way as the natural world, 
based on direct observations from which universal and invariant laws of human 
behaviour could be identified’ (Snape and Spencer, 2013: 9). However, during the 1930s 
and 1940s, there emerged scepticism about how the objective observation of the social 
world can contribute to the production of knowledge which is supposed to be helpful in 
revealing the truth of the world.  
 
The epistemological divergence between inductive and deductive methodologies has 
pushed the positivist research towards a new tendency. The inductive logic ‘involves 
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building knowledge from the bottom up through observation of the world, which in turn 
provide the basis for developing theories or laws’ (Snape and Spencer, 2013: 7). However, 
it was realized that without the support of systematically established theories, ‘it was 
always possible that a future observation might prove an exception’ to the previous 
observations on the ground (ibid: 9). As Bryman as noted, ‘Social scientists are 
sometimes prone to being somewhat dismissive of research that has no obvious 
connections with theory – in either the grand or the middle-range senses of the term. 
Such research is often dismissed as naïve empiricism’ (Bryman, 2012: 22). The new 
tendency of positivism, which is later referred as ‘post-positivism’ or ‘post-empiricism’, 





Figure 7.1 The Process of Quantitative Research (Bryman, 2012: 161) 
  
Deductive logic refers to ‘a top-down approach to knowledge. It starts with a theory from 

























hypothesis will then be confirmed or rejected, thereby strengthening or weakening the 
theory’ (ibid: 7). As shown in Figure 7.1, the circular process of quantitative research 
starts with a theory or hypothesis and ends up with a result proving or denying the 
original theory or hypothesis. The findings of the deductive quantitative research are 
always expected to provide a quantified and generalized truth for certain kind of social 
phenomena ‘by way of generating numerical data or data that can be transformed into 
useable statistics’ (Wyse, 2011). Such characteristics can be noticed in the two most 
frequently deployed methodological strategies for quantitative research - ‘Experiments’ 
and ‘Surveys’ (Creswell, 2009: 14). The former ‘includes true experiments, with the 
random assignment of subjects to treatment conditions, as well as quasi-experiments 
that use nonrandomized designs’, and the latter ‘includes cross-sectional and 
longitudinal studies using questionnaires or structured interviews for data collection, 




Table 7.2 Five Principles of Positivism in Social Research 
 
Although many researchers believe that positivism and post-positivism approve that ‘the 
methods used in the natural sciences are appropriate for studying the social world’ (ibid: 
10), ‘there is a long-standing debate about the appropriateness of the natural science 
model for the study of society’ (Bryman, 2012: 28). In Table 7.2, the five principles 
summarized by Bryman indicate how positivist social research can be structured 
methodologically to study phenomena realized through subjective senses (2012: 28).  
 
1. Only phenomena and hence 
knowledge confirmed by the 
senses can genuinely be 
warranted as knowledge (the 
principle of phenomenalism).
2. The purpose of theory is to 
generate hypotheses that can be 
tested and that will thereby allow 
explanations of laws to be assessed 
(the principle of deductivism).
3. Knowledge is arrived 
at through the gathering 
of facts that provide the 
basis for laws (the 
principle of inductivism).
4. Science must (and 
presumably can) be 
conducted in a way that 
is value free (that is, 
objective).
5. There is clear distinction between scientific statements and 
normative statements and a belief that the former are the true 
domain of the scientist. This last principle is implied by the first 
because the truth or otherwise of normative statements cannot 
be confirmed by the senses.
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7.1.2 Qualitative research 
Qualitative research ‘is often described as a naturalistic, interpretative approach, 
concerned with exploring phenomena ‘from the interior’’ (Flick, 2009). As we can see 
from Figure 7.1, epistemologically speaking, qualitative research is largely regarded as 
closely interlinked with interpretivism. Like positivism, the historical origin of 
interpretivism also involved another philosopher - Immanuel Kant. In his masterpiece 
Critique of Pure Reason published in 1781, Kant brought up new proposals on the 
approaches to obtain knowledge about the world: 
 
‘Perceptions relates not only to the senses but to human interpretations of what our 
senses tell us; Our knowledge of the world is based on ‘understanding’ which arises 
from thinking about what happens to us, not just simply from having had particular 
experiences; Knowing and knowledge transcend basic empirical enquiry; 
Distinctions exist between ‘scientific reason’ (based strictly on causal determinism) 
and ‘practical reason’ (based on moral freedom and decision-making which involve 
less certainty)’ (Snape and Spencer, 2003: 6-7).  
 
By highlighting the subjective autonomy of ‘understanding’ the experience that happens 
to us, interpretivism with an idealist perspective differentiates itself from positivism 
which is based on the absolute objectivity of truth. In later years, Max Weber inherited 
the idea of ‘understanding’, and ‘he emphasised that the researcher must understand 
the meaning of social actions within the context of the material conditions in which 
people live’ (Snape and Spence, 2003: 7). Weber further distinguished the differences of 
understandings in natural science and social science: ‘in the natural sciences, the 
purpose is to produce law-like propositions whereas in the social sciences, the aim is to 
understand subjectively meaningful experiences’ (ibid).  
 
Especially in the postmodernist age of social science, ‘advocates of postmodernism have 
argued that the era of big narratives and theories is over’ and instead ‘locally, temporally, 
and situationally limited narratives are now required’ (Flick, 2009: 12). Such emphasis 
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on contextual triviality and individual subjective perceptions can be noticed in the 
strategic approaches deployed by qualitative research. Table 6.3 displays five main 
strategies of qualitative research summarized by John W. Creswell, which are 
‘ethnographies’, ‘grounded theory’, ‘case studies’, ‘phenomenological research’ and 




Table 7.3 Five Main Qualitative Approaches (Bryman, 2009: 13) 
 
Compared to the deductive quantitative research method, the process of qualitative 
research in social science is much more inductive. As indicated in Figure 7.2, the process 
of qualitative research method is bottom-up with more reflexivity. Qualitative research 
starts with a general question derived from physical observation, and data is collected 
to export theory instead of being guided and limited by the theory. Moreover, as shown 
in Figure 7.2, the interaction between step 4 and 5 allows the researcher to analyse the 
data and rationalize the theoretical frame more dialectical by reconsidering each other 
with more solid empirical or theoretical ground. And the extra self-circle of step 5a and 
Ethnography is a strategy of 
inquiry in which the research 
studies an intact cultural group 
in a natural setting over a 
prolonged period of time by 
collecting, primarily, 
observational and interview 
data. The research process if 
flexible and typically evolves 
contextually in response to the 
lived realities encountered in 
the field setting.
Ground theory is a strategy 
of inquiry in which the 
researcher derives a general, 
abstract theory of a process, 
action, or interaction grounded 
in the views of participants. 
This process involves using 
multiple stages of data 
collection and the refinement 
and interrelationship of 
categories of information.
Case studies are a strategy of 
inquiry in which the 
researcher explores in depth 
a program, event, activity, 
process, or one or more 
individuals. Case are 
bounded by time and activity, 
and researchers collect 
detailed information using a 
variety of data collection 
procedures over a sustained 
period of time.
Phenomenological research is a strategy of 
inquiry in which the researcher identifies the 
essence of human experiences about a 
phenomenon as described by participants. 
Understanding the lived experiences marks 
phenomenology as a philosophy as well as a 
method, and the procedure involves studying a 
small number of subjects through extensive 
and prolonged engagement to develop patterns 
and relationships of meaning.
Narrative research is a strategy of 
inquiry in which the researcher studies 
the lives of individuals and asks one or 
more individuals to provide stories 
about their lives. This information is 
then often retold or restoried by the 
researcher into a narrative chronology. 
In the end, the narrative combined 
views from the participant's life with 
those of the researcher's life in a 
collaborative narrative.
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5b subsumed within step 5 indicates the flexibility of social research in terms of 
strengthening the core theme of research and collecting valuable data. As Bryman points 
out: ‘research is done to answer questions posed by theoretical considerations. But an 
alternative position is to view theory as something that occurs after the collection and 









Figure 7.2 An Outline of the Main Steps of Qualitative Research (Bryman, 2012: 384) 
 
7.1.3 Critical Research 
Both the epistemology of quantitative research or qualitative research is deeply 
concerned about how ‘true knowledge’ is acquired by human beings. Although there 
seems an irreconcilable contradiction between positivism and interpretivism in terms of 
defining the substance of knowledge, ‘the history of social science research reveals a 
pattern of using both qualitative and quantitative techniques and approaches without 
deliberately drawing attention to this’ (Rocco et al., 2003: 596). More importantly, 
following the philosophical tradition invented by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and 
carried forward by Karl Marx and adopted by the Frankfurt School, there emerged a 
rather neutral and dialectic approach to study sociology which is framed as the critical 
theory or critical research (Vine, 2009).  
 
Similar to the qualitative inquiry, critical research shares an interpretivist stance of 
1. General Research 
Question (s) 
2. Selection of Relevant 
Site(s) and Subjects 
3. Collection of 
Relevant Data 
4. Interpretation of 
Data 
5. Conceptual and 
Theoretical Work 
6. Writing up 
Findings/Conclusions 
5b. Collection of 
Further Data 
5a. Tighter 
Specification of the 
Research Question (s) 
 
recognizing the importance of subjective cognition in the formation of knowledge. 
However, critical theory is sceptical of how the subjective interpretation of the objective 
environment is forged in the first place. By questioning the human subjective cognition, 
critical theory further ‘attempts to dig beneath the surface of historically specific, 
oppressive, social structures’ (Harvey, 1990). The eternal goal of critical research is to 
free human beings from ‘the constraints placed on them by race, class, and gender’ 
(Creswell, 2009: 63) which have been incorporated into the existing knowledge system. 
Therefore, ‘critical social research involves an epistemological perspective in which 
knowledge and critique are intertwined’ (Harvey, 1990). Here is the definition of 
knowledge in critical social research provided by Lee Harvey: 
 
‘Knowledge is a dynamic process not a static entity. Knowledge is not a bucket into 
which grains of information are dropped in the hope that they somehow coalesce 
into some kind of explanation of the world. For critical methodologists, knowledge 
is a process of moving towards an understanding of the world and of the knowledge 
which structures our perceptions of that world’ (1990). 
 
To critical researchers, the formation of knowledge is the consequence of the dialectical 
intercourse between nature and human beings as a perpetual dynamic process. This 
dialectical method places no particular priority on the metaphysical importance of 
human consciousness, but also pays equal attention to the significance of physics – the 
objective material environment which conditions the human consciousness. As Leon 
Trotsky once wrote, ‘society is a product of the development of primary matter, like the 
earth’s crust or the amoeba’ (Trotsky, 1940). The production of knowledge in human 
societies is therefore realized by constant searching for scientific evidence through 
positivist research and thereafter evolving theories through interpretivist meditation. As 
indicated in the Marxist methodology of dialectical and historical materialism, scientific 
methods of positivism are of great importance in respect of understanding the reality of 
a given era which the human knowledge is based on and determined by (Soares, Campos 
and Yonekura, 2013).  
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Therefore, a dialectical approach should neither be dominated by empirical evidence as 
‘facts as descriptions of surface appearances are anathema to critical-dialectical thinking 
as they reify common sense at the expense of deconstruction’ nor be engulfed by 
speculative imagination as ‘a theory analysis that fails to engage the material world 
through empirical material is itself limited’ (Harvey, 1990). The ideal approach then is 
the combination of ‘empirical analysis together with theoretical conjecture’ which is 
‘essential for a dialectical analysis of inner connections’ (ibid). 
 
As far as this PhD project is concerned, the outline of the main steps deployed in this 
critical research, as indicated in Figure 7.3, represents an integration of both positivist 
and interpretivist research traditions. First of all, similar to qualitative research, this 
critical research starts with a very general question triggered by the observation of a 
certain social phenomenon. Instead of deploying a ground theory and to collect data 
directly, the researcher is more likely to build a connection between the original 
observation and the established theories. By building up the connection, it is expected 
to unearth the historical lineage of the social phenomenon and thereafter to contribute 
to the human knowledge in a more systematic and scientific way. Following an 
established theoretical frame, it is common to envisage a hypothesis at the primary stage 
to guide the rest of the research. Additionally, in order to design the research rationally, 
there should be a step to consider how to link the essential concepts and notions to the 
subjects of field research. Inheriting the qualitative tradition, in the step of conceptual 
and theoretical work, there will be two extra steps for reflexive analysis and to further 
complement evidence to perfect the theoretical analysis. Finally, different from 
qualitative research but more similar to quantitative research, the conclusions of this 
research are not supposed to be the linear closure but a supplementary and circular 
contribution to the existing theoretical frame. In section 7.2, there will be detailed 






Figure 7.3 The Process of Critical Research Deployed in This Research 
 
7.2 Research Design 
This section is mainly constituted of three sub-sections. The first sub-section of research 
questions and hypothesis contains the illustration on the necessity of deploying an 
online questionnaire to forge the research questions and the content of the 2014 
questionnaire including its relevant major findings. The second sub-section depicts the 
details of conducting the field research using the methods of a questionnaire (again), 
individual interviews, content analysis and discourse analysis.  
 
7.2.1 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The starting point of this research is based on the researcher’s interest in exploring the 
agenda of globally expanding CCTV-News and how the foreign audiences interpret the 
media content of the news channel. The general research question as displayed in the 



































results of an online questionnaire survey conducted in 2014. The 2014 questionnaire 
helped the researcher to have a general understanding of the status quo of the foreign 
audience of CCTV-News* and to narrow down the scope of research sites and subject. 
Therefore, the importance of the questionnaire needs to be spelled out as it is used in a 
specific way for this research. 
 
At the beginning of the research in the early 2014, the researcher’s original idea 
regarding the foreign audiences of CCTV English news channel was rather preliminary 
and vague. Back then, a general survey was required to provide the concrete details as 
inspirations for workable research questions and objectives. The method of a 
questionnaire was regarded as a suitable and efficient way to collect such details. 
Generally speaking, there are two main objectives in conducting a questionnaire. The 
first is ‘to maximise the proportion of subjects answering the questionnaire’ and the 
second is ‘to obtain accurate relevant information for the survey’ (Leung, 2001: 187). 
Therefore, a questionnaire is suitable for collecting raw data to draw a general picture of 
the research subjects.  
 
More importantly, it is a very practical method with many advantages. Bryman 
summarizes five of these: 1) cheaper to administer; 2) quicker to administer; 3) absence 
of interviewer effects; 4) no interviewer variability; 5) convenience for respondents 
(2012: 233-4). Given the large scale and difficulties of collecting such general information 
through personal interviews, conducting an online questionnaire, at the primary stage 
of research, to acquire basic information of research subjects is very reliable as it 
standardises the answers of the respondents in a way designed by the researcher for 
his/her research purposes.  
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*More information and results of this questionnaire can be found in the Chinese article 
‘Developing Countries’ International Communication Pattern Analysis (
	
)’, written by author and Liao Dieer, published in ‘ (TV 
Research)’, Vol.1 (326), pp. 27-30, in 2017. 
 
 
In consideration of practicability, the online questionnaire conducted in November in 
2014 was limited to foreign students studying in China. The first reason for this choice 
was that compared to conducting an international questionnaire, it was much more 
feasible to conduct it within one country and, at the same time, the diversity of the 
foreign interviewees could also be ensured. Secondly, foreign students in China are the 
biggest group of foreign residents in China. According to the statistics of the 2010 
population census of the Chinese government, the international students who were 
studying in China were 26% of 593,832 foreign residents (National Bureau of Statistics 
of PRC, 2011). Additionally, foreign students are more likely to watch China’s media due 
to either their interest in Chinese culture or the limited access to foreign media.  
 
The 2014 questionnaire (the detailed content of this questionnaire and results can be 
found in Appendix 1) has collected 182 samples with 155 of them valid. As indicated in 
the following tables and figure, interviewees participated in the questionnaire were from 
37 countries (Table 7.7) across five continents (Table 7.5), 75% of them were between 
the age of 18 to 30 and 87% of them have stayed in China less than three years (Table 
7.6). As Figure 7.4 shows, the geographical distribution of interviewees in China covered 
twelve provinces, three municipalities and one special administrative region. The main 
significant results are listed below which inspired the researcher to carry out further 
exploration on the audience study of the CCTV-News channel.  
 
Age Range 18≤20 21≤25 26≤30 31≤35 36≤40 
Number of Interviewees 49 68 31 5 2 
 
Table 7.4 The Age Range of Interviewees 
 
Original Region Africa Asia Europe North 
America 
Oceania 
Number of Interviewees 55 68 23 8 1 
 
 
Table 7.5 The Geographical Distribution of Interviewees’ Origins 
 
The Length of Time Spent in China Less than 
one year 
1 to 3 
years 
3 to 5 
years 
5 to 10 
years 
Percentage of Foreign 
Interviewees 
41% 46% 10% 3% 
 










Nigeria 19 Sierra Leone 3 Kenya 6 
Uganda 3 Philippines 1 Somalia 6 
Rwanda 2 Ghana 3 Zambia 3 
Sudan 1 Mauritius 1 Namibia 2 
Italy 2 Argentina 1 India 13 
Spain 1 Panama 1 Russia 6 
Czech 
Republic 
1 Nepal 1 Turkey 1 
Germany 1 Bulgaria 1 Japan 6 
Kazakhstan 1 Belgium 1 Malaysia 1 
Indonesia 4 Thailand 19 Canada 1 
South Korea 23 South Africa 2 United Kingdom 6 
United States 8 DR Congo 2 Papua New 
Guinea 
1 
Côte d’Ivoire 1 
 









Figure 7.5 African Students’ Perception of CCTV-News Channel (left) and the Image of 




























According to the above statistics, it is interesting to note that in the 2014 questionnaire 
there were a considerable number of participants from the continent of Africa compared 
to other areas. According to the statistics from the Ministry of Education of the PRC in 
2015, African students studying China represents the third biggest group of international 
students (49,792 – 13%) next to Asian foreign students (240,154 – 60%) and those from 
Europe (66,746 – 17%) (China Scholarship Council, 2016; Ministry of Education of PRC, 
2016). More interestingly, African students held much more positive opinions on the 
media content of CCTV-News. As shown in Figure 7.5, 72% of African participants held 
positive attitudes towards CCTV-News and 80% of them thought very positively about 
the image of China on CCTV-News, and no African students were very negative of CCTV-
News and the image of China at all. Despite the fact that the questionnaire was perhaps 
not sufficiently all embracing enough to portray an in-depth assessment about how 
exactly participants interpreted such a positive stance, it is a still very intriguing point as 
an inspiration for a research question. Another element contributing to the final choice 
of conducting a reception analysis of African audiences is an observation of the 
establishment of CCTV-Africa’s bureau in Nairobi in Kenya in 2012. As well as CCTV-News 
providing a comprehensive international news channel, it also has two special editions 
focusing exclusively on news from the continent of Africa and Unites States, those 
programmes emanating from CCTV-Africa and CCTV-America. Both these editions have 
independent broadcasting times in many African countries and in the US. This implies a 
very important strategic emphasis of CCTV-news on the Sino-African media flow and 
content. The fact that CCTV, as an official state-controlled media platform, representing 
the interests of the Chinese government, the Sino-African political economic background 
is therefore inevitably brought into consideration, which is another key factor influencing 
the formation of the questions and objectives of this research.  
 
All in all, based on the general results acquired from the 2014 questionnaire and certain 
observations on the status quo of CCTV-News channel, the research questions that were 
raised were: 1. How do the African students studying in China (as the potential future 
elite opinion leaders of their local societies) understand the (ideological) message 
 
delivered by the news produced by CCTV-Africa? 2. How does the reality of the enhanced 
Sino-African political and economic interaction contribute to the way that African 
students understand the media content of CCTV-Africa?  
 
The objective of this research is to cast a glimmer of light on the discussion about the 
correlation and struggles between mass ideologies and political economic structures 
from a transnational perspective using the case study of CCTV-Africa and its African 
audiences. Based on the literature review and theoretical framework as indicated in the 
preceding five chapters, the hypothesis of this research is that African students studying 
in China, conditioned by the political and economic structure of Sino-African bilateral 
interaction and their social class, tend to interpret CCTV-Africa positively and decode 
most of the ideological messages delivered by the news in a dominant position (applying 
the theory and terminology of Stuart Hall on encoding and decoding (Hall, 1980).  
 
7.2.2 Interview 
7.2.2.1 Pilot Questionnaire 
If the above 2014 questionnaire can be regarded as the first stage in the survey to frame 
research questions and hypothesis, then the online questionnaire conducted in the 
summer of 2016 is clearly an important and relevant second stage, which was also used 
not as a sole and independent method to achieve key results but rather as a functional 
tool to collect general data and select suitable respondents for further in-depth 
interviews. In order to clarify these two questionnaires designed for different purposes, 
they are respectively named ‘2014 questionnaire’ (the one introduced above) and ‘2016 
questionnaire’ (or pilot questionnaire as the title of this sub-section indicates).  
 
The pilot testing, usually in the form of a mini-survey, was conducted to reduce the risk 
of not fully understanding the conditions of the interviewees and putting together 
unnecessarily complex questions, and it ‘helps you to avoid making mistakes and can 
save time and effort in the long run’ (Mytton, 1999: 73). As far as this research is 
concerned, a random sample survey, with a specific focus on the group of African 
 
students in China, was conducted before the interviews as a pre-screening method to 
select the interviewees who are fit for the following interviewing sessions. This online 
questionnaire, which was put online on 20th January 2016, collected information from 
90 African students studying in China. Finally, 38 of them were found to be suitable, 
willing and available to be interviewed (the detailed content of the questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix 2).  
 
The results of the pilot testing, as displayed in Figure 7.6, provided a general picture of 
the African students’ community in China. Nearly half of the interviewees of pilot 
questionnaire claimed themselves to be regular viewers of CCTV-Africa and 65.8% of 
them held a rather positive perception towards CCTV-Africa. It is surprising to find out 
that 42.2%, nearly half, of the interviewees are self-funded students and the scholarships 
were largely issued by the Chinese government rather than their national governments. 
All in all, these results have helped structure the further interview questions in a very 
effective way.  
 
Questions Answers 
Gender Proportion Female: 36.7% Male: 63.3% 
Are you a regular 
reviewer of CCTV-
Africa? 
Regular Reviewer:  
51.1% 
Non-Regular Reviewer: 48.9% 
Are you planning to 
return to your country 
in Africa after you finish 







Are you obliged to 






What diploma are you 





































Table 7.8 The Results of Pilot Questionnaire (2016) 
 
7.2.2.2 Individual/Semi-structured Interview 
To test the hypothesis, various methods are deployed for the field research. The method 
of interviewing is the most common one for qualitative research. ‘In qualitative research 
interviewing, the researcher wants rich, detailed answers’ (Bryman, 2012: 470). In-depth 
interviewing therefore is ideal for digging into the much deeper and complicated 
subjective consciousness of interviewees. There are mainly two types of interviewing: 
group and individual. The former method in media audience studies is mostly used for 
focus group interviewing on the understanding that ‘focus groups create concentrated 
conversations that might never occur in the ‘real world’’ (Morgan, 1998: 31). Group 
interviewing is usually used to explore diverse opinions of the participants among whom 
there is a gap regarding social class, educational background etc. (ibid: 57-9).  
 
As far as this research is concerned, the theoretical hypothesis of the sampling of 
respondents assumes that elite audiences are more ‘able to articulate some of the 
presentational codes of the discourse which structure it in the direction of a 
preferred/dominant reading’ (Morley, 1980: 40). Therefore, the demographical 
character of the interviewees in this research is concentrated on the group of African 
students in China. Group interviewing, though ‘a quick way to pick-up relevant themes 
around a topic’ (Smithson, 2000: 105), is always affected by the possibility that a few 
strong voices dominate the whole group (ibid: 107). Additionally, limited by reasons of 
 
practicality and logistics, it is nearly impossible to assemble all the interviewees together 
from across China into a focus group for interviewing. And because of the different 
situations of individual interviewees, such as time and location, it is much more sensible 
and efficient to organize individual interviewing instead of undertaking the group 
sessions. 
 
Individual interviewing can also focus on specific topics, and it is designed ‘to determine 
responses to particular communication … which have been previously analysed by the 
investigator’ and crucially providing a means of focusing on ‘the subjective experiences 
of persons exposed to the pre-analysed situation in an effort to ascertain their definition 
of the situation’ (Morley, 1980: 32-3). Thus, the subjective interpretation of the media 
content of CCTV-Africa by African students is, therefore, the essential outcome that this 
field research is looking to evaluate and summarise.  
 
The format of the interviewing procedure is semi-structured, and this practice, along 
with unstructured interviews are the methods frequently deployed when conducting 
research on media audience studies. Unstructured interviewing, ‘similar in character to 
a conversation’, is usually conducted during a relaxed and informal occasion, which 
allows the interviewees to speak freely, and it usually involves more than one interview 
with the interviewee (Morley, 1980: 471). For anthropologists who are expecting to have 
extensive descriptions about the context of local communities and to spend a rather long 
period of time in the field, unstructured interviewing seems the appropriate method to 
deploy. In contrast, semi-structured interviewing is quite effective and efficient. This 
qualitative research method ‘incorporate(s) both open-ended and more theoretically 
driven questions, eliciting data grounded in the experience of the participant as well as 
data guided by existing constructs in the particular discipline within which one is 
conducting research’ (Galletta, 2012: 45). It is ideal for a mixed-method research, in that 
semi-structured interviews incorporate both the features of qualitative research that 
emphasize exploring the subjective experience of the interviewees and the 
characteristics of the quantitative research is guided by the organized structure following 
 
the theoretical framework.  
 
7.2.2.3 The Conduct of the Interview 
Interviews were conducted from the end of May to the middle of July in 2016 in China. 
As shown in the Figure 7.7, 38 interviewees are originally from 19 different African 
countries across the continent of Africa. Participants, ranging from 20 to 37 years of age, 
were residing in four cities (Changchun, Harbin, Jinhua and Ningbo) and three 
municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai) in China, and therefore the interviews were 
conducted in these cities separately. The average interviewing time length was from 30 
minutes to one or two hours depending on the responses of the interviewees individually.  
 
 
Figure 7.6 The Nationality Distribution of African Interviewees 
 
Due to the fact that not all the interviewees are regular viewers of CCTV-Africa (as 
 
indicated in Table 6.8, only 31.7% of them are regular viewers), the researcher deployed 
the quasi-experimental approach to conduct the audience interview by showing the 
interviewees two pieces of latest news videos from the website of CCTV-Africa selected 
by the researcher in advance. The selection of news is based on the nationality of the 
interviewees. Two pieces of news include one with a positive title and another one with 
a negative title (such as the story about the establishment of an industrial park versus 
the drought in the countryside in Ethiopia). It was felt that in this way, the researcher 
was able to provide the interviewee the balanced background information about CCTV-
Africa and to provide solid news content for the interviews to build on. There were 
exceptions as up to date examples of coverage by CCTV-Africa in a few specific African 
countries was limited, and in that case, the latest news was selected regardless of its 
content (The detailed information about the news selected can be found in Appendix 3).  
 





































Doctorate 2 Self-Funded 19 Neutral 4 
 
Table 7.9 Information of 38 Interviewees 
 
The interview questions, prepared by the researcher as guidance for the semi-structured 
interviews, can be found in Appendix Six. When the interviews were conducted in real 
life, some of the above questions were rephrased to suit the variable knowledge 
structures of individual interviewees. To bring more context into the questions to make 
them understandable for the interviewees to comprehend, most of the questions were 
adjusted to a much more personalized and conversational style (the brief field notes can 
 
be found in Appendix 4). 
 
7.2.3 Content analysis 
In order to enhance ‘the validity of evaluation and research findings’, various data 
‘resources and methods’ are expected to be deployed ‘to lead to a singular proposition 
about the phenomenon being studied’ (Mathison, 1988: 13). Therefore, another 
research method deployed to provide a complementary illustration as the triangulation 
of this research is the content analysis of CCTV-Africa’s Global Business (Africa) 
programme. As an additional but necessary contribution to depicting a full picture of the 
ideological agenda of CCTV-Africa in terms of promoting Sino-African bilateral economic 
cooperation, the content analysis of Global Business (Africa) was conducted during the 
same period of time when the individual interviewing took place in order to resonate 
with the reception of the African audience.  
 
Although this research is mainly focusing on the audience reception of television news 
which is the decoding part of mass communication, analysing the encoding part plays an 
indispensable and equally significant role in terms of conducting a systemic and 
thorough research on exploring the mechanism of television communication. Research 
methods on media content are various, but the value of Content Analysis (CA) lies on the 
aspect that ‘in essence it involves the classification of parts of a text through the 
application of a structured, systematic coding scheme from which conclusions can be 
drawn about the message content’ (Rose, Spinks and Canhoto, 2015: 1). In this way, the 
results of content analysis can be efficiently connected with that of other methods.  
 
The quantitative origins of this method ‘as the use of mass communication as data for 
testing scientific hypotheses and for evaluating journalistic practices’ has been gradually 
merged with the qualitative essence of sociological researches (Krippendorff, 2004: 8). 
Although quantification of data does have an advantage of providing clear summative 
results, a more qualitative approach gradually grew stronger after the Second World War 
to compromise the ‘shallow results reported by the content analysts’ (ibid: 16). The 
 
qualitative content analysis, rooted in ‘literary theory, the social sciences and critical 
scholarship’ (ibid: 17), have three basic features: 1. ‘A close reading of relatively small 
amounts of textual matter’; 2. ‘The re-articulation (interpretation) of given texts into 
new (analytical, deconstructive, emancipatory, or critical) narratives that are accepted 
within particularly scholarly communities that are sometimes opposed to positivist 
traditions of inquiry’; 3. The acknowledgment of analysts in terms of ‘working within 
hermeneutic circles in which their own socially and culturally conditioned 
understandings constitutively participate’ (ibid: 17).  
 
In this research, the content analysis involves two interlinked but separate study subjects. 
The first one is relatively more quantitative. It is an analysis of the types of interviewees 
that appeared in the programme Global Business (Africa). It is expected that the findings 
would, to some extent, reveal the agenda of CCTV-Africa in terms of representing the 
interest of certain classes. This quantification of news content has limitations, not only 
because the class the interviewee belongs to matters but also the message he/she 
communicates. An overwhelming proportion of the coverage of certain groups of people 
indicates the preference of the media in respect of valuing some over the other. The 
period of the programme chosen to be studied is the same period as that of individual 
interviewing, from 25th May 2016 to 13th July 2016. The total length of all the 36 episodes 
of the programme during the time is roughly 17 hours (The detailed record of the content 
analysis can be found in Appendix 5). 
 
Besides conducting a content analysis of the types of people being presented on the 
Global Business (Africa) programme on CCTV-Africa, there is also a general content 
analysis of the frames of the news produced by Global Business (Africa). This specific 
mix-method approach incorporates the functions of two research methods – content 
analysis and frame analysis. Therefore, the definition and practice of the framing 
paradigm should be spelled out at first.  
 
Somewhat different from the method of content analysis, which possesses a outstanding 
 
feature of quantification, frame analysis is rather qualitative and even subjective relying 
on the perception of researchers in some cases. As Entman has pointed out, ‘framing 
essentially involves selection and salience’ (1993: 52). In a way, similar to the Marxist 
definition of ideology as an illusionary representation of reality, ‘frames call attention to 
some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to 
have different reactions’ (ibid: 55). Resonating with Stuart Hall’s definition of the 
‘dominant code’, Entman wrote that the ‘dominant meaning consists of the problem, 
causal, evaluative, and treatment interpretations with the highest probability of being 
noticed, processed, and accepted by the most people’ (ibid: 56). The meaning or 
message that audiences interpret from the context of the news is rather integral 
information instead of fragmentary concepts. Therefore, to study the frame of news is 
not to study the atomic elements of news in a quantitative way. As Entman notes: ‘a 
framing paradigm cautions researchers not to take fugitive components of the message 
and show how they might be interpreted in ways that oppose the dominant meaning’ 
(ibid: 56). Therefore, frame analysis of news or media content, in general, is to analyse 
the meaning of the message by extracting an overall impression of it based on its 
concrete context constituted of images, sounds, texts, etc. The hermeneutic approach 
of framing studies has the disadvantage of being dominated by the subjective 
interpretation of researchers, because ‘the perception and coding of frames strongly 
depend upon how the researcher perceives the issue’ (Matthes and Kohring, 2008: 260).  
 
To overcome the disadvantage and to reduce the subjective dominance of researchers 
over the extraction of frames, the frame analysis of Global Business (Africa) put out by 
CCTV-Africa in this research follows the existing frames categories cited from the 
research of Vivien Marsh (2016) which was summarized from the original work by 
Semetko and Valkenburg (2000). By pressing ‘an article into an already existing frame 
category’, ‘frames are defined and coder schemata are developed’, and therefore ‘it 
might be difficult to observe the emergence of new frames’ (Marsh, 2016: 261). To apply 
the existing frames categories to this research, one new frame (China’s Positive 
Involvement) is discovered and added to make the categories more suitable and 
 
connected. As shown in the following Table 7.9, there are seven major categories used 
for this research. 
 
Framing Categories 
Conflict* Does the story involve disagreement or accusations between 
parties (including countries) or refer to two or more sides to a 
problem or issue?  
Human Interest* Is there a human angle to the coverage, does it show how 
individuals or groups are affected, or does it depict scenarios 




Does the report contain a suggestion that an individual, group 




Does the report indicate solutions or suggest that officials or 
government are capable of solving or easing the problem?  
Morality* Does the story bear a moral message or appear to tell viewers 
how to behave?  
Sustainability** Is reference made to the stability (or lack of it) of a country, 
government or society, or fears or hopes about future stability?  
China’s Positive 
Involvement*** 
Is reference made to the involvement of China which 
contributes to the positive solution or result for issue  
 
Table 7.10 Framing Categories (*summarized by Marsh from Semetko and Valkenburg, 
2000: 100; ** Marsh, 2016: 180; *** Added by the researcher) 
 
Additionally, the above frames used to identify the news output of Global Business 
(Africa) are further processed in a quantitative approach. The frequency of these frames 
appearing in the news is counted, and the proportions of each frame compared to each 
other express the core tune of this news programme. This two-step method is named as 
 
‘content analysis of news frames’ in this research. 
 
7.2.4 Discourse Analysis 
The discourse analysis is based on a specially edited section of the news programme 
Global Business (Africa) called ‘Grass Root’(GR). The results obtained from this research 
method constitute a minor part of the research findings. However, it is still a very 
relevant and key finding which can directly and concretely reflect the neoliberalist 
economic agenda of Global Business (Africa) or even the whole channel of CCTV-Africa. 
Media discourse takes a rather dynamic form – ‘interactions that take place through a 
broadcast platform’ which can barely be thoroughly covered by quantitative data 
(O’Keeffe, 2011: 441). Media discourse analysis, on the other hand, with its linguistic 
origins, has been used to dig into the deeper level of the institutional and social 
mechanism beneath the written texts as well as audio and visual texts). It reaches into 
the ideological dimension of the media content. The qualitative nature of media 
discourse analysis, therefore, balances the quantitative approach of analysing the 
encoding part of CCTV-Africa and adds storytelling characteristics to the findings of this 
research. 
 
7.3 Validity and Generalizability 
For most research into modern social sciences, the limitation of methods is inevitable. 
As far as this research is concerned, there are some issues in the validity of the research 
design and findings due to the constraints of the methods deployed.  
 
The first is about the effectiveness of the 2016 questionnaire (pilot questionnaire) as a 
pre-screening tool. The questions listed on the 2016 questionnaire, which can be found 
in Appendix 2, were designed to select suitable respondents for individual interviews. 
However, most of the questions are multiple-choices with given answers which can easily 
be quantified but at the same time are limited by the knowledge of the researcher. 
Therefore, there is a certain degree of simplification in terms of finding out the 
subjective experience of respondents as viewers of CCTV-Africa.  
 
 
The second and third concerns are the sampling of respondents constrained by reasons 
of practicality. As illustrated in the above section, although more than half of the 
respondents of the 2016 questionnaire claimed that they are part of the regular 
audience of CCTV-Africa, there were only 11 of them who finally participated in the 
individual interviews with the researcher. The high mobility of African students in China 
and the limited time of the researcher in the field led to the consequence of changing 
the original plan of sampling the respondents. The reduced number of regular viewers 
as interviewees is on the one hand a realistic compromise but on the other hand a 
chance to bring in more variables to the research.  
 
Additionally, the simplified consideration of the backgrounds of respondents from 
different African countries is also another limitation which may influence the validity of 
the research result. The audience study of this research is to reflect how the African 
audiences interpret, receive and negotiate with the ideology of CCTV-Africa. Therefore, 
the political and cultural backgrounds of the respondents are considered less significant 
in this research. The 18 African countries where the respondents came from were not 
selected for a designed purpose but rather a random result. However, because the 
sampling for individual interviews is based on the online questionnaire conducted for 
African students in China, the variety of the nationalities of these students also reflect 
the multilateral relations between China and these African countries.  
 
The fourth is about triangulation. Although the qualitative dimension of the content 
analysis used in this research has improved the flow of qualifying media content, it is 
inevitable that the quantitative nature of the triangulation has some limitations which 
make the result of the research less thorough. For example, the types of frames to 
categorize the news of Global Business (Africa) to some extent limit and rigidify the 
qualitative content of news and lose some of the connotative meaning of the content 
which can be quite pluralist in various contexts.  
 
 
Besides the above concerns, the generalization of this research is also constrained by the 
uniqueness of the design of this research. For example, as illustrated in Section 7.2.2, 
one screening feature of sampling the respondents for interview is how they are funded 
for their study in China. As shown in Table 6.8, almost 50% of the interviewees are 
funded by the Chinese government or related projects, and the other half are self-
funded. Although the funding resource is a designed variable which is assumed to be 
influential in terms of shaping the perception of African audiences of Chinese news, the 
particular and specific political and economic backgrounds of these respondents make 
their participation in this research less applicable in other situations and contexts. Also, 
the unrepeatable timing and the fact that objective conditions could not be duplicated 
further reduces the generalization of this research. However, limited generalization does 
not neutralize the value contributed by this thesis. Abundant and detailed research 




Chapter 8 - Findings 
This chapter presents the data and findings from the results of the empirical research 
conducted by the researcher for this thesis. There are two main sections: the findings on 
the news content of CCTV-Africa, which illustrates the encoding stage of the process in 
the output of CCTV-Africa, and the reception of this by its audiences, which constitutes 
the decoding stage of the process. The encoding part of the content analysis is to 
triangulate the main findings of the decoding on the part of the African audiences. 
However, in order to set out the complete communication process of television news, 
the encoding section is discussed before the decoding process in this chapter.  
 
8.1 Encoding Global Business (Africa), CCTV-Africa 
Global Business (Africa) is a regular news programme broadcast by CCTV-Africa of about 
30 minutes in duration from Monday to Friday. Unlike the channel’s other programmes, 
Global Business (Africa) has a specific focus on economic and financial news related to 
the continent of Africa. Because of its direct connection with the core economic interests 
of both Chinese and African governments and businesses, the narratives of Global 
Business (Africa) are of great importance for analysing the role of CCTV-Africa in 
constructing and representing the ‘harmony of interest’ between Chinese and African 
elites. This research analyses around 980 minutes (16.2 hours) of programme content 
stored on CCTV-Africa’s official website, which covers all the Global Business (Africa) 
output from Monday to Friday between 25th May and 13rd July 2016, deploying a mixed 
methodological approach with content analysis of speaker representations and the news 
frameworks of the programme.  
 
8.1.1 Content Analysis of Speakers in Global Business (Africa) 
The first finding is achieved by conducting a content analysis of speaker representations 
in the programme. There are four main types of speakers, as categorized by the 
researchers, in Global Business (Africa) (see Table 8.1), the complex underlying messages 






Students, customers, taxi drivers, residents of 
communities, farmers, start-up entrepreneurs, etc.; 
Business Elites Bankers, CEOs, directors, managers, members of chambers 
of commerce, etc.; 
Governmental Officials Presidents, ministers, local governors, spokespersons, 
parliamentary committees, etc.;  
Observers Scholars, researchers, analysts, experts, economists, etc. 
 
Table 8.1. Four Types of Speakers in Global Business (Africa) 
 
As illustrated in Table 8.1, this special edition of the programme – ‘Grass Roots Series’ – 
most frequently features speakers from the so-called ‘ordinary - people’ with a 
conspicuously positive attitude towards the development of entrepreneurship within 
the general public. For example, the small business owners selected by the programme 
are usually the ones whose businesses are tending to be growing stronger. At the same 
time, the entrepreneurship element is usually presented as introducing positive social 
influences, such as growing numbers of female entrepreneurs in generally conservative 
Islamic societies, more opportunities for unemployed young students, enhanced social 
security with the help of third-party information agencies and so on. This pattern can 
also be noticed in the selection of speakers from ‘Business Elites’. Although not all the 
speakers under the ‘Business Elites’ category are wealthy capitalists or occupying high-
level managerial positions - some are ordinary employees - their views show a strong 
consistency with regard to the core interests of their respective corporate affiliations 
(such as the employee from Huawei in the 02/07/2016 programme). As for the 
government officials, their voices are also unified when it comes to the role of local 
government in socio-economic development. However, it does not mean that the 
programme is ignorant of the serious contradictions and confrontations in contemporary 
African societies. Some local governors interviewed by the programme have also 
expressed their concerns for unequal economic development in a ‘self-restricted’ 
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manner, such as the provincial governor in Democratic Republic of Congo who talked 
about how the local mining industries are being exploited by foreign companies without 
mentioning any specific names (in the 08/07/2016 programme). Moreover, the fourth 
category refers to the ‘independent’ voices that are supposed to either provide 
‘objective’ explanations on certain background information or present alternative 
opinions from academia. However, by and large, the speakers in the fourth category are 
also eagerly advocating the dominant narratives about economic development and 
political stability, as one Nigerian economist remarked (in the 13/07/2016 programme), 





Chart 8.1. Proportions of Different Speakers in Global Business (Africa) 
 
Calculated by the total length of appearance, Chart 8.1 shows the proportion of the four 
different types of speakers in the programme from 25th May and 13rd July 2016, 
presenting two main findings. The first is that the total proportion of business elites, 
government officials and experts’ appearance is almost four times larger than that of 
















African Chinese  International (China Excluded) Mixied Nationalities
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officials instead of ordinary people in the reviews of social issues such as an economic 
crisis and increasing unemployment, the causes and aftermaths of which were thus fully 
explained from the perspective of the government rather than the ordinary citizens. 
Even in certain cases, ordinary interviewees did express their concerns, but still very few 
dissident voices against the government were presented. As analysed above, it is 
assumed that a particular kind of agenda is pursued by all types of speakers to promote 
a positive image of the socio-economic situation in Africa, which has been further 
underpinned by the programme’s emphasis on featuring elite opinions. This elite-centric 
journalism as displayed by CCTV-Africa undoubtedly embodies the discursive alliance 
that Chinese government is trying to build with both local business tycoons and political 
leaderships among African nations. 
 
Another interesting finding is that, among the business elites and government officials 
featured in the programmes, the proportion of Chinese speakers is around 10% of 
international speakers. On the one hand, although 10% is not an impressive number, 
China as a single country unsurprisingly occupies a predominant position in the coverage 
of Global Business (Africa) produced by the Chinese state-owned CCTV-Africa. On the 
other hand, it indicates that, supporting the theoretical assumptions, the alliances and 
struggles between the centres of Core and Periphery and the centres of Semi-Periphery 
and Periphery are coexisting and intertwined with each other on the continent of Africa. 
It appears that the legacies of the ‘old’ imperialist regimes still have great significance in 
Africa, as most of the continent was historically so deeply encroached by colonialism, 
while China is a relative ‘new comer’. Even so, the presence of China and its political-
economic agenda in Africa have become too ubiquitous to be neglected. Another finding, 
as indicated in the next section, on the news frames of Global Business (Africa) shows 
that the attempt by CCTV-Africa to carry out its agenda in Africa is often concealed.  
 
8.1.2 Content Analysis of News Frames in Global Business (Africa) 
By using a mixed method to approach the frames extracted from the news coverage of 
Global Business (Africa) in a quantitative way, the analysis here uses both qualitative and 
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quantitative methods. It examines some specific interesting meanings from particular 
contexts while also summarizing the overall tone of the news programme. In order to 
further reduce the interference of the researcher’s (naturally) subjective bias, the frames 
applied here are revised from Vivien Marsh’s summary of the five news frames devised 
by Semetko and Valkenburg based on the analyses of 2,601 newspaper stories and 1,522 
television news stories (2000: 93). Including Marsh and the authors’ own frames 
‘stability’ and ‘China’s Positive Involvement’, there are six frames in total deployed in this 
research. 
 
The first five frames, as shown in Table 7.10 in the previous chapter, are some general 
observations on professional news. The ‘conflict frame’ ‘emphasizes conflict between 
individuals, groups, or institutions as a means of capturing audience interest’ (Semetko 
and Valkenburg, 2000, 95). As a result of commercial interest or other driving forces, 
highlighting or even constructing conflicts to enhance audience ratings by over-
simplifying each party’s opinion or stance is commonly observed in news production. 
However, as a state-controlled media outlet, CCTV-Africa always prioritizes its diplomatic 
mission over profits. It is rare to see Chinese journalists report conflicts in Africa in a 
sentimental or provocative way. Of course, stories on conflicts are never scarce in the 
coverage of CCTV-Africa. As shown in Table 3, 17.4% of the political news in question 
used the ‘conflict frame’, which ranks third among all the frames. Generally speaking, 
though, the ‘conflict frame’ only constitutes 12.4% of the overall news coverage of 
Global Business (Africa). Apparently, ‘capturing audience interest’ by creating or making-
up conflicts is not the primary purpose and strategy of CCTV-Africa. 
 
Secondly, the ‘human interest frame’ ‘brings a human face or an emotional angle to the 
presentation of an event, issue, or problem’ (ibid), which has become a standard 
component of professional news that aims to show the ‘human touch’. Resonating with 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s claims about the endeavours of CCTV-Africa – ‘CCTV 
embraces the vision of seeing Africa from an African perspective and reporting Africa 
from the viewpoint of Africa’ (quoted in Marsh, 2016, 177) - CCTV-Africa has apparently 
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
made great efforts to represent the people’s voices with its own agenda. As mentioned 
above in the last section, the special edition ‘Grass Roots’ focuses primarily on the start-
up entrepreneurs who epitomize the vibrancy of the African economy. As shown in Table 
8.2, 25.2% of the news coverage on ‘economic development’, which has a conspicuously 
positive tone, has used the ‘human interest frame’, ranking second among all the frames. 
In sharp contrast, the proportion of the same frame drops down to 13.2% when the news 
reports focus instead on an ‘economic/financial crisis’, which quite often indicate 
negative portrayals of local situations. In this way, the ‘human touch’ of CCTV-Africa is 
rather selective and purposeful. More specifically, this frame is mostly observed in the 
stories that people benefited from certain policies of local governments and/or have 
strong confidence in the market economy. There appear to be attempts by CCTV-Africa 
to distract economic crises away from ordinary people’s everyday experiences while 
manufacturing public consent around the recent developments of the market economy.  
 
What requires extra attention here is the two dimensions of the ‘responsibility frame’, 
the respective focuses of which on ‘cause’ and ‘solution’, in conjunction with their 
different perspectives on ‘conflict,’ embody the distinctions between the traditional 
Western critical journalism and what is labelled as ‘constructive journalism’ (‘peace 
journalism’). It was argued by Yanqiu Zhang that CCTV in Africa is reporting news 
following the principles of constructive journalism that ‘covers positive and solution-
focused news formats’ (2014: 8). Putting aside the arguments about whether 
constructive/peace journalism is proper journalism or not (Lyon, 2007), the initiator of 
peace journalism Johan Galtung has a clear answer for how the ‘conflict frame’ should 
be handled. He said ‘… the road of peace journalism, focuses on conflict 
transformation …’ (2003: 177). Apparently, the key difference lies between ‘conflict as 
an end-in-itself’ and ‘conflict as a process/means’. Surely, it is obvious in Table 7.3 that 
the proportion of the ‘responsibility (solution-orientated) frame’ outnumbers the 
‘responsibility (cause-orientated) frame’. However, the small proportion of the ‘conflict 
frame’, especially in contrast with the ‘stability frame’, indicates that controversial issues 
on the continent of Africa have not been sufficiently addressed by CCTV-Africa. It is noted 
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by Gagliardone (2013) that there are certain political crises being intentionally avoided 
by the Chinese news networks. In addition, he has shown that stories about African 
workers striking against Chinese companies or Chinese ivory traders’ involvement in 
illegal poaching have never been found in the coverage of CCTV-Africa. As Xiaoling Zhang 
has observed, CCTV-Africa has almost zero negative reports on China’s engagement with 
Africa (2013: 13-16). 
 
Another unusual feature of CCTV-Africa is, as noted by Marsh is its emphasis on ‘stability’. 
The ‘stability frame’ of Global Business (Africa), as defined in Table 8.2, refers to the 
narratives that the stability of local societies is the primary concern. As shown in Table 
7.3, this frame is the most frequently deployed among all frames, which directly reflects 
the core political and economic interests of the Chinese government in Africa. Driven by 
its domestic dilemmas such as increasing labour wages (Wang, H. and Wang W., 2014), 
polluted environment and over-capacity of steel or cement (Fan, 2015), the Chinese 
government is eager to find cooperative peripheral countries to locate cheaper labour, 
natural resources and new markets. It is also very important that the partner is stable in 
respect of its government and market. As a firm believer in the positive correlation 
between social stability and economic development (Wang and Hu, 2010), the Chinese 
government has managed to achieve the former in mainland China for several decades 
and is expecting to make it happen in certain African countries as well. Constrained by 
its non-interference policy and other realistic issues, at the current stage, the Chinese 
government is unlikely to exert influence on local politics directly. However, it is clear 
that its pursuit of stability has pervaded the agenda of CCTV-Africa and possibly other 
Chinese media in Africa as well.  
 
The last news frame is the ‘China’s positive involvement frame’. It would not make much 
difference if the frame were renamed as ‘China’s involvement frame’ because almost 
every single Chinese element in the news of Global Business (Africa) is positive and 
benevolent. Therefore, in the discourse of CCTV-Africa, China’s involvement equates to 
a positive influence. As manifested in Table 8.2, in contrast to the relatively high 
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exposure of China’s positive involvement in economic development (6.4%), local crises 
seem to have very limited connection with China (0.6%). The efforts made by CCTV-
Africa to embellish China’s expanding participation in African countries are pleasing 
governments in China and Africa. Chinese officials are quite satisfied by the fact that 
CCTV-Africa has somehow fulfilled its mission to ‘enhance China’s image in Africa’ (Feng, 
2015), while African officials are happy that the positive reporting of CCTV-Africa is 
helpful for increasing foreign investment and gives them a relief from all the 






























Stability 23.7% Conflict 17.4% 
Human Interest 
18.5% 












Conflict 6.3% China’s Positive 
Involvement 4.4% 
 
Table 8.2 Content Analysis of the News Frames of Global Business (Africa) 
 
This particular reporting focus of CCTV-Africa on the ‘positive’ or ‘constructive’ 
information is not only welcomed by neoliberal globalists within the Chinese 
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government and academia but also highly praised by the ‘impatient elites’ in Africa, who 
desperately want to improve their ‘image’ (Zhao, 2014) and to ‘set themselves apart 
from the obligations of the postcolonial state’ by pursuing every possible means of 
transnational capitalistic integration (Prashad, 2012, 6). The ambassador of Zimbabwe 
in Beijing, Paul Chikawa, has expressed his dislike of the BBC’s documentary The Chinese 
are Coming at a China-African official event (a private workshop in Beijing funded by the 
Gates Foundation and supported by the Chinese government officials). He contended 
that the negative construct set up by that documentary undermined the harmonious 
and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries, and further 
emphasized that ‘China and Africa should talk to each other directly’ (27 July 2016). As 
noted by the South Africa-based academic Paul Tembe, there exists an ideologically 
constructed and mass-mediated consensus between Chinese and African elites as 
manifested in the interconnectivity between the prevailing ideas as incorporated in the 
‘Chinese dream’ and ‘African dream’, both of which to some extent focus upon 
integration into the world economy and rejuvenation of national power and prestige 
(Tembe, 2015). 
 
8.1.3 Brief Discourse Analysis of ‘Grass Roots Series’ 
‘Grass Roots Series’ (GR) is a short segment (around three minutes) incorporated in the 
main programme of Global Business (Africa). It mostly interviews the start-up 
entrepreneurs who are running small businesses and are achieving pleasing progress. As 
indicated in its title, the focus of ‘Grass Roots’ is on the ordinary population rather than 
financial giants, which underlines the ‘human touch’ of CCTV-Africa and increases the 
proportion of the news frame – ‘human interest’ as shown in Table 8.2 above. The 
interviewees of ‘Grass Roots’ (GR) are from all kinds of backgrounds, from female street 
food vendors in Egypt to student bakers in South Africa. They have one thing in common: 
they are enthusiastic about entrepreneurship and their businesses are getting better, 





Picture 8.1 African Interviewees in the ‘Grass Roots Series’ (Xiang, 2017) 
 
 
The topics of ‘GR’ cover various aspects, and by highlighting the industrious spirit of the 
ordinary, even vulnerable, people such as unemployed older women, ‘GR’ creates a very 
positive atmosphere about economic development in very local African social and 
economic contexts. As one interviewee Rosebill Satha from Malawi, a female 
entrepreneur who ‘turns her [weaving] hobby into a profitable venture’, spotlighted in 
the programme: ‘we need the change of mind-set … and it is not from top, it’s mainly 
from the bottom, from brothers, husbands [and] your neighbours’ (CGTN, 2016). The 
coverage of such bottom-to-top optimistic views for entrepreneurship and economic 
development by CCTV-Africa not only corresponds with the instruction from the Chinese 
government to report ‘Africa from the viewpoint of Africa’ (CCTV News 2014, cited in 
Marsh, 2016: 177), but also advertises ‘China’s model’ of social development which 
prioritizes economic growth across the continent of Africa. This specific edition depicts 
a very positive and industrious image of African societies with the focus on encouraging 
entrepreneurship. Therefore, ‘Grass Roots’ directly reflects the one key agenda of CCTV-




The above analyses of the news frames and content of CCTV-Africa indicate that there is 
a clear ideological agenda underpinning the operation of the news channel. On the one 
hand, it is undeniable that, as indicated in Table 8.3 in Section 8.2.1 below, the 
journalistic approach of CCTV-Africa is to provide more solution-oriented reports. On the 
other hand, the obvious preference of CCTV-Africa to promote the image of the Chinese 
government and companies in Africa reduces its credibility in deploying an authentic 
constructive approach. From the perspective of critical political and economic media 
studies, this very contradiction defines the characteristic of CCTV-Africa, indeed even 
Chinese media overall in Africa. As discussed in Chapter 6, the ideological Sinicization 
represented by CCTV-Africa is to promote the sustainable economic development in 
African societies by advocating a positive and harmonious image about the local political 
and economic environment. Not only do the elite speakers outnumber the grassroot 
class of people, but also the latter is depicted as rather positive and supportive of the 
ideas both of joining the global economic system and cooperating with the Chinese 
government. 
 
8.2 Decoding CCTV-Africa by the African Audience 
This part of the research findings covers both a quantitative questionnaire with 89 
participants and qualitative individual interviews with 36 interviewees from 18 African 
countries conducted by the researcher in the summer of 2016, specifically from the end 
of May to the beginning of July. All participants either for the questionnaire or the ‘face-
to-face’ interviews were African students studying for Bachelor’s, Master‘s or PhD 
degrees in mainland China. Some of the interviewees had already been watching the 
channel before they came to China. The accesses of the interviewees to CCTV-Africa 
were various. Since all interviewees of this research are international students in China, 
the dormitories in China’s universities for international students were usually equipped 
with television. Most of the interviewees who said they were regular audience of CCTV-
Africa watched the news channel on the television in their dormitory rooms. The 
broadcasting time of CCTV-Africa on the channel of CCTV-News in Chinese time is one 
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o’clock in the morning. This broadcasting time in mid night suits some of the 
interviewees’ timetable. Except watching CCTV-Africa on television, before the relaunch 
of CGTN on 1st January of 2017, interviewees also had the access to the channel on the 
website of CCTV-Africa (which now is replaced by the website of CGTN-Africa).  
 
The ethnical identities of African interviewees in China are sometimes one of the 
problems faced by researcher of other nationalities. As Adams Bodomo wrote in his book 
‘Africans in China’: “many people from the Maghreb countries rejected [the] requests 
for interviews because they did not consider themselves Africans” (2012: Chapter one, 
Kindle Edition). Therefore, in order to eliminate the misunderstandings of the researcher 
(who is ethnically Chinese) on the ethnical origins, the identities of the interviewees as 
African students are confirmed by the interviewees themselves.  
 
 
Chart 8.2 The Perception of African Students with regard to CCTV-Africa (2016) 
 
One clear result of the questionnaire survey is that is has provided a useful overview of 
African students’ perception of CCTV-Africa. As shown in Chart 8.2, among the 89 
participants, 63% of them have a rather positive impression of CCTV-Africa, and only 13% 
of them regard it negatively. In order to further understand how students from Africa 












individual interviews were conducted with interviewees selected from the questionnaire 
results. The average time length of each individual interview was about 40 minutes; 36 
interviews were conducted in four cities (Changchun, Harbin, Jinhua and Ningbo) in 
three provinces (Zhejiang, Jilin and Heilongjiang) and three municipalities (Beijing, 
Shanghai and Tianjin).  
 
8.2.1 Seven Categories of African Audience’s Reception of CCTV-Africa 
According to Stuart Hall, there are mainly three types of codes deployed by general 
audiences to interpret the message encoded in media content which are: hegemonic 
codes, negotiated codes and oppositional codes (2006: 171-3). Hegemonic codes refer 
to the reception that audience decode ‘the message in terms of the reference code in 
which it has been encoded’ (2006: 171). Negotiated codes refer to the mixed reception 
of adaptive and oppositional understanding of the encoded media message (2006: 172). 
Oppositional codes refer to reception when the audience, though understanding very 
well the connotative meaning of the media content, tries ‘to decode the message in a 
globally contrary way’ (2006: 172). Matching the three types of codes with the typology 
of the audience’s reception of CCTV-Africa, it is clear that the reception categories of 
‘conscious of the ideological agenda and agree with it’ and ‘partly conscious of the 
ideological agenda but agree with it’, fit the hegemonic codes well; the category of 
‘conscious of the ideological agenda but only agree with parts of it’ resonates with the 
negotiated codes, and the category of ‘conscious of the ideological agenda but disagree 
with it’ conforms to the oppositional codes.  
 
However, what if the typology used in this research does not fit the analytic frame of 
Hall’s reception code, i.e. when the audience is unconscious of the ideological agenda 
encoded in the media content? It is because the encoding/decoding model used by Hall 
is based on the significant moments that happen in the process of disseminating 
information only within the media system. The premise of the three reception codes is 
that the significant moments of encoding and decoding do happen. But for the audience 
unconscious of the ideological agenda of the ‘connotative levels of signifiers’ in media 
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content, the moment of decoding fails to happen thoroughly if it happens at all (Hall, 
2016: 169). Hall aimed to provide an analytic frame to understand the audience’s 
reception mainly from the perspective of media discourse, which is simultaneously a 
denotative reflection and a crucial part of the wider societal structure. For audiences 
who are unconscious of the media agenda, they are hardly influenced by the ideology 
expressed by the media discourse; their agreement and disagreement with the 
ideological agenda encoded in the media content is primarily forged by the reality of the 
audience members lives within the overall societal structure. Therefore, the formation 
of the ideology of an audience, as indicated in the typology in Table 8.3, is not only under 
the direct influence of media but more likely conditioned by the broader political 
economic structure. 
 
As shown in Table 8.3, the typology deployed in this research to categorize interviewees’ 
perceptions of the agenda of CCTV-Africa is based on the typology of ideologies 
summarized by Christian Fuchs in his book Culture and Economy in the Age of Social 
Media (2015). There are nine categories that incorporate audience perception of the 
ideological agenda of media content. The empirical results collected from the interviews 
in this research fall mainly into seven categories, which are: 1) Unconscious of the 
ideological agenda in CCTV-Africa but agree with it; 2) Unconscious of the ideological 
agenda in CCTV-Africa and agree with only parts of it; 3) Conscious of the ideological 
agenda in CCTV-Africa and agree with it; 4) Conscious of the ideological agenda in CCTV-
Africa but only agree with parts of it; 5) Conscious of the ideological agenda in CCTV-
Africa but disagree with it; 6) Partly conscious of the ideological agenda in CCTV-Africa 
but agree with it; 7) Partly conscious of the ideological agenda in CCTV-Africa but partly 
agree with parts of it. 
 
 Agree with the 
ideological agenda 
Agree/Disagree with 
parts of the 
ideological agenda 
Disagree with the 
ideological agenda 





recognize it in 
CCTV-Africa, but 
they agree with it 
in reality. 
recognize it in CCTV-
Africa, but they 
partly agree as well 
partly disagree with 
it in reality. 
recognize it in CCTV-
Africa, but they 






3) They recognize it 
in CCTV-Africa, and 
they agree with it 
in reality. 
(Hegemonic Code) 
4) They recognize it 
in CCTV-Africa, and 
they partly agree as 
well partly disagree 
with it in reality. 
(Negotiated Code) 
5) They recognize it 
in CCTV-Africa, but 








6) They partly 
recognize it in 
CCTV-Africa, and 
they agree with it 
in reality. 
(Hegemonic code) 
7) They partly 
recognize it in CCTV-
Africa, but they 
partly agree as well 
partly disagree with 
it in reality. 
They partly recognize 
it in CCTV-Africa, and 
they disagree with it 
in reality. 
 
Table 8.3 Typology of Audience’s Reception of CCTV-Africa 
(adapted from Fuchs, 2015: 87) 
 
It is difficult sometimes to draw a clear boundary between the receptions of ‘agree’, 
‘partly agree’ and ‘disagree’. In some cases, the audiences’ reception of the ideological 
agenda (promoting China-Africa economic cooperation) can only be defined according 
to the subtle differences of wording, speaking tone even facial expressions. Therefore, 
instead of mechanically defining and categorizing the audience’s reception according 
fixed standards, the typology deployed in this research to analyse the qualitative results 
of interviewing tends to depict a general change about the overall attitude and 
understanding of audiences. The following seven sections are the organized findings of 
individual interviews which are structured and edited by the researcher in order to 
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present a systematic analysis. Only a few words of the interviewees have been revised 
to better express his or her meanings. Some grammatical awkwardness is retained to 
ensure authenticity. 
 
Category 1: Unconscious of the Ideological Agenda but Agree 
 
Name2 Age Gender Nationality Diploma Funding Perception Habit 









































2 The names of interviewees displayed in this research are provided by the 
interviewees themselves without further verification by the researcher. In most cases, 
only the last names are provided by the interviewees, and they have given the 
researcher the consent to use the names given by themselves in this research.  
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Table 8.4 Twelve Interviewees of Category 1 
 
 
Chart 8.3 Twelve Interviewees of Category 1 







Watching Habit Non-Regular Audience Regular 
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For this group of interviewees, they have different perceptions on whether CCTV-Africa 
is producing international-level quality news. Some of them, such as Chen Fei from 
Tanzania, have negative assumptions about international news (mainly Western media). 
As Chen Fei said: ‘… International news always depicts Africa as chaotic with wars, 
diseases and natural disasters’ (25th May 2016).  
 
Many of the African interviewees hold a similar perspective towards international news. 
Non-regular audiences of CCTV-Africa like Chen Fei naturally assumed that CCTV-Africa 
is producing news with the same logic. Even after watching the news of CCTV-Africa 
about infrastructure development in the Tanzanian capital city of Dar-es-Salaam, Chen 
Fei still regarded CCTV-Africa as ‘one of those stereotyped international news media’.  
 
Although Chen Fei thought negatively of CCTV-Africa, he still claimed that he is 
supportive of the idea of China-Africa cooperation and economic development in their 
societies. There seems a contradiction between his perception of CCTV-Africa and his 
personal experience in real life.  
 
This kind of contradiction is easily understood in some cases with interviewees having a 
generalized understanding of media as critical tools. Martin from Cameroon said: ‘I don’t 
think (CCTV-Africa) is negative. It is just what media does’ (4th July 2016). For Martin, 
being a state-controlled media does not really make any difference to the quality of news. 
Lubari from South Sudan expressed his firm faith in the absolute truthfulness of CCTV in 
Africa saying that ‘I believe in CCTV. …. CCTV will tell the truth’ (24th May 2016). 
 
Regarding media as objective or never having critical thinking about the role of media in 
real life are the main reasons why some interviewees are ignorant of the ideological 
agenda of CCTV-Africa. When asked ‘do you think CCTV-Africa has a certain kind of 
reporting style that reflects its nature as a state media’, Deborah from Benin just simply 
shook her head.  
 
 
Hajo from Sudan who was studying material sciences in Shanghai Donghua University 
also seemed clueless about the logic behind the screen. He agreed with the interviewer 
that there are indeed some kind of purposes behind CCTV broadcasting in Africa, but ‘I 
am not a political person’ said Hajo (7th July 2016).  
 
Although they claimed to be unconscious of the news agenda, when watching the CCTV-
Africa news about their countries they tended to agree with the perspectives of the 
content. Martin was impressed by the report about the video game industry in 
Cameroon, and he quoted from a speech given by the Cameroonian president: ‘China or 
France. They are all same people. But the difference is that China does not take anything 
from you … France, they don’t give what the China gives. So, to me, [this news] coming 
from CCTV is really a very nice thing. I’m very happy to see that from CCTV’. 
 
In contrast, there are other interviewees who were also non-regular viewers of CCTV-
Africa and usually consume BBC and CNN for international news, who had a rather clear 
and favourable attitude about CCTV-Africa. When asked how she found out about the 
news video she just watched, Diana from Tanzania gave a very affirmative answer: ‘I 
watched a video on the infrastructure system of my country (Tanzania) and the new 
system of the fast buses, considering that this is a new system for my country it is an 
excellent experience to see that CCTV-Africa has taken upon itself to report on the matter, 
but I think the report should have also looked at the problems that have been brought 
about by the new buses, such as the many traffic accidents that have been brought about 
by the ignorant drivers that tend to drive their cars onto the special roads assigned to 
the buses alone. Also, the report could have given a chance to more citizens to give their 
opinions on the new system and what they think can be done to make things better’ 
(24th July 2016).  
 
Rukia from Tanzania described CCTV-Africa news as ‘educative and informative’ (25th July 
2016). Laina from Namibia said: ‘I feel good about CCTV-Africa and I feel that they are 
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well strategized. They mostly report news all around Africa and that gives one an 
opportunity to learn what is going on around the African continent. Considering the fact 
that I am based in China, I feel good to be informed of the on goings, whether good or 
bad, back in Africa and particularly my country’ (20th July 2016).  
 
Even though Laina thought highly of the CCTV-Africa news, she did not believe that ‘the 
content has any kind of agenda.’ They both liked the Chinese news, but also, they were 
very positive about China-Africa governmental collaborations and economic cooperation. 
Rukia said, ‘My government’s attitude towards China is very positive and good, [since] 
Tanzania and China have had good relations for a long time. The relationship with Beijing 
is a cooperative one and I support my government's opinion of cooperating with the 
Chinese government’.  
 
Such a positive attitude is further established upon a comparison of behaviours between 
China and leading Western countries in Africa: ‘We like Chinese. China has been signing 
contracts (with African countries). Because for America, even you don’t have a bill, you 
still have a gun. Africa would totally be afraid of something (like that), but Chinese won’t 
(do that). And we still make a lot of contracts with China’ (Abduhali 14th July 2016).  
 
Some interviewees also showed strong support for the development approach of the 
China model. Jia La from Mali, who provided only his Chinese name instead of his Malian 
one, also spoke highly of the protection of governmental policies over domestic 
industries in China, which, in his opinion, is the key to the success of the China model 
and a good example for his own government to follow. Another Malian interviewee was 
Ibrahim, who also claimed that he was not aware of the agenda of CCTV-Africa and 
wanted to ‘skip this question’; and when further asked by the interviewer about the soft 
power of CCTV in Africa, was also rather positive and supportive about the ‘win-win’ 
policy between China and Mali (26th May 2016). Lawrens from Equatorial Guinea 
admitted that ‘my country and China to be partners is good for us’ as China can provide 
‘a lot of opportunities’ (5th July 2016). 
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As shown in Table 8.4, almost all interviewees in this category were non-regular viewers 
of CCTV-Africa. This is possibly the major reason why they are unaware of the ideological 
agenda of the news channel, as awareness can rarely be raised by watching two short 
pieces of news videos but is rather based on long-term perception of growing Chinese 
presence in their respective countries and in the African continent more generally. 
However, in terms of being influenced by the media effect, the audience’s consciousness 
did not really play a decisive role in changing their perspectives on China-Africa relations. 
In this case, the information they got from CCTV-Africa news resonated with their 
personal experiences, more or less. Their views were based on their preconceptions of 
matters related to China-Africa interactions, and the significance of the media, therefore, 
was less evident. 
 
Category 2: Unconscious of the Ideological Agenda but Partly Agree 
 
Name Age Gender Nationality Diploma Funding Perception Habit 


































Chart 8.4 Four Interviewees of Category 2 
 
After watching the news video about the infrastructure development in Tanzania, Japhet 
talked about his limited knowledge of China-Tanzania history: ‘… maybe I don’t know [a 
lot] about history (on China and Tanzania), but I got one of Tanzanian professors … say[s] 
that even before the second world war, maybe after the second world war, Tanzanians 
come to China to [ask] to help them because at that moment, China was socialist. My 
country, socialist (too)’ (3rd July 2016).  
 
Japhet also talked about the giant football stadium built by the Chinese and many forms 
of Chinese investment in his country; also about his pride for the Tanzanian capital Dar-
es-Salaam as it was quickly developing. Compared to a news video of CCTV-Africa about 
an attack on a mosque, Japhet expressed a clear preference for positive news: ‘I like the 
good news, the public transportation (one).’ He was a little concerned that the recent 
surge in tourism in Tanzania as it declined in Kenya because of the latter’s terrorism could 
be influenced by its own domestic terror attack. Japhet also admitted that the two news 
reports were both good in terms of professional journalism and he did not think the 
news produced by CCTV-Africa was directly related to what China was doing in Tanzania. 
 
Due to his previous working experience and his close observation of the job market in 










Tanzania, Japhet had a less rosy perspective on Chinese companies in his country:  
 
‘For sure, in Tanzania, it’s easy to get a job. You can get a job. But people are going 
to say how much [it] will pay. You can ask anyone here from Tanzania. China maybe 
needs to improve its policy for their salary. If they improve, they can mobilize more 
people to learn Chinese … We have German companies there, we have Spanish 
companies there, normally people try to think to go to European companies. I think 
for Chinese companies; they need to increase the salary. Yes, you can get the cheap 
labour, but for those who are educated you should increase the salary.’  
 
He agreed with the idea that Chinese investment is contributing to the development in 
Tanzania, but he saw a few problems, such as low salary, a topic rarely mentioned in 
CCTV-Africa news reporting about many African economies. 
 
Nobert from Cameroon shared the opinion of Japhet on CCTV-Africa creating good 
images of their countries: ‘CCTV is trying to say something good. Because China 
broadcasts the whole nation to the world, I think it’s of great importance … So many 
people are going to know this country’ (5th July 2016).  
 
Nobert’s understandings of CCTV-Africa and China’s participation in Cameroon were 
rather ambivalent. He had a rather realistic understanding of the approach of China’s 
investment in Cameroon and the disputed cheap but poor quality ‘Chinese goods’.  
 
Unlike Western developed countries, Nobert thought China knew Cameroon better: 
‘China seems [to] know our country is not established, is still developing, so China knows 
the way they invest ... Dealing with a country like Cameroon, I think China knows what 
the people need; they know what they can afford.’  
 
Accordingly, Nobert is quite clear about the cheap goods from China: ‘Most people 
complain that the Chinese products are not of good quality, but still, they consume them. 
 
They’re happy using them, even if there’re complaints, but it’s good because the local 
community can afford them, and it’s helpful.’  
 
Regular viewer Magareth is originally from Namibia. She had a positive understanding of 
international relations: ‘We live in a global world. So, it’s very common/normal for 
Chinese officials to travel to African countries because they have something to share.’ 
(25th May 2016). Therefore, the ‘positive message’ that CCTV-Africa sends to the world, 
in the eyes of Magareth, did not necessarily imply a specific political and economic 
agenda for China’s presence in Africa.  
 
However, regarding the participation of China in Namibia, Magareth thought ‘everything 
has two sides.’ She had noticed some very serious environmental pollution caused by 
Chinese companies in Namibia, which, in her opinion, were the result of the weak 
environmental protection policies of local government: ‘Probably for the economy to 
grow, you need to boost it, and that comes down to industries. As we know, more 
industries produce more pollution, but I don’t think there is a price that you can pay for 
human health, but it all depends on regulations.’ 
 
Magareth had an understanding of the messages she was getting from the Chinese 
media, such as CCTV-Africa, in relation to China’s investment in Africa. She said:  
 
‘investment, I think, is a good thing for any country, but I think countries have to 
strengthen their policies. They must make their policies clear, and have all their 
people in place, because you make policy but people need to implement them, like 
we know there is a lot of corruption. You end up with the situation that policies are 
not strictly followed, and there are consequences.’ 
 
She also made it very clear that compared to the news she watched on CCTV her 
personal experience studying in China influenced her mind more. 
 
 
Another interviewee Abdul, from Ghana, had quite a different perception of the two 
news videos he watched on the interviewer’s laptop. The positive one is about an airline 
joint venture between Ghana and China and the negative one was about the slowing 
down of economic growth in Ghana. Abdul liked the former better than the latter 
because he thought the positive one helped to correct the negative images of Africa 
portrayed by western media such as the BBC; the latter is ‘not objective’ and not telling 
the whole story (3rd July 2016).  
 
As a non-regular viewer, Abdul did not have a clear understanding about the specific way 
CCTV-Africa reports news in Africa. Like many other interviewees, he was very surprised 
to hear that CCTV had a media centre located in Nairobi in Kenya. But Abdul was deeply 
concerned about the increasing involvement of China in Africa. ‘You have a lot of Chinese 
investment in Africa. Basically, in five years, Africa belongs to China … The gold, the oil, 
the diamonds, everything … More Chinese people in Africa, more Chinese investment in 
Africa. And then, in the long run, Africa is flooded with Chinese people. And the 
continent would become a continent of China. I hope it doesn’t happen. But it’s gonna 
happen.’ 
 
On the other hand, Abdul did notice that China’s investment and financial aid have 
brought Ghana some positive changes: ‘We just [have a new] studio in the center place 
of Ghana which is funded by Chinese people. Very nice. And we just finished the 
international theatre. It was built by the Chinese and was a gift given to Ghana.’ Abdul 
agreed with the fact that China-Ghana cooperation does bring good results to the 
development of the local society but the old nightmare of being ‘colonized’ still haunts 
him. 
 
From the above examples, it is noticeable that the regular viewers had a relatively 
deeper understanding of CCTV-Africa as a media tool to gain more soft power in the 
international relations arena. As for the other two, they had rather different 
understandings of the Chinese media and Chinese economic involvement in Africa. It is 
 
very possibly because that they are not familiar with the state-controlled nature of CCTV. 
However, the obvious observation in this case is that the positive reports by CCTV-Africa 
about African local societies can trigger the audience’s associated knowledge about the 
good side of China-Africa relations whether in the past, current or future. This ‘act-
response’ causal relation is key to the significance of the media effects especially in the 
situations when audiences of Category 2 have a mixed feeling about China in Africa. 
 
Category 3: Conscious of the Ideological Agenda and Agree 
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Kosy 22 Male Nigeria Bachelor’s 
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Henry 29 Male Liberia Master’s Chinese Relatively Regular 
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Degree Government Positive Audience 
Judith 20 Female Tanzania Master’s 
Degree 
Self-Funded Positive Regular 
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Chart 8.5 Nine Interviewees of Category 3 
 
Interviewees in this category usually had a clear understanding of CCTV-Africa as state-
controlled media and that it had a particular agenda which was closely related to China-
Africa interactions.  
 
Boris from Burundi said bluntly: ‘CCTV is Chinese. It depends on the political agenda they 
have between Burundi and China, so they don’t really go to the negative side as well as 
the positive side of the political crisis … most of what CCTV Africa shows is about 
business … (Chinese government) encourage[s] the Chinese investors to invest in Africa’ 
(4th July 2016).  
 
CCTV reports on issues in Africa demonstrated, even in the eyes of non-regular viewers 
such as Wendy from Ghana, that ‘the Chinese government is trying to break into the 









Ghanaian market also the global markets, and [the Chinese government] wants to 
promote its cooperation with the Ghanaian government’ (25th May 2016).  
 
Yorgri from Ghana said: ‘(there is) an agenda that China is pushing to strengthen the ties 
between China and Ghana … I don’t think it’s a very bad idea … but depending on the 
strings that might be attached to it’ (25th May 2016).  
 
Judith from Tanzania noticed the ideology incorporated in the CCTV-Africa news implied 
that ‘development occurs in process. It took time for Tanzania to have well developed 
infrastructures, but here are some improvements being made’ (26th July 2016). 
 
The media expansion of CCTV in Africa did not really concern the interviewees as much 
as the critics, as Benjamin from Ghana said: ‘I wouldn’t worry about [the critique of 
China’s cultural imperialism]. It depends on how you use the resources … You will see 
why the government invests in the media centre in Africa. Because they know that they 
do things and Africa will pay them back. Why is China embarking on ‘one belt one road’? 
Why is China building a railway from China to Philippines? Because we need a boosted 
economy’ (27th May 2016). 
 
The interviewees’ agreement with the agenda of CCTV-Africa was largely based on their 
daily life experiences.  
 
Benjamin explained his opinion about the ‘soft power’ of CCTV-Africa saying: ‘It doesn’t 
matter whether CCTV is made free to the rural people … Actions speak louder than 
words … when I was hungry, and you fed me matters much more than you just saying 
you love me’.  
 
Apparently, to audiences of this category, the China-Africa economic cooperation is 
bringing much more positive influences than negative ones. Interestingly, when asked 
their opinion on some negative issues of China in Africa, such as poor-quality products 
 
or illegal mining factories, interviewees tended to tell the other side of the story and to 
emphasize the fault of their own governments.  
 
Wendy explained why African people would have a bad impression of Chinese products:  
 
‘Most of our things [are] made in China and people will think that it’s not durable or 
it’s fake. Because the producers come [to China] and tell the manufactures “I want 
[this product] at this price.” And the producer says fine. If you want that maybe it 
will be 100RMB, then you are going to get very good quality. Then the suppliers say 
that “No. If I send it to Ghana, I cannot make more profit, so give me for 30 RMB”. 
For 30RMB you are not going to get that quality. Ghanaians will buy, so people have 
this mentality that things from China are not durable. Until I got to China, then I 
realized this wasn't true. So anytime I talk to my people back in Ghana, I tell them 
China has a lot of quality things, it depends on the money you have and what you 
want.’  
 
As for the environmental pollution caused by Chinese factories (also factories from other 
countries as well), Benjamin accepted the fact and said that ‘it is the price that we have 
to pay (for economic development).’  
Yorgri was trying to convince the researcher that unfairness is a common and natural 
existence. She said: 
 
‘… society is not fair. Nature is not fair. Our fingers are not same. We are unique in 
our own ways … What I’m also saying is that if there wasn’t any cooperation, there 
wasn’t any stronger ties, those were involved in a business will not get the 
opportunity of travelling to China. It’s because of the cooperation, that’s why you 
can get a visa to come to China to buy this and to sell. And when they come here to 
buy, some people can also buy from there. They can also employ some people to 
be selling and then there is some trickle-down effect. You get my point.’ 
 
 
Besides showing firm support for the political and economic agenda behind CCTV-Africa, 
some of the interviewees were quite pleased with the news produced by it: ‘… CCTV is 
good because it is not trying to take any part or any kind of position … Personally, I think 
it is good (to sell the good image of Africa) … Because the bad news will shock people …’ 
(Boris).  
 
Martina and Kosy were also happy with the constructive tone of the news they watched 
about Nigeria: ‘I think the content of this news (about the emerging online shopping 
industry in Nigeria) portrays optimism towards sustainable development in Africa’ (Kosy, 
21st July 2016). Judith also thought that the reports of CCTV-Africa can make Africa ‘be 
known at a certain point’. 
 
Paul from Cameroon was glad to see that there was news from CCTV-Africa reporting 
the innovative industry of the young generation in his country: ‘I really appreciate the 
reports on this, because most of the reports I get from Africa, Cameroon [are] not really 
showing the good side of the country. You know. Most of the reports we get show mostly 
about the war … has killed [many] people ... I think if CCTV and the west can be showing 
the good side of things that are happening in the country, I think it will really encourage 
more people to invest in areas of Africa’ (4th July).  
 
To Henry, who is originally from Liberia, CCTV-Africa covers more aspects on Africa than 
just the political conflicts shown by Western media: ‘For the BBC, most events are 
political, for CCTV, they give the news on what’s happening. Some things people should 
know or be informed about.’ (23rd May 2016).  
 
One common thing about interviewees of this category is that they expressed 
straightforwardly that they ‘want [foreigners] to see the good side’ of their countries 
(Henry). In terms of promoting the positive image of their countries, interviewees are on 
the same page with their governments which are approval of the constructive reporting 
style conducted by CCTV-Africa is appealing. The positive and energetic image of Africa 
 
is good for attracting foreign investment, as the interviewees believe that economic 
development is the priority for developing countries in Africa and the China model is a 
good example for their governments to follow (Benjamin). This was also the main reason 
why they choose to go to China for further studies. Judith said: ‘The Chinese government 
and our country have a very good relationship in general, and I support the cooperation. 
Because we have a lot to learn from China as it is one of the developed countries in the 
world. I myself have learned a lot just by studying here in China.’  
 
Even though some of them realized that China may profit more from its economic 
cooperation with African countries, it seems to them an inevitable process to join in the 
world system as an active participant, something which China has achieved in recent 
decades. The messages they received from CCTV-Africa reconfirmed their pre-concepts 
about China in Africa – constructive, friendly and helpful. Therefore, the reception level 
of this category suits the very description of Hall’s ‘dominant decoding’. The significant 
moment happens, and the encoder’s message is decoded exactly the way expected (at 
least according to the words of interviewees).  
 
Category 4: Conscious of the Ideological Agenda but Partly Agree 
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Chart 8.6 Four Interviewees of Category 4 
 
Interviewees in this category did not unconditionally accept the messages encoded in 
the news content of CCTV-Africa, although they were fully conscious of the agenda of 
CCTV-Africa. On the one hand, interviewees had different understandings of the 
reporting style of CCTV-Africa.  
 
Joe from Cameroon thought that ‘[CCTV-Africa’s] programmes are really nicely 
displayed … the difference (from Western media) is that CCTV-Africa goes deeper in [its] 
news while the Western ones discuss the general matter only’ (26th July 2016). Mamudu 
from Zambia spoke highly of CCTV-Africa as he believed that CCTV-Africa ‘can correct the 
false information about Zambia and Africa’ (3rd July 2016).  
 
However, Johnny from Ghana claimed that he ‘did not see differences between CCTV-
Africa and other media … If the information is credible, the report or news should be 









what they are giving. If BBC have given some reports about the negative aspects of the 
society, they are just telling the truth and it’s the true pain we have’ (24th May 2016).  
 
Similarly, Nmanka from Tanzania thought ‘CCTV-Africa has no big different [in terms of 
reporting] approach on covering news from those (Western) main-stream [media] such 
as the BBC and CNN’ (24th July 2016). 
 
On the other hand, they all seemed to be clearly aware of the agenda of CCTV in Africa. 
Joe said that ‘The content of the news about Cameroon does convey a certain ideology 
that development occurs and is finally in the process of taking place.’ Mamudu realized 
that the message of CCTV-Africa tries to deliver is to encourage people to ‘come and 
invest.’  
 
Most interviewees agreed with the fact that China’s investment and its economic 
cooperation with their countries are helpful and good in a general sense. ‘I think it’s a 
good thing, because they have done a lot for Zambia, and China has made a lot of money 
from that’ (Mamudu). They were clearly aware of the fact that the ‘cooperation between 
the two governments is approved by all because the changes are visible in the country’ 
(Joe). However, when they were asked about their personal opinions about China-Africa 
economic cooperation, they became rather reserved.  
 
Johnny from Ghana who was studying for a master’s degree course of Public 
Administration at Harbin Institute of Technology had asked the interviewer to stop 
recording the interviewing more than once. Due to Johnny’s on going official position in 
his local government, he seemed very concerned about certain ‘sensitive’ questions on 
the relations between the Chinese and Ghanaian governments. However, the off-record 
conversations showed his realistic and rather pessimist attitude towards Ghana’s foreign 
relations with countries of stronger economies. As Johnny said on the record: ‘I see China 
as a business man, to gain profit, to invest money… always interested in profits’ (24th 
May 2016). The pragmatism of China impressed Johnny. Although he reserved his 
 
comments on some controversial phenomena of China in Africa, which was regarded as 
a form of disagreement in the view of this researcher, he thoroughly agreed with this 
development approach either for his country or for himself: ‘Everyone wants to survive.’ 
 
Compared to Joe’s complete silence on the questions about his personal perceptions on 
the ideology he sensed from CCTV-Africa’s news and Johnny’s reserved expressions, 
Mamudu from Zambia talked about the inequality in the local society which contributes 
to uneven and variable perceptions of the African public on the participation of China in 
Africa: ‘… not all people get [profit from China’s investment in Zambia] …For example the 
Chinese government gives us the scholarships. They (the Chinese government) really 
want people to do something better, to come [to China] to study. But … they will give it 
to the government [of] Zambia. When your mother, or your father, your sister or your 
brother is not [part of the government then] you will not get the scholarship, so this is 
not good.’ Overall, though, Mamudu admitted that, although China gets profit from 
Zambia, China also provides monetary aid, which is good: ‘Chinese don’t mind to give 
certain amounts of money. That thing I think is really good. And the Chinese like Zambia. 
They make a lot of money from there even more than in their own country.’ 
 
Nmanka had a negotiated understanding about the image of China in Africa presented 
by CCTV-Africa: 
 
‘According to the two videos I just watched and other programmes I have watched 
before, I think the news does convey a certain kind of ideology. Because once a 
media is managed by the state, some news will be limited to protect the state and 
the people of the country … CCTV-Africa presents an ideology of giving more news 
about the government[s’] activities rather than an insight into the people’s daily life 
and complaints to the government for the things they have done wrongs or things 
they need to do.’  
 
Even though Nmanka actually partly agreed with the criticism that Chinese media in 
 
Africa appears to be a new form of cultural imperialism (‘I think the criticism is portraying 
the true current situation to some extent,’), she still supports the decision of her 
government to cooperate with China: ‘My country (Tanzania) and China have a very 
strong relationship. I would say it is a very cooperative one. To some extent I do support 
my government’s opinion and cooperation with China.’  
 
When the audience understands the ideological agenda that the media is trying to 
deliver through encoded messages but partly appreciate the media content, as indicated 
in this category, then there emerges a possible rift of the ideology underpinned by the 
pseudo-environment of media. This rift, representing the potential room for critical 
thinking, is opened further by the contradiction between what audiences are told by the 
news and what they see in real life. The fact that they are conscious of the agenda of the 
news programme but not fully convinced by it shows the complexity of the audience’s 
reception of the effect of the media. However, the negotiated decoding of interviewees 
in category 4, as indicated in the above interviewing records, seems inadequate in terms 
of bridging the doubt of audiences about real life problems within the overall 
background of China-Africa neoliberal economic cooperation as presented by the 
agenda of CCTV-Africa. What is more important is that, as shown in the case of Johnny 
from Ghana, even though the good image of China was questioned by the audience, the 
ideology of pragmatism prevails. This kind of ontology of pragmatism in the 
manifestation of the prevailing ideologies of ‘economic development as a priority’ is the 
essential agenda reflected in the case of Chinese media in Africa and far beyond this 
concrete example pointing directly to the escalating global economic system of 
capitalism.  
 
Category 5: Conscious of the Ideological Agenda but Disagree 
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Chat 8.7 Four Interviewees of Category 5 
 
Mamadou from Guinea pointed out the falseness of the foreign media in Africa saying 
that ‘Sometimes what they say is just bullshit. So, they usually focus on the negative 
African news and how to try to help us but not doing it … That’s why I don’t believe the 
news that the media give me’ (27th May 2016). He noticed that ‘The way they (CCTV-
Africa) report. They come to Africa with aides from China. If there is a problem, they 









bring the solution. China is proposing order to help those countries. I think this is what 
is happening now, Chinese companies are everywhere. They have cooperation with the 
governments.’  
 
However, Mamadou expressed his concern for the growing expansion of China in Africa: 
 
‘I really appreciate the help we get from the government, and Chinese officials. But 
there is one thing that needs asking: What’s going to be the payback? What are they 
expecting from us in the future after they help us? When we talk about this we 
usually think about the past when the French came into my country. They said that 
they will help you guys; they do everything, like teaching us their language. But at 
the end of the day, till today, we want to be free of these people. They exploited us 
in various ways. They come to our country to exploit our gold. Our labour is cheap 
the goods are cheap. I just hope China won’t do the same thing.’ 
 
He also talked about the negative side of China doing business in Africa: ‘If the 
government itself wants a win-win, while some officials just want their own interests, 
there can be bribery. The Chinese officials can pay the money to get the contracts and 
do whatever they want to do … it’s happening. I have some proof about it. That’s how 
Africa works … Some Chinese companies in your country give a lot of bribes. I know a lot 
about this in Sudan and Nigeria. There was damage to environment due to oil 
exploitation, so people protested about it.’ 
 
Mamadou was not very optimistic about the increasing participation of China in Africa. 
But still, heavily influenced by his father who used to be an independent reporter in 
Guinea, Mamdou believed in the development model of China. ‘I think we need to follow 
this model. China comes from nothing. Decades ago, China and Africa were at the same 
level … My dad always tells me whenever I come home that wherever you go, all the 
countries you been, always watch and try to imitate. And he always tells me that China’s 
development model is a good example.’  
 
 
Such dualistic perceptions of China as a good example for African countries to follow and 
its controversial participation in Africa are also noted in the conversation with Congolese 
student Vanessa.  
 
Originally from Democratic Republic of Congo, Vanessa was studying medicine at a 
university in the city of Tianjin in northern China. The researcher did not manage to find 
a positive news video on CCTV-Africa website as the comparison to a negative one due 
to the fact that, during that period of time (from May to July 2016), the DRC was afflicted 
by widespread unrest in the country. This was possibly part of the reason why Vanessa 
did not recognize the difference in reporting style between CCTV-Africa and other 
foreign media in Africa. But she did notice that compared to other media reports she 
watched on the issue about the unrest, CCTV-Africa seemed reluctant to present the 
whole truth: ‘the reality is much worse than what the news reported,’ said Vanessa. 
 
Although she was not a regular viewer of CCTV-Africa, she seemed fully aware of how 
the agenda of this Chinese media works. It was obvious to her that the target audience 
of CCTV-Africa was the elite classes in local societies: ‘Given the fact that they (elite and 
middle classes) are the only ones watching. That’s their agenda (to report news they care 
about instead of the public). They are the only ones who have access to it. It makes sense’ 
(30th May 2016). 
 
Vanessa agreed that her government prefers positive reports about the DRC rather than 
negative ones because ‘if they (media) show the real deep stuff, that gives them (the 
government) a bad image, and that would be worse.’ 
 
She thought that the preference to watch good reports about one’s own country was a 
normal thing for anyone who is, more or less, patriotic: ‘Anyone who is smart and has 
seen any news that is reported about the country would be happy to see they are 
reporting something positive, because 99% of the news about Congo is negative … when 
 
they show the positive parts, especially [about] financial [development], my country [as] 
one of the richest countries in resources, it attracts investors.’  
 
However, from a more critical perspective, Vanessa doubted that the investment of 
China in the DRC and bilateral cooperation were really helping her country develop as 
much as many Chinese and African politicians promised. ‘Chinese people go to our 
country. They come with their own food, with their own plants, with their own 
everything. They come with their own workers, especially for the lower classes. 
[Therefore], even if the economy is seemingly rising, right now there is serious financial 
crisis.’  
 
Additionally, the monetary aid and the wealth created by bilateral economic relations 
are only visible to a certain group of people in local society. ‘Even if it does bring money, 
the population would never get to see. Only the people in the elite class would be able 
to get access to it … No one in the working class gets it,’ said Vanessa. 
 
Yet, Vanessa saw some valuable characteristics about Chinese culture that is a key to 
successful economic development. ‘One thing I admire about China is the unity among 
the people. Back home, this tribe is fighting against that tribe, this people want to kill 
that people. [If I’m the boss], you are my relatives and friend, you get employed … The 
second thing I think is that China is smart, investing in many things.’ 
 
When asked about how to rationalize her seemingly contradictory perceptions about 
China and China in Africa, Vanessa explained: ‘You have to weigh the pros and cons (of 
dealing with China). When you invest in something, you have to see what the benefits 
are.’ 
 
To Leroy and his female friend, the ‘cons’ of China’s involvement in the domestic issue in 
Africa outweigh the ‘pros.’ Regarding a news video about an investigation on the 
diamond trade in Zimbabwe, Leroy and his friend expressed their sceptical opinion on 
 
the improper involvement of China: ‘That’s two hundred million dollars if diamonds 
disappeared. And they (the local government) just let it happen. China must have 
something to do with it’ (30th May 2016).  
 
They also noticed that instead of using the words ‘diamond theft’, CCTV-Africa used a 
rather neutral term ‘diamond trade’, which clearly showed the stance of the Chinese 
government on this matter. Leroy said that many local media in Zimbabwe bluntly 
accused China of ‘stealing away’ the diamonds when the government of Zimbabwe 
decided to nationalize the diamond company of AnJin which used to be a joint venture 
between Chinese and Zimbabwe companies.  
 
After watching another news video about the economic growth in Zimbabwe, Leroy did 
not change his perspective on CCTV-Africa. To Leroy, the reporting style of CCTV-Africa is 
no different from the mainstream Western media that he has watched. ‘It (the reporting 
style) is very Westernized,’ he said. However, it seemed a futile strategy to Leroy and his 
friend: ‘Why are all the presenters non-Chinese? If they want to express the Chinese 
opinion, the Westernized style is definitely not helping.’  
 
Compared to the interviewees who partly agree with the agenda of China-Africa 
economic cooperation, viewers in this category hold a rather sceptical opinion of it. On 
the one hand, they doubt that the economic penetration of China into Africa is anything 
else but another round of ‘scramble for wealth and riches’ that was the motivation of 
many of the European and American colonial adventurers and entrepreneurs in the 19th 
and even 20th centuries. Although they clearly blame their local governments for such 
negative consequences, they do not see China-Africa economic cooperation changing 
the status quo. However, on the other hand, the interviewees in general do believe the 
development path of China in the past thirty years indicates an alternative approach for 
their own country to succeed in the global economic system. To them, though, the 
dominant global structure seems unlikely to change. Compared to contributing to a fairer 
global system, it is more practical for these interviewees to imagine their countries 
 
becoming another emerging economy within the current structure.  
 
As indicated in Table 8.8, all interviewees were non-regular viewers of CCTV-Africa. 
Therefore, their understanding of the agenda of this news channel is based on their long-
term awareness about the political economic logic of transnational media, fragmented 
knowledge about CCTV-Africa and the new videos the interviewer showed to them 
during the interviewing process. The construction of an audience’s consciousness about 
the ideological agenda of a news programme, as indicated in this case, is made up of a 
very complicated process during which the sole role of media incorporated in the 
mechanism of societal structure is less significant in terms of shaping the audience’s 
knowledge system about the objective environment. 
 
Category 6: Partly Conscious of the Ideological Agenda and Agree 
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Table 8.9 Two Interviewees of Category 6 
 
Interviewees in this category did not have an independent awareness of the existence 
of the news agenda of CCTV-Africa. However, when asked if he/she has sensed efforts 
by CCTV-Africa to build up positive images of their countries and China in Africa, viewers 
like Sidon agreed, and another like Isaac did grasp part of the agenda of the news 
programme.  
 
Sidon from Ethiopia did not think that there existed governmental influence in the news 
of CCTV-Africa that the interviewer showed to her. She ‘understand[s]’ that CCTV-Africa 
 
deploys a rather positive or constructive reporting style to cover stories either in Ethiopia 
or the continent of Africa. She did not deny that there existed a clear agenda of CCTV-
Africa and yet neither did she express clearly what the political and economic purpose 
of CCTV-Africa was as a government-guided media operation.  
 
 
Chart 8.8 Two Interviewees of Category 6 
 
However, Sidon seemed a firm supporter of China-Ethiopia cooperation: ‘…five years ago, 
we did not have any trains and metros. We did not have the African Union headquarters, 
(in Addis Ababa) where all the leaders of Africa get together to talk. It’s like the UN. So 
that was a gift from (funded by) China to Ethiopia. They built it for us. So, this 
cooperation between the two nations is good because it’s obviously developing our 
country … It’s helping us developing ourselves. It’s good’ (5th July 2016).  
 
She also observed the different approach of China in Africa compared to Western 
countries. Sidon said: ‘America helps us and aids us a lot. But I think it’s more with money 
rather than building … On the other hand, China, they train our people there. They teach 
us and they help us build it. So that’s good. That helps us more rather than just the 
money in your hand, and not knowing what to do with it … China’s trying to help us. I 
support that decision.’ 










On a different tack, Isaac from Ghana appreciated the governmental ‘guidance’ behind 
the television station’s output. He said: ‘The media will have an influence to push the 
agenda of Chinese government on other countries … mostly CCTV talks about aid to 
Africa’ (23rd May 2016).  
 
He agreed with the ideology of the Chinese government on the issue of economic 
development and political stability: ‘It is beneficial to call for the investment, and … 
political stability is good.’ The investment from and cooperation with China, in the eyes 
of Isaac are ‘playing a vital role in the [Ghanaian] economy.’ 
 
Interestingly, Isaac expressed a strong denial of the media effect on his views. When 
asked ‘does watching CCTV influence your thinking of China’, Isaac firmly answered: ‘No, 
I am afraid, I have seen the news report for four years. I think I see differences from my 
environment … It has nothing to do with whether I watched the programme or not.’ 
 
Category 7: Partly Conscious of the Ideological Agenda and Partly Agree 
 
Name Age Gender Nationality Diploma Funding Perception Habit 















Alan 24 Male Tanzania Bachelor’s 
Degree 
Self-Funded Positive Regular 
Audience 





Chart 8.9 Three Interviewees of Category 7 
 
Alan from Tanzania told the interviewer that from the news video he watched about the 
new public transportation system in Tanzanian capital, he sensed that CCTV-Africa is 
trying to build up an investment-friendly picture of Tanzania to attract investors (6th July 
2016). He was glad that CCTV-Africa is trying to show the good side of his country, 
because ‘before it was negative … people died. There is hunger. People had nothing. But 
now you see, it's a good place to live.’  
 
Although Alan noticed that compared to the BBC and other Western media, CCTV-Africa 
goes deeper into the background of stories in Africa, he did not realize the specificity of 
the ideological agenda of CCTV-Africa and he said: ‘I think they have similar rules to 
follow, so there is not much difference.’ He also realized that there are certain topics that 
CCTV-Africa will never explore in any detail for political reasons.  
 
For example, Alan explained there are some illegal activities in Tanzania that involve the 
participation of Chinese people, like poaching. It was also caused by the ‘high level of 
corruption.’ ‘Everything is possible, if you have money, people just do this. I give you 
money. It’s illegal, but people want to do that.’ According to Alan’s observations, news 
about poaching on CCTV-Africa never probes about who is really carrying out such 










unlawful business.  
 
However, Alan still believed that the government-controlled media contributes to the 
development of a country: ‘Why in China can they do better than in Tanzania? When it 
comes to news in China, they can cover everything.’ 
 
Hillary is originally from Kenya where the headquarters of CCTV-Africa is located. To 
Hillary, it was also an obvious fact that CCTV-Africa as a Chinese state media is speaking 
for the interest of its own people: ‘In CCTV, you have to defend yourself, so you have to 
talk good about yourself’ (7th July 2016).  
 
After watching the news video about a ‘Safe City project’ coordinated by the Kenyan 
government and the Chinese company Huawei (which is ostensibly privately owned but 
obviously comes under Chinese government scrutiny), Hillary told the interviewer that 
‘the local security isn’t getting any better.’ He believed that this kind of positive news is 
to ‘bring investment to us (Kenya),’ and he thought the agenda of CCTV in Africa is 
‘Bring[ing] confidence. [Showing that] We are safe. [Encouraging people] Come to invest.’  
 
Although Hillary said that he thought China-Africa cooperation and Chinese investment 
in Kenya are good, he also saw a lot of problems caused by such multilateral interactions. 
The changes brought by the foreign investment in Kenya were ‘some good, some bad,’ 
said Hillary. ‘For local [companies], we work from 8am to 5pm and take a rest at noon, 
but the Chinese, they work from 7am to 7pm … many local [labourers] will be exploited. 
 
Similarly, Ephrem from Ethiopia also had mixed feelings about CCTV in Africa but from a 
quite different angle. Although Ephrem did not recognize a clear agenda of CCTV-Africa, 
he knew that the news video about establishing an industrial park was going to please 
the local Ethiopian government much more than the other about drought in rural areas.  
 
Admitting himself as one of the middle, even elite classes, in Ethiopia, Ephrem expressed 
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a favourable attitude in terms of China’s relations with his country: ‘Ethiopia like[s] 
Chinese investment very much … I think it’s a really good commission for the country 
and the people.’ Accordingly, Ephrem liked CCTV-Africa far more than the ‘Western 
media’: ‘[CCTV-Africa] is really even not just OK. It’s wow! … I really like it’ (26th May 
2016).  
 
It seems that not only does CCTV-Africa represent Africa in a way that the critical 
Western journalists never did, but also the Chinese media in Africa in general presents a 
very different China to African people: ‘(Ethiopian people) did not have good impressions 
of China before. They were thinking that China is still as poor as Ethiopia. But when they 
see [CCTV], they have been shockingly surprised.’  
 
However, this increasing influence of Chinese media on the African continent raised 
some concerns for Ephrem. He regarded all international media as tools of soft power 
for different nation-states (which is part of the reason why he did not see the specificity 
of the ideological agenda of CCTV-Africa), and he felt that the officially promoted 
publicity about China could mean the rise of a new hegemony: ‘[China’s global expansion] 
is a good thing. [But] at the same time, for the future, it is scary. Not for now, but for the 
future when [China] is (fully) developed.’ 
 
8.2.2 Conclusion 
The above findings display a very complicated and diverse panorama of the African 
audience’s reception of CCTV-Africa news content. As illustrated in previous chapters and 
sections, the ideological agenda of CCTV-Africa is to promote bilateral economic 
cooperation between China and the continent of Africa by highlighting the importance 
of neoliberal economic development and China’s involvement in enhancing such 
development. However, due to the variables of the interviewees, such as nationality, 
study subject, viewing habits, previous knowledge about China-Africa relations and so 
on, the communication process employed by CCTV-Africa to deliver such an ideological 
agenda has prompted a variety of responses amongst the targeted viewing audience, all 
 
from different backgrounds. 
 
As we can see from the seven different reception categories, audiences of similar 
understanding about CCTV-Africa described their general perceptions about this news 
channel rather differently. The results of the qualitative interviewing show that the 
audience’s original perceptions of CCTV-Africa as alternatively positive, relatively 
positive, neutral, relatively negative or negative as indicated in Chart 8.2, and contain 
diverse and different interpretations of the news content. Figure 8.1 depicts the multi-
layered interpretation of African audiences towards CCTV-Africa. Based on the question 
on whether the audience think CCTV-Africa reports news differently, Figure 8.1 draws 
out several variations in the African viewing public’s general understanding. As shown in 
Figure 8.1, those who are more or less aware of the agenda of CCTV-Africa are more 
likely to notice its positive and constructive approach to reporting news in Africa. It is 
noticeable that amongst the people who sensed the different reporting style of CCTV-
Africa, there are indeed several divergent opinions towards what that difference truly 
stands for. And even for the group who share a similar interpretation on the difference 
of CCTV-Africa as compared to other foreign media, there exists a different degree of 
acceptance of the agenda that such a difference implies. 
 
According to the comparison between Chart 8.2 and Figure 8.1, the interviewees’ 
general perceptions of CCTV-Africa do not directly correlate with their views of the 
ideological agenda of the news channel. Adjectives such as ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ are 
too general and over-simplistic for interviewees to accurately express their feelings. This, 
again, proves the importance of conducting qualitative research to obtain the complex 
subjective opinions of a media audience.  
 
There were some other unexpected findings. As shown in Chart 8.3, each category of 
reception is made up of interviewees from at least two different countries. The 
differences of nationalities did not play the most significant role in forming the opinions 
of audiences about CCTV-Africa’s news content. Similarly, the different funding sources 
 
of interviewees for their study in China are equally not necessarily a decisive factor (See 














Figure 8.1 African Audience’s Receptions of CCTV-Africa 
 
However, it can be noted from Chart 8.4 that the percentage of self-funded African 




































































































































Chinese government or educational institutions. It is an interesting finding, showing that 
besides the formal efforts made by the Chinese or African governments to promote the 
multilateral cultural and economic exchanges, the attractiveness of a Chinese degrees 
has naturally boomed due to the growing understanding that Chinese companies bring 
more jobs to local African markets. 
 
 
Chart 8.10 The Nationalities and Reception of African Audience 
 
However, there is indeed a pattern that emerges, as shown in Chart 8.5, which indicates 
that interviewees who watch the news programmes of CCTV-Africa regularly are more 
likely to have a clearer understanding of the ideological agenda of the news channel. 
One exception is the reception category 5 whereby the audience is conscious of the 
agenda but disagrees with it. Compared to other audiences who partly agree with the 
agenda, interviewees of category 5 showed a relatively strong tendency towards 
decoding the message in an oppositional position. Similar to the profound favour 
towards China shown by some viewers who were not very familiar with CCTV-Africa, the 




































relatively rigorous antipathy is to some extent also a possible result of the ‘strangeness’ 
of the media product felt by some viewers. 
 
 




Chart 8.12 The Watching Habit and Reception of African Audience 
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Despite all the differences indicated in the above findings, almost every interviewee gave 
an affirmative answer to the question ‘do you think your government would find the 
news of CCTV-Africa appealing’. The positive reporting style of CCTV-Africa, partially 
because of the restricted regulations affecting governmental media in China, is 
welcomed by many African democratic governments. Even though the agenda of CCTV-
Africa remains unclear to some interviewees, the agenda of the Chinese and African 
governments to promote multilateral economic cooperation is quite familiar to both the 
Chinese and African public. No matter what the interviewees personally think of China-
Africa relations and the news about it on CCTV-Africa, it seems common sense to them 
that their governments are willing to cooperate with Chinese government and accept 
Chinese investment. The macro political structure, indicated in policies launched by the 
Chinese government, represents a seemingly unchallengeable authoritative stance 




Chart 8.13 The Social Classes of African Audience 
 
Additionally, another element as influential as the macro political structure is the social 



























status of interviewees in their domestic societies and within the global system. As 
illustrated in previous chapters, the people of the centre class of peripheral countries, 
determined by their living conditions, are likely to show support for the maintenance of 
the global hierarchical structure. And accordingly, international news usually has a 
positive influence in terms of fostering and reinforcing the ideological consent for the 
transnational elites. Many of the African interviewees of this research clearly expressed 
their awareness of being part of an elite class of their societies. As shown in Chart 8.6, 
according to their own descriptions, there are mainly three categories they use to label 
themselves: Elite Class, Middle Class and Working Class. Although interviewees have 
different understandings towards the definitions of these terms (some regard elites as 
having political influence while others think elite simply means highly educated), it is 
obvious that a major percentage of the interviewees describe themselves as either the 
middle class or elite class in their domestic societies. Compared to the ordinary public in 
Africa who do not have access to all the information resources and are less powerful in 
deciding the public agenda, highly educated elites, with valuable study experience 















Therefore, although the diverse opinions about CCTV-Africa among the African students 
in China provide us a multi-dimensional panorama of the ideological dynamic of the 
would-be elite African class, conditioned by the macro political structure and micro 
personal demands interviewees of this research, receiving higher education in China, 
have expressed a unified attitude towards the necessity of cooperating with China but 
with different degrees of concerns towards the concrete approaches to implement such 
cooperation. As indicated in Chart 8.7, the percentage of the interviewees who agree 
with the agenda (categories 1, 3 and 6) occupies the biggest proportion which is 45%. 
Viewers who partly agree with the agenda represented 31%, and only 24% of them 
critically interpret the news of CCTV-Africa taking up an oppositional coda. As we can see 
from this case study of African students who are viewers of CCTV-Africa in China, most 
of the interviewees, who are more aligned with Sino-African economic cooperation as 
they are living and studying in mainland China, have a rather positive understanding of 
the news content and interpret the message following the dominant code.  
 
The news clips showed to the interviewees are included in the sampling of the content 
analysis. Therefore, the ideological consistency of the content analysis subject and the 
news clips for individual interviews is confirmed. The findings of the content analysis 
have shown that there indeed exists a certain kind of ideological agenda of CCTV-Africa 
as manifested in its economic news content to promote economic development and 
political stability. And the qualitative findings indicate that the majority of the target 
audiences of CCTV-Africa do follow the dominant decoding position to perceive the 
messages they get from the news. Such agreement with the ideological agenda of CCTV-
Africa resonates their knowledge about the China-Africa relations in reality which 
encouraged their decisions to study in China in the first place.  
 
This main finding responds to the argument made by Hall that ‘polysemy must not, 
however, be confused with pluralism’ (2006: 169). People from different cultures and 
societies would probably have different understanding or misunderstanding of foreign 
media because of the different dominant orders of their local/domestic ‘social life, of 
 
economic and political power and of ideology’ (2006: 169). However, in the scenario of 
Sino-African media flows, where the different societies are gradually synced with each 
other within the political and economic structure dominated by the global economy of 
neoliberal capitalism, the African interviewees watching CCTV-Africa, conditioned by 
their elite position in the structure are more likely to follow hegemonic protocols to 




Chapter 9 - Conclusion 
 
The ninth BRICS summit in Xiamen, a coastal city in southern China, was hailed by various 
media pundits worldwide as the ‘largest ever BRICS Business Forum’. (ENCA, 2017). 
Despite the on-going border ‘difficulties’ between China and India (Pandey, 2017), the 
heads of government of the five countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) 
gathered in Xiamen and spent a significant weekend together. Chinese president Xi 
Jinping expressed his support for South Africa hosting the next BRICS Summit in 2018 
(Zhang, 2017). The increasing importance and rising position of non-Western political 
entities such as BRICS are drawing considerable global attention. Considered as part of 
the shaping of a new world order, which some observers see as a challenge to the long 
standing Western hegemony (Adnan, 2014; Desai, 2013), the development paths of the 
rising economies of BRICS countries also reflect an undeniable truth about the thorough 
penetration of global capitalism in the non-Western areas of the world (Bond and Garcia, 
2015). Despite the discursive opinions and discussions on the status quo of the global 
South, the reality of BRICS is focused on developing an economically favourable future 
for its members. In the case of China-Africa cooperation, the dramatically increased 
multilateral interactions are bringing about a profound impact on the global system of 
politics and economics. Although it is indeed too early to assert a prediction about what 
kind of impact it will truly be, there are numerous circumstances worth closer 
investigation in order to have a glimpse of the various possibilities that lie ahead. The 
growing dynamic of the China-Africa media flows is one such possibility.  
 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, the boom in China-Africa studies contributes to the growing 
interest of global scholars in the field of China-Africa communication and media studies. 
Though China and many African countries have a long history of political and economic 
interaction, the encounters between them have usually been limited to political agendas 
or economic transactions. China studies in Africa and Africa studies in China are both in 
a relatively primary stage, which explains the under-developed theoretical frameworks 
for and the under-studied topics of China-Africa communication and media studies. 
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After generally reviewing the genealogy of audience studies in the field of international 
communication studies, it seems clear to the researcher that from both the perspective 
of developing a theoretical paradigm for the new critical agenda of international 
communication studies and enriching the empirical material on the media of the global 
South, it is of great importance to explore the dynamics of the China-Africa media flows. 
As the vital components of any social process, the subjectivities of human beings are 
always of interest to researchers of sociological studies. Therefore, this researcher chose 
to conduct an audience research survey on the African viewers of the Chinese media in 
Africa, in particular focusing on CCTV-Africa.  
 
During the past few years of this doctoral research, on the several academic occasions 
that the researcher got to present her periodical works, a few questions were raised 
towards the theoretical approach deployed by this research to study the media 
reception among diverse audiences. As repeatedly highlighted throughout this thesis, 
the research adopts the critical political and economic perspective of analysis, although 
this is not the most conventional way to conduct such audience studies. As reviewed in 
Chapter 3, most outstanding works of reception studies, or popular culture studies in 
general, were conducted within the theoretical framework of Cultural Studies. There 
have always been various debates between the two schools – political economy and 
Cultural Studies, and particularly where the critical political and economic route overlaps 
with the cultural angle. But from the literature review of audience studies and of the 
concept of ‘ideology’ in Chapters 3 and 5, we can see that this research takes a complex 
stance between these two approaches – adapting relevant parts of both. However, as 
the last paragraph of Section 4.4 indicates, this research aims to employ a Marxist 
critique of capitalist ideologies as manifested in media practices. For example, in the 
concrete case of Chinese media in Africa, the researcher does not want to limit the 
audience study of CCTV-Africa to the analysis of the media content and expressions of 
interviewee and ignore the discussion of the political and economic background, which 
simultaneously conditions the production of such content and expression.  
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Thus, instead of exclusively emphasizing empirical studies, this thesis recognises the 
important role of the theoretical framework which underpins the research. Four 
chapters of literature reviews set out to compare the interlinked connections and 
divergences between key theories and terminologies. The contributions of this research, 
therefore, are not limited to the originality of its research subject but also its theoretical 
reflections on the ‘cultural imperialism’ paradigm and its efforts to bring in the concept 
of ‘ideology’ to remedy the flaws of the paradigm, which are neither applicable in the 
contemporary era of international communication studies nor in the specific context of 
this research. Additionally, as set out in Chapter 6, the revision of the ‘structural theory 
of imperialism’ introduced by Johan Galtung provides this research with a solid 
theoretical structure in which to present the arguments on China-Africa international 
news communication. In Chapter 8, the deployment of the combined typology of 
audience reception to analyse the complicated processes of African viewers of CCTV-
Africa is also another contribution to the renewal of the ‘encoding/decoding’ model. 
 
The main arguments of this research can be summarized in the following three sections: 
Section 9.1 briefly examines and concludes the discussion about the theoretical 
consistency between the three key concepts in this research – imperialism, ideology and 
reception. In Section 9.2, the discussion moves further to the localization of those 
concepts in the case of China-Africa media studies from the political and economic 
perspective. Finally, Section 9.3 concludes how the empirical findings on the reception 
of the African audiences in China help to answer the two main research questions. The 
last section of this chapter, Section 9.4, extends this research and the findings and 
discusses the other questions or observations that emerged during the carrying out of 
this research.  
 
9.1 Imperialism, Ideology and Reception 
The review of ‘imperialism’ theories in Chapter 4 and that of China-Africa political and 
economic realities in Chapter 6 have raised an interesting question: Does the dynamic 
between China and Africa fall into the type of ‘the highest stage of capitalism’ – to 
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borrow Lenin’s famous phrase? As we see from the discussion on imperialism and 
related theories in Section 4.3, political-economic interactions between developing 
countries and underdeveloped countries are not really counted as imperialist expansion 
and are not fully dissected in the discourse of imperialism studies. They are regarded 
merely as satellite nations around the superpowers, such as the (former) Soviet Union 
or United States, acting as ‘a buffer zone between core and periphery, and have a mix of 
the kinds of activities and institutions that exist on them’ (Martinez Vela, 2001: 4). 
However, in Section 6.1.1, a recently revived and more critical term is introduced and 
deployed to analyze the interactions amongst the emerging economies – ‘sub-
imperialism’ as used to describe the semi-periphery in the world system of Immanuel 
Wallerstein in Section 4.3.4. That section argued that certain characteristics of China fit 
the standards of being a semi-imperialist country. This view of the economic nature of 
China leads to a revision of the ‘harmony of interest’ model of structural theory of 
imperialism by Johan Galtung as indicated in Section 6.1.2.1.  
 
As previously reviewed in Section 4.3.3, Galtung’s structural theory of imperialism 
classifies the world into two major components – Core and Periphery. As indicated in 
Figure 4.1, the dominant hierarchical relation between core and periphery is maintained 
through the establishment of ‘harmony of interest’ between the transnational elite class 
and ‘disharmony of interest’ between general populations. International news produced 
by the Core countries is therefore regarded as an ideological apparatus to set an agenda 
that reinforces and maintains the ‘harmony of interest’ between global elites: 
‘Information is transferred to the Southern elite in such a way that primary importance 
is attached to the same issues the developed world sees as important’ (Thussu, 2006: 
51). However, the concept of sub-periphery or sub-imperialism naturally adds to the 
complexity of this binary model. The revised structure, as shown in Figure 6.1, brings in 
the dynamics of semi-peripheral countries interacting with Centre and Peripheral 
countries. It is clearly illustrated in Section 6.1.2.1 that the interactive patterns between 
Semi-periphery and Periphery versus Core and Periphery are very different due to the 
different political and economic realities of these countries. Although Core, Semi-
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periphery and Periphery are all following the rules of the global economic system of 
capitalism and producing ideologies that promote neo-liberal economic development, 
the concreteness and individuality of each nation makes the manifestation of such 
ideologies complex and open to multiple interpretations  
 
The literature review in Section 5.2 on the concept of ‘ideology’ introduces the 
importance of an economic base in conditioning the superstructure of ‘ideology’. As 
defined in Section 5.2.4, ideology refers to ‘the people’s consciousness formed by the 
solidity and firm foundations of the given economic structure which is necessarily 
produced by the ensemble of productive relations of a specific human society’. Since the 
political and economic realities of Core, Semi-periphery and Periphery are hugely 
different, the ideologies disseminated by the multilateral interactions between these 
nations are therefore various. For example, the harmony of interest between American 
and African elites and that between Chinese and African elites are not the same, and the 
ideological consensuses that are manufactured by the international media to reinforce 
these ‘harmony of interests’ are naturally different as well. As concluded in Section 5.3, 
ideological imperialism in this research refers to the international process by which the 
dominant collective consciousness of one society is being formed by the adaption of its 
economic transformation impelled by the global capitalist structure. Accordingly, in 
Section 6.1.2.2, the political and economic dynamics between China and African 
countries were illustrated in order to explain how the interactions between Semi-
peripheral China and Peripheral Africa are conditioned by the global structure of the 
neoliberalist market economy.  
 
Based on the literature reviews in Section 5.2.2 of Stuart Hall’s ideology of general 
theories and Section 3.3 on the ‘encoding/decoding’ model, we can understand how in 
this research the process of mass media communication is related to the dissemination 
of certain dominant ideologies or in other words ‘mainstream opinions’. The 
‘encoding/decoding’ model as espoused by Stuart Hall explores how ‘meaning’ is 
constructed through encoding the media message by media practitioners and how 
 
‘(mis)understanding’ is achieved through the audience’s decoding of the message. 
Consistent with his stance on highlighting the importance of contingencies within 
articulation of meaning, Hall not only argues that there is no guarantee for ideological 
dominance but also points out the possibility of an audience able to interpret the media 
message freely. It is understandable that Hall’s proposal was to enhance the autonomy 
of the general public, downplaying the overwhelming power of the political and 
economic structure of society. However, as the final conclusion of Chapter 5 indicates, 
this research is not about exploring the alternative social ideas the audience can actively 
acquire from media content but to mainly focus on how the dominant decoding works 
in the case of the Chinese media in Africa; hence the definition of ideology in this 
research restricts itself to the critical theories of Marxism.  
 
As the typology of Table 8.4 indicated, the decoding positions have evolved into a 
complex set of segmented differentiations of an audience’s reception of media content. 
According to Table 8.4, there are nine types of audience reception. As far as this research 
is concerned, seven of them appeared in the case of African audiences of CCTV-Africa. 
As discussed in the beginning of Section 8.2.1, the renewed typology of reception 
positions extends the ‘encoding/decoding’ model of Hall to the aspect of unconscious 
interpretation of the ideological agenda of media content. Section 5.2.3 introduces the 
post-modernist approach of ideological studies which largely involves the discussion on 
the ‘unconsciousness’ of the human mind, seemingly unaware of the influences of the 
media. Interestingly, ‘being unconscious of the ideology’ is the essential premise for 
implementing the function of ideology, as Marx put it ‘they do not know it, but they are 
doing it.’ However, to Žižek, ideology means ‘they know that, in their activity, they are 
following an illusion but still, they are doing it’. Therefore, as we can see from the 
typologies of Table 8.4, the fact that the reception of audiences is mixed will be reflected 
at all levels of decoding positions.  
 
To conclude, the subject of the reception studies of this research is the ideological 
agenda of the Chinese media in Africa, which is conditioned and shaped by the political 
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and economic realities these countries are embedded in, and such realities are also the 
manifestations of the global system of capitalism. 
 
9.2 Sinicization, Harmony of Interest and CCTV-Africa 
The term Sinicization is deployed in this research to summarize the ideological 
homogenization of the China-African elite class through the establishment of a ‘harmony 
of interest’. As explained in the beginning of Section 6.1, Sinicization refers to a 
comprehensive intra-national process of political and economic interactions between 
China and other countries, especially those less developed ones, and the dissemination 
of the specific ideology created during the process. According to the theories of Mathias 
Luce on sub-imperialism, Section 6.1.1 illustrates the five features of China being a semi-
imperialist nation:  
 
1. ‘A dependent country’s accession to regional sub-centre status in response to 
global accumulation patterns through its transformation into a sub-centre of 
heavy industry with a particular domestic level of production and capitalist 
financial operation;  
2. Bourgeois unity through displacing internal contradictions;  
3. The formulation of a national sub-imperialist plan;  
4. Formation of national capitalist trusts that tie the dependent economy to 
imperialism via state intermediation;  
5. The dependent economic condition that not only transfers value into imperialist 
economies but also appropriates the surplus value of weaker nations’ (Luce, 
2015: 34).  
 
The economic realities faced by China impel it to develop a series of strategies and 
policies to survive and thrive in the global system of capitalism. The economic 
transformation in the domestic market and the ‘going out’ policy of Chinese government 
are the manifestations of such realities. It is inevitable for China to enhance both its hard 
power and soft power in the global system to assert its ascendance. Under such 
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circumstances, the phenomenon of Sinicization can be understood as the one of the 
consequences of the thorough penetration of neo-liberal capitalism into the global 
South.  
 
As illustrated in Section 6.1.2.2, there exists a mutually dependent relationship between 
China and certain African countries. On the one hand, China, as a semi-peripheral 
country, is eager to squeeze into the ranking of ‘central’ countries of the global system 
by exporting value-added products to, importing cheap natural resources from, and 
recruiting cheap labour in under-developed countries. On the other hand, peripheral 
countries in Africa want to transform into semi-peripheral countries by changing their 
labour-intensive industries to capital-intensive industries, which need capital and 
technological investment from richer countries. The bond between China and many 
African countries is therefore set in line with their different demands and needs that can 
be met from each other. Marxist political and economic critique has taught us that the 
ruling class and the elites benefit the most from the rapid development of capitalist 
societies. Accordingly, they are more likely to align with each other by the ‘harmony of 
interest’ of maintaining their dominant status and bettering their superior living 
conditions. There are numerous approaches for multilateral governments and 
transnational financial institutions to constantly solidify and promote such ‘harmony of 
interest’ in the aspects of foreign diplomacy and economic cooperation. However, the 
publicity of such efforts is also of vital importance as the superstructure is not the 
derivation of an economic base but rather a symbiotic existence. Efforts to maintain the 
‘harmony of interest’ need to be packaged and branded to demonstrate the shared goals 
of benefits for both the elites and the public. In the words of Althusser, ideological 
apparatuses function as the reproduction of the ‘submission to the ruling ideology for 
the workers, and … the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology … for the agents of 
exploitation and repression, [and to] provide for the domination of the ruling class’ 
(Althusser, 1971: 5). State-run media, such as China Central Television in Africa, are the 
tools deployed by the governments to reinforce the ideological consensus between 




As set out in the thesis, CCTV-Africa was established in Nairobi in Kenya in 2012 as the 
key strategy adopted by the Chinese government to promote its discourse and soft 
power across the vast continent of Africa. There have been discussions recently in the 
field of journalism studies about the journalistic approach of the Chinese media in Africa. 
As introduced in Section 2.4, Chinese scholar Zhang Yanqiu argues that the Chinese 
media in Africa such as CCTV-Africa and China Daily (the English language state run 
newspaper that is headquartered in Johannesburg in South Africa) are deploying an 
innovative journalistic framework called ‘constructive journalism’ to report issues in the 
continent of Africa. Zhang argues that this is an alternative approach to reporting social 
phenomenon from a more constructive perspective and positive tone instead of 
constantly criticizing governments and focusing exclusively on the negative side of the 
story. Indeed, in August 2017, Guo Weimin, vice-minister of China’s State Council 
Information Office, said during the China-Africa Media Forum in Johannesburg, that 
media from China and Africa should become recorders and disseminators of China-
Africa friendship and the witnesses and promoters of Sino-African cooperation (Pan and 
Liu, 2017). 
 
This positive and encouraging spirit is also outlined in the findings of Chapter 8 on the 
media content of CCTV-Africa’s business programme Global Business (Africa). However, 
this researcher is somewhat sceptical about the nature of such encouragement for 
economic development presented by a state-run media organisation. As the conclusion 
of Section 8.1.4 indicates, the concrete ideological Sinicization represented by CCTV-
Africa is to promote sustainable economic development in African societies by 
advocating a positive and harmonious image about the local political and economic 
environment. Therefore, in the opinion of the researcher, it is not suitable to frame such 
a journalistic approach as constructive journalism.  
 
However, no matter what kind of journalistic practices are deployed by CCTV-Africa, it 
 
remains as one of the most important ideological tools for China to export its political 
and economic consensus with other countries, as indicated by Guo Weimin earlier. The 
Ideological agenda of CCTV-Africa, which is regarded as the manifestation of Sinicism, 
can be summarized as ‘advocating China-Africa cooperation’, ‘encouraging economic 
development’ by ‘highlighting the good side of the story’. The reception of such an 
ideological agenda by the group of African students in China is the key to reveal the real 
mechanism of the process involved in China-Africa mass communication flow.  
 
9.3 Reception of African Audiences in China: Answers to Research Questions 
The two main research questions introduced in Section 7.2.1 were as follows: 1. How do 
the African students studying in China (as the potential elite opinion leaders of their local 
societies) understand the (ideological) message delivered by the news produced by 
CCTV-Africa? 2. How does the reality of the enhanced Sino-African political and 
economic interaction contribute to the way that African students understand the media 
content of CCTV-Africa? This section is aimed at summarizing the answers to these 
questions found in the process of conducting this research.  
 
9.3.1 First question 
The media reception of African students in China is relatively complicated as indicated 
in Section 8.2. One key finding was that a majority of African students studying in China 
had a positive perception about CCTV-Africa. As shown in Chart 8.2, 63% of the 
interviewees spoke well of it. Only 13% of them held negative or relatively negative 
opinions. And the results of the individual interviews show that 61% of the students 
agreed with the agenda of CCTV-Africa, and 10% of them did not (Chart 8.7). It can be 
concluded that at least in the group of African students who are receiving higher 
education in China, the dissemination and reception of the ideological agenda of CCTV-
Africa are relatively successful. However, as summarized in Figure 8.1, there are 
underlying differences beneath such positive reception. The reception of African 
students in China in this research can be generally categorized in three types according 
to their awareness of the agenda of the news: 1) Unconscious of News Agenda; 2) 
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Conscious of News Agenda and 3) Partly Conscious of News Agenda.  
 
As we can see in Figure 8.1, most of the audiences of the first type agreed with the 
agenda of CCTV-Africa, although they were initially unaware of the existence of such an 
agenda. For those who were conscious of the fact that CCTV-Africa is reporting news in 
a different way from Western media in Africa, it was more likely for them to agree with 
such an agenda. There is an interesting point about such awareness; as shown in the 
interviews of Section 8.2, African students representing the highly-educated group of 
their societies expressed their urgent wishes for change. Indeed, there are concerns 
about the involvement of China in African affairs, but they agree that China-Africa 
cooperation is bringing new opportunities that have never been offered to them before. 
Even for those who are not aware of the different approach of CCTV-Africa, they sense 
that the media content about the development of their countries as depicted on CCTV-
Africa means the station is showing a good image of Africa and telling a positive story 
about social developments.  
 
For the audiences of the second type, not only are they aware of the different reporting 
style of CCTV-Africa, they are also conscious of what kind of agenda that CCTV-Africa is 
trying to advance. Obvious divergence is therefore noticed in this type of reception. 
Although a majority of this type admit and agree with the ideological agenda that CCTV-
Africa is trying to deliver, a few interviewees expressed their disagreement with such a 
journalistic approach and the motivations behind it. For the ones who disagree, CCTV-
Africa is facilitating China in Africa to profit only the elite class of people. It is a difficult 
reality for them to come to terms with. However, as the conversation with Mamadou 
shows, such agreement is probably a concern about the nature of elites in many African 
countries. Audiences of this kind of reception, however, also show a certain degree of 
appreciation about China’s aid and investment in Africa.  
 
The third type of reception is somewhere in between. The viewers realized that CCTV-
Africa is trying to convince them about something and they are very clear what the 
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ideological agenda really is about. However, when they are asked about what they think 
of the news put out by CCTV-Africa and in what way does such news contribute to the 
social development of Africa, they were certain that the influence of CCTV-Africa was for 
the good of China-Africa cooperation. Not all of those who are only partly conscious of 
the agenda absolutely agree with it. Some are also a bit worried about how such 
multilateral cooperation is really contributing to the development of their countries. 
Most of them also understand that the difficulties brought about by China-Africa 
interactions are inevitable and will be solved eventually.  
 
Of course, the reception of African audiences is also influenced by other factors, such as 
their ages, viewing habits, the differences in their subjects of study and perhaps different 
ways of understanding issues because of previously acquired and preconditioned 
knowledge. As the findings of Section 8.2 show, older people tend to have a realistic and 
a more pragmatic perspective of China-Africa relations and they are more willing to 
analyse the news of CCTV-Africa from the angle of cooperation and business. Younger 
interviewees are more sympathetic about the social crises such as poverty, 
environmental pollution and natural disasters. Regular viewers are more likely to grasp 
the reality of the agenda of CCTV-Africa and to have a deeper understanding about the 
media content of the news. Students studying medicine are more likely to consider 
China-Africa relations from a humanistic perspective, while those studying business or 
international relations are more likely to understand things from the angle of political 
and economic benefits. One can also surmise that the higher the degree that the 
students are studying for, the better and more thorough interpretation of the complex 
realities of China-Africa interactions. 
 
9.3.2 Second question 
The result of the enhanced China-Africa cooperation is manifested in the identities of 
these African students studying in China. As many of the interviewees have told this 
researcher, the original reason they chose to come to China for a higher education 
degree is because Chinese companies are flooding into the African market. Thus, with 
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the experience of studying in China or even the ability to speak fluent Chinese, they have 
a better chance than other African students to get a job in those Chinese companies or 
the African companies that are doing business with the Chinese companies. 
Notwithstanding their concerns about China-Africa enhanced cooperation, their 
decision to choose to study in China shows their willingness to accept the reality and 
admit the advantages of China’s economic power.  
 
For most of the interviewees, their choices of China as the destination for a foreign 
qualification are the direct results of China’s promotional discourse in Africa. In addition 
to better job opportunities, there are many other reasons that these students chose 
China. Chen Fei from Tanzania, who insisted on being called his Chinese name instead of 
his Tanzanian name, told the researcher that, before he came to China, he was studying 
at the Confucius Institute in his local university, and there were scholarships for excellent 
students to come to China for further educational and for cultural exchanges. As 
reviewed in Section 2.3, the educational training and the establishment of Confucius 
Institutes in Africa have increased dramatically in the past few years. As shown in Chart 
8.4, there is a considerable number of African students interviewed for this research who 
are funded by the Chinese government or related scholarships. This is also the reality of 
the general situation of African students in China. Although the number of self-funded 
students is increasing rapidly as well, Chinese government-led educational projects are 
still the most significant component of China-Africa educational cooperation. 
Scholarships are the vital channels for African people to know China better and to learn 
the knowledge about China and apply this to their own societies. As far as the findings 
of this research are concerned, the governmental nature of these scholarship projects 
does not necessarily have a direct influence on the audience’s reception of CCTV-Africa. 
Instead, it seems that the enhanced chances for these students to live in China and 
experience Chinese life play a more important role in shaping their opinions about China 
and about the evolving China-Africa relations.  
 
However, there are two groups of statistics as displayed in Chart 8.4 worth attention and 
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further discussion. One is the comparison between the proportion of self-funded and 
scholarship students in the ‘Unconscious but Agree’ type of reception. The other is the 
comparison of such in the ‘Conscious but Disagree’ type of reception. These two types 
of reception modes are the most extreme and denote typical decoding positions of 
dominant and oppositional variety. The former stands for the absolute success of 
ideological manipulation – ‘do not know but still do it’, and the latter refers to the 
absolute autonomy of audiences – ‘do know and oppose it’. As we can see from Chart 
8.4, the former audience reception of the dominant decoding position has more 
students of China-African scholarships than self-funded students. On the contrary, the 
latter audience reception of oppositional decoding position has much more self-funded 
students than those with scholarships. Although no interviewee in this research spoke 
bluntly about how their ideas are influenced by the scholarships they receive from 
Chinese government or universities (a few even complained heavily about them), it is 
important to consider the potential impact of the funding context.  
 
Excepting educational enhancement, African students in this research are very 
impressed by the development of Chinese society. As many of them have expressed in 
the interviews, the economic growth of China sets a good example for African countries 
to follow. Benjamin from Cameroon believes that since China can do it, Cameroon can 
do that too, as long as the Cameroonian government is as determined as the Chinese 
government. In some cases, even though interviewees are sceptical about the 
journalistic practices of CCTV-Africa and are not very convinced by the veracity of 
Chinese news, they still have a faith in the development pattern of Chinese society. 
Sometimes such faith can influence their perception of Chinese media as well. As Alan 
from Tanzania told this researcher, he thought the ‘censorship’ of the Chinese media was 
necessary and was also required in his own country. Paul from Cameroon liked the 
positive reporting style of CCTV-Africa and he believed that it was important for the 
public to have confidence in their countries and their governments.  
 
The growing China-Africa cooperation is making significant changes to the continent. As 
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reviewed in Section 3.1 on the modernization paradigm of international communication 
studies, the process of a certain kind of ideological hegemony delivered from one 
developed country to less developed ones is always top-bottom and underpinned by the 
political and economic realities of these countries. In the case of this research, though 
China and African countries are both developing countries, there exists a certain area of 
difference that is reflected as semi-periphery and periphery. Therefore, when China is 
trying to introduce its ‘China Model’ to Africa, the people of Africa are not only just 
receiving this information from the mass media but also from their daily experiences of 
various social changes. This is also why this research does not exclusively focus on the 
news content of CCTV-Africa, but emphasizes the wider background of China-Africa 
political and economic interactions. From the results of the research, it seems 
appropriate to conclude that the reception of CCTV-Africa by African students in China, 
as the relatively direct beneficiaries of multilateral economic cooperation, is largely 
influenced by these China-Africa interactions. The African audiences with higher 
education backgrounds in China tend to generally agree with messages delivered by the 
Chinese media in Africa.  
 
9.4 Discussion 
This thesis has covered many theories and topics to underpin this research presented, 
such as the revision of the cultural imperialism paradigm and structural theory of 
imperialism, the redefinitions of ‘ideology’ and ‘Sinicization’ and the renewal of the 
‘encoding/decoding’ model. Although the researcher has made great efforts to fully 
explore all relevant aspects of the theoretical framework of this research, there are 
certain observations of the researcher on China-Africa media dynamics which cannot be 
included due to the limits of the dissertation. This researcher believes that China-Africa 
media studies are of great importance to the future development of international 
communication studies; and the process of China’s media integration in the African 
continent has been noteworthy in the early years of the 21st century as it can be regarded 
as a trail-blazing’ template for how China might deliver its political and cultural agenda 
across a wider spectrum in coming decades. Therefore, this section is placed here to 
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extend the discussion of this research a little further and to discuss how these 
developments in China-Africa and China-global relations could be further studied and 
analysed. 
 
9.4.1 From ‘Sub-imperialism’ to ‘De-imperialism’ 
One area of discussion is on the nature of the sub-imperialist countries as the 
subsidiaries of the pre-existing imperialist nations and the possibility of cultivating the 
ground for ‘de-imperialism’ studies based on this argument. As far as this research is 
concerned, China as a semi-peripheral or semi-imperialist country, compelled by global 
capitalism, is implementing a series of economic strategies to solve its own financial 
dilemma in the domestic market. In the case of China-Africa economic cooperation, the 
huge amount of investment by the Chinese government and the large-scale projects 
undertaken by Chinese state corporations in Africa are the manifestation of China 
undertaking a ‘spatial fix’ to solve the economic dilemma as introduced in Section 4.3.5 
of David Harvey’s theories on ‘new imperialism’. It is a common fate that the 
development of sub-imperialist countries tends to emulate the pattern of imperialist 
countries in seeking new territory to disperse over-accumulated capital and boost under-
consumption in their domestic markets. 
 
As indicated in the case of China, integrating into the world system via implementing the 
Open and Reform policy in 1978 and joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, the 
road to independence and self-reliance is inevitably intertwined with realistic 
considerations. The development model of China and also those of the so called ‘Four 
Asian Tigers’ have distinctive characteristics of sub-imperialist expansion. According to 
the definition provided by Mathias Luce (2015), sub-imperialist countries ‘do not just 
transfer surplus value to imperialist centres but also succeed in appropriating weaker 
countries surplus value by displacing some of the contradictions specific to dependent 
capitalism.’ In the words of Lin Yifu (2016), the former chief economist of the World Bank, 
in the decades after the 1980s, China changed its strategy from focusing on labour-
intensive industries that had driven the economy in the 1950s to capital-intensive 
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industries, and nowadays China is transforming its economy into capital-intensive 
industries by exporting labour-intensive industries to less-developed countries such 
Ethiopia. Such transformations were also observed in the Asian countries of South Korea 
and Singapore, in the 1960s, and within territories such as the then British-governed 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan, which China has always insisted is its integral part. However, the 
vast demographic scale and growing status of China on the world stage has made the 
transformation this time much more significant.  
 
As Chen Kuan-Hsing stated in his book Asia as Method (2010), the sub-imperialist 
development of Asian countries itself is also the manifestation and consequence of the 
imperialist proliferation of West-centred expansion. The hierarchical global system that 
the semi-peripheral and peripheral Asian, African and Latin American countries are 
embedded in is a dominant structure prioritizing the interests of the Core Western 
countries. The regional hegemony noted between semi-peripheral and peripheral 
countries in the global South, which is interpreted by some as a new phenomenon of 
globalization, is nothing else but the derivation of such dominant structures. In order to 
construct an alternative approach of de-imperialism, it is of vital importance to confront 
the fact that the discourse of China in Africa, and also other developing areas of world, 
is underpinned by sub-imperialist economic logic. Only based on such a consensus can 
the discussion on developing de-imperialism studies be possible. 
 
In the field of China-Africa studies, one point considered by the researcher as an 
opportunity to develop the discussions on de-imperialism studies is the collectivism of 
the ‘Beijing Consensus’ or ‘China Model’ demonstrated by the activities of Chinese state 
corporations in Africa. However, whether such collectivism really responds to the pursuit 
of the theoretical framework of de-imperialism is an important question which needs to 
be further studied.  
 
9.4.2 ‘Unprojectable’ Oppositional Decoding 
Another extended discussion is also about an alternative approach to dominance but 
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from the perspective of the audience reception of media content. This researcher was 
inspired by a short live performance by Tony Conrad, the American pioneer of structural 
film, at Tate Modern in 2008, entitled ‘Unprojectable: Protection and Perspective’. In this 
piece, ‘musicians and their unorthodox instruments are visible to the audience only as 
projections cast onto giant screens’ (YouTube, 2008). This experimental performance in 
one single idea captured the author’s imagination – ‘unprojectable’. Behind the moving 
shadows on the screens and the ‘high-octane sonic assault’ (ibid) saturating people’s 
ears, something was held back. Some part of the qualities of the performers and their 
musical instruments were filtered and could not be projected onto the screens. This 
short live performance reminded the researcher of the oppositional interpretation some 
of the African students had towards the news content of CCTV-Africa. As the Category 5 
of audience reception in Section 8.2.1 has shown, there were four interviewees who 
disagreed with the ideological agenda they sensed from the news content of CCTV-Africa. 
The autonomy of the audience is therefore confirmed, and the contingencies of 
alternative ideas should accordingly be produced. However, the critical attitudes of 
these viewers towards the agenda of CCTV-Africa do not further persuade the audience 
overall to embrace views that defy the orthodoxy. Instead, while the audiences are 
complaining about the failure of their respective national governments and the agenda 
of CCTV-Africa and the Chinese government to acquire profits from Africa, they still 
approve of the development pattern adopted by China in the past 40 years. There exists 
a contradictory consciousness of the audience who decode the news of CCTV-Africa in 
an oppositional position. Within the layers of such contradiction lies the critical question 
of how the autonomy of an active audience and the contingency of alternative 
interpretation are filtered out from the oppositional decoding. The substantial pursuit of 
audience for an alternative discourse or agenda, therefore, cannot be projected onto the 
existing realities that they live in. 
 
One assumption could be that the audience is conditioned by the political and economic 
reality and is not aware of any other options besides following the ‘China Model’. As 
many interviewees have expressed, the Western companies following the ‘Washington 
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Consensus’ certainly did not bring good fortune to Africa. Therefore, although China-
Africa cooperation is not perfect, it is still regarded as a new option for the development 
of African countries. Such assumptions lead back to the discussion on semi-imperialism 
and de-imperialism. Are there alternative approaches in semi-imperialist or semi-
peripheral countries to develop a de-imperialist political and economic structure? The 
findings of this research on the reception attitudes of the African audiences of CCTV-
Africa do not provide clear and precise answers to that question, raising the issue how 
the ‘big question’ about the way CCTV-Africa is perceived and understood by its African 
viewers can be satisfactorily answered. Certainly, the elements of confusion about the 
delivery and ultimate destination in terms of audience comprehension of the media 
message might, for the Chinese government, be both perplexing and challenging at this 
time. And yet it is a forward-thinking political, economic and even philosophical policy, 
embracing the current transnational role that China is keen to pursue, in terms of 
President Xi Jinping’s development programme - that can only be perfected by practice. 
Therefore, it is a clear and an imminent intellectual imperative that further studies on 
exploring the substance of China-Africa cooperation need to be carried out in order to 
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Appendix 1 – 2014 Questionnaire 
 
Impression on China's Foreign Media 
 
Thank you very much for participating in this survey. My name is Yu Xiang. I am a second-
year PhD candidate from University of Westminster in London, and my name is Yu Xiang. 
This survey is part of the research I am doing about the influence of China's foreign 
focused media on the foreign audience. I am grateful to you for participating in this 
survey.  
 
If you have any further questions about the survey or the research, you are sincerely 
welcome to email me through yu.xiang@my.westminster.ac.uk.  
 
 
Questions Options (Choices and Open Answers) 
1. Personal Information (Multi-choice, 
compulsory) 
Location in China ___________ 




2. How long have you been in China (in 
total)? (Single-choice, compulsory) 
○ less than 1 year  
○ 1-3 years  
○ 3-5 years  
○ 5-10 years  
○ More than 10 years 
 
3. When is the first time that you started 
to know about China's media? And What 
is the name of the media? (Compulsory) 
 
4. How frequent do you read or watch 
China's foreign media before you came to 
China? (Single-choice, compulsory) 
○ Never  
○ Few times a year  
○ Few times a month  
○ Few times a week  
○ Almost every day 
5. Which or what kind of China's media, 
according to your knowledge, is available 
in your hometown? (please write down 
the full name of the media if you can.) 
(compulsory) 
 
6. What is the name of the media do you 
use most frequently to get information 
about China in your own country if it is 
not China's foreign-focused media? 
(compulsory) 
 
7. How frequent do you read or watch 
China's foreign-focused media when you 
are in China? (Single-choice, compulsory) 
○ Never  
○ Few times a year  
○ Few times a month  
○ Few times a week  
○ Almost every day 
8. What is name of the China's foreign 
media that you use most frequently when 
you are in China if there is any? 
(compulsory) 
 
9. Do you prefer to get information about 
China from other countries' media 
○ All the time  
○ Sometimes  
○ Occasionally  
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instead of China's media? (Single-choice, 
compulsory) 
○ Seldom  
○ Never 
10. [Multiple Choice] What kind of media 
content of China Central Television do you 
personally like the most? (Multi-choice, 
compulsory) 
□ Politics and Law  
□ Technology, Education, Culture and 
Public Health  
□ Economics  
□ Social News  
□ Entertainment  
□ Sports  
□ Military Info.  
□ International Affairs 
11. Degree of satisfaction with China 
Central Television (from 1 the least to 5 
the most). (compulsory) 
Appeal of the Content _____ 
Journalistic Professionalism _____ 
Accessibility _____ 
12. What is your overall impression on the 
development of China Central Television? 
(Single-choice, compulsory) 
○ Very Positive  
○ Positive  
○ No Impression  
○ Negative  
○ Very Negative 
13. What is your personal impression on 
the image of China represented by the 
CCTV-News? (Single-choice, compulsory) 
○ Very Positive  
○ Positive  
○ No Impression  
○ Negative  






















How long have 
you been in 
China (in 
total)? 
How frequently did you read 
or watch China's foreign 
focused media before you 
came to China? 
Shenyang, Liaoning Nigeria Student Female 27 less than 1 year Almost every day 
Shenyang, Liaoning Sierra Leone Student Male 30 1-3 years Few times a year 
Jilin, Jilin Papua New Guinea Undergraduate Student Female 23 1-3 years Almost every day 
Dalian, Liaoning Uganda Student Male 27 5-10 years Never 
Unknown Unknown student Male 24 3-5 years Few times a year 
Jilin, Jilin Uganda Lab Tech Female 25 1-3 years Few times a week 
Jilin, Jilin Kenya Student Male 25 3-5 years Never 
Jilin, Jilin Somalia Student Male 27 1-3 years Never 
Harbin, Heilongjiang Russia Student Male 22 5-10 years Never 
Harbin, Heilongjiang Britain Student Female 23 1-3 years Never 
 
Jilin, Jilin Somalia Doctoral Student Female 24 1-3 years Few times a week 
Jilin, Jilin Somalia Student Male 21 3-5 years Never 
Jilin, Jilin Somalia Student Male 24 5-10 years Never 
Jilin, Jilin USA Doctor/Teacher/Trainer Male 21 3-5 years Never 
Jilin Somalia Doctoral Student Female 23 1-3 years Few times a year 
Hefei, Anhui Indonesia Undergraduate Student Female 23 1-3 years Few times a year 
Tonghua, Jilin USA English Instructor Female 23 1-3 years Few times a year 
Jilin, Jilin USA Student Male 22 1-3 years Never 
Hefei, Anhui South Africa Student Male 27 1-3 years Few times a year 
Hefei, Anhui South Africa Student Male 20+ 1-3 years Never 
Hefei, Anhui South Africa Student Female 20 1-3 years Few times a month 
Hong Kong China Student Female 22 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Jilin, Jilin Somalia Student Female 23 1-3 years Few times a year 
Hefei, Anhui South Africa Student Female 20 1-3 years Never 
Hefei, Anhui India Student Male 19 3-5 years Few times a month 
Kunming, Yunnan USA Student Female 22 1-3 years Never 
 
Shanghai USA Student Male 22 less than 1 year Never 
Tianjin Thailand Student Female 24 less than 1 year Never 
Shanghai South Korea Student Male 26 1-3 years Few times a month 
Shanghai Unknown Unknown Unclear 20 1-3 years Few times a month 
Shanghai Philippines Student Female 24 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Shanghai Belgium Student Male 25 1-3 years Never 
Shanghai Bulgaria Student Female 17 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Yanji, Jilin Korea Student Male 27 1-3 years Few times a week 
Tianjin Kenya Student Male 24 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Jilin Nepal Student Female 23 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Tianjin Kenya Student Female 23 less than 1 year Few times a week 
Tianjin Kenya Student Male 26 less than 1 year Few times a week 
Tianjin Turkey Student of Chinese literature Male 21 less than 1 year Never 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student of International economy Male 22 1-3 years Never 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Congo Student Male 22 less than 1 year Never 
Tianjin Czech Republic Student Man 21 less than 1 year Few times a month 
 	
Liaoning, Jinzhou Russia Master’s-student Male 22 less than 1 year Never 
Jilin Russia Student of economic 
management 
Female 21 1-3 years Few times a year 
Yanji, Jilin Korea Student Female 25 less than 1 year Few times a week 
Shanghai Germany Student Female 23 1-3 years Never 
Shanghai Britain Student Male 23 1-3 years Few times a year 
Shandong Britain Student Female 23 1-3 years Never 
Yanji, Jilin Japan Student Male 28 1-3 years Few times a week 
Jilin Korea Student Female 25 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Yanji Japan Student Female 28 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Harbin, Heilongjiang USA Student Male 26 less than 1 year Almost every day 
Beijing Italy Student Male 27 1-3 years Few times a year 
Tianjin Korea Student Male 36 5-10 years Few times a year 
Tianjin Indonesia Student Female 23 less than 1 year Never 
Tianjin Thailand Student for Master’s Degree Male 26 3-5 years Few times a month 
Tianjin Korea Student Male 28 1-3 years Never 
 

Yanbian, Jilin South Korea Graduate Student Male 26 1-3 years Few times a month 
Jilin Japan Undergraduate Student Female 23 less than 1 year Never 
Tianjin Korea Student Male 21 less than 1 year Never 
Jilin South Korea Student Male 22 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Yanji, Jilin Russia Student Male 22 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Tianjin Indonesia Student Female 23 1-3 years Few times a month 
Yanbian, Jilin Russia Student Male 23 1-3 years Few times a year 
Changchun, Jilin Korea Student Female 20 1-3 years Few times a month 
Jilin, Jilin Britain Student Male 22 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Yanji, Jilin Korea Student Male 20 1-3 years Few times a month 
Jinlin South Korea Graduate Student Female 24 1-3 years Few times a year 
Tianjin Britain Student Male 24 1-3 years Never 
Tianjin Korea Student Male 23 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Tianjin Thailand Student Unclear 40 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Changchun, Jilin Sierra Leone Student of Pharmacy Male 30 5-10 years Few times a year 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 18 less than 1 year Few times a week 
 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Ghana  Student Male 20 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Jinzhou-liaoning Rwanda Student Female 21 1-3 years Never 
Hangzhou Rwanda Student Female 21 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Zhejiang Zambia Student Female 23 1-3 years Few times a year 
Jinzhou Namibia Student of Civil Engineering Male 18 less than 1 year Few times a week 
Jinzhou Liaoning Kenya Student Male 31 1-3 years Few times a week 
Jinzhou guta liaoning Nigeria Student Male 23 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 19 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Jinzhou Zambia Student of Computer Science Male 30 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Jinzhou Congo Student Male 31 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 18 less than 1 year Few times a week 
Jinzhou Liaoning  Nigeria Student Male 22 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 23 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student  Male 23 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 20 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Jinzhou Nigeria Student Male 23 less than 1 year Few times a month 
 
Jinzhou Uganda Student Male 21 1-3 years Few times a year 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 25 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 21 less than 1 year Never 
Jinzhou, China Uganda Student Male 22 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 22 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 27 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 25 less than 1 year Never 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 19 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Jinzhou Namibia Student Male 32 1-3 years Few times a year 
Yanji, Jilin Korea Student Female 25 1-3 years Few times a week 
Yanji, Jilin Korea Student Male 29 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Yanji, Jilin Mauritius Student Male 27 1-3 years Almost every day 
Yanji, Jilin Korea Student Male 27 less than 1 year Few times a week 
Yanji, Jilin Korea Student Male 30 1-3 years Few times a month 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 18 less than 1 year Few times a week 
Dalian, Liaoning Zambia Student Male 20 1-3 years Never 
 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Kenya Student Female 22 3-5 years Few times a year 
Xi'an, Shaan Xi Lithuania Student Female 23 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Dalian, Liaoning Sudan Student of Medicine Male 20 1-3 years Few times a month 
Unknown Italy Student Female 22 less than 1 year Never 
Yanji, Jilin Korea Student Male 30 1-3 years Few times a week 
Yanji, Jilin Japan Student Female 28 less than 1 year Few times a month 
Yanji, Jilin Japan Student Male 31 3-5 years Almost every day 
Yanji, Jilin Korea Student Male 30 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Yanji, Jilin Malaysia Student Male 28 less than 1 year Few times a week 
Unknown Russia  Student Male 18 less than 1 year Never 
Ningbo, Zhejiang Panama Student Male 20 1-3 years Never 
Ningbo, Zhejiang Italy Student of Master’s Degree Male 27 1-3 years Few times a month 
Yanji, Jilin Korea Student Male 21 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Ningbo, Zhejiang Indonesia Student Female 19 1-3 years Few times a month 
Unknown Unknown Unknown Unclear 18 1-3 years Few times a year 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Male 20 1-3 years Never 
 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Male 20 1-3 years Never 
Changsha Cote d'Ivoire Student Male 29 1-3 years Almost every day 
Ningbo Kazakhstan Student Male 20 3-5 years Almost every day 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Male 19 1-3 years Never 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Male 19 1-3 years Never 
Weifang India Student Female 20 1-3 years Few times a year 
Weifang India Student Female 20 1-3 years Never 
Weifang India Student Female 19 1-3 years Few times a year 
Weifang India Student Female 18 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Unknown India Student Male 20 3-5 years Few times a week 
Shanghai Japan Student Female 19 less than 1 year Few times a year 
Weifang Kenya Student Female 21 1-3 years Few times a month 
Weifang India Student Female 20 1-3 years Few times a month 
Weifang India Student Female 18 1-3 years Few times a week 
Guangzhou India Student Female 17 less than 1 year Never 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Male 20 1-3 years Never 
 
Unknown Thailand Student Male 20 1-3 years Never 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Female 19 less than 1 year Never 
Weifang India Student Female 19 1-3 years Few times a week 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Female 19 less than 1 year Never 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Female 20 1-3 years Never 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Female 20 1-3 years Never 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Female 20 1-3 years Never 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Female 20 1-3 years Never 
Weifang India Student Female 19 1-3 years Few times a year 
Beijing Japan Student Female 31 3-5 years Few times a year 
Jinzhou, Liaoning Nigeria Student Male 25 3-5 years Almost every day 
Shenyang, Liaoning Ghana Student Male 25 3-5 years Few times a week 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Female 20 1-3 years Never 
Xiamen, Fujian Thailand Student Female 18 less than 1 year Never 
Dongying, Shandong Korea Student Female 20 1-3 years Few times a year 
Changchun, Jilin North Korea Doctoral Student Male 30 3-5 years Few times a year 
 
Nanjing, Jiangsu India  Student Male 20 1-3 years Few times a month 





Appendix 3 – 2016 Questionnaire 
 
Pre-Screening Survey for Individual Interviewing (African Participants Only) 
 
 
My name is Yu Xiang, and I am currently a third-year PhD student of international 
communication at University of Westminster in London, UK. This preliminary 
questionnaire is designed and conducted in order to pre-screen the interviewees for 
individual interviews which are part of my PhD field research on audience's reception of 
CCTV-Africa (China Central Television's English News channel with Africa-focused 
programs).  
 
My PhD research is purely academic, non-profitable and non-governmental and all 
information of yours is confidential and will not appear in any publication without your 
consent.  
 
Thank you very much for your time and help. If you have any questions, please feel free 




2.Email Address  







7.Are you a regular viewer of CCTV-Africa? Yes 
No 
8.Which of the following programs are produced by CCTV-
Africa 
Africa Live 
Global Business  
Talk Africa 
African Start-Up 
Faces of Africa 




9.When did you first come to China?  
10.In which city and province of China are you currently 
living? 
 
11.What was your job before coming to China?  
12.What is your highest education? High School 
Bachelor’s Degree 
Master’s Degree 
13.For which degree are you studying in China? Bachelor’s Degree 
Master’s Degree 
PhD Degree 





15.Are you obliged to return to your country after finishing Yes 
 




16.Are you are planning to return to your country in Africa 









18.Why do you watch CCTV-Africa?  
19.Are you willing to be further interviewed individually for 





20.When are you available for further individual interview 
















Appendix 4 – News Clips of CCTV-Africa for Interviews 
 
Country News Title mins Country News Title mins 
Benin ‘Benin’s Exemplary 
Democracy: Boni 
Yayi gracefully steps 
down after expiry of 
his two terms’ 
(2016-03-23) 
1’59’’ Mali ‘Mali Attack: Gunmen 
open fire on EU 







Cycling tour title’ 
(2016-05-17) 
1’22’’ ‘Mali’s Fatouvata 
Diawara: Afro-pop 
artist speaks about 
her life and music’ 
(2016-05-13) 
2’50’’ 
Burundi ‘Burundi Political 
Crisis: Rights group 




2’24’’ Namibia ‘Namibia Cheetah 
Conservation: 
Initiative moves in to 
save dwindling 








2’28’’ ‘Wang Yi’s Africa 
Visit: Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi to 




Cameroon ‘Cameroon Storms: 
Heavy rains cause 
flooding in Douala’ 
1’33’’ Nigeria ‘Nigeria 
Unemployment: 









pushing use of 
technology to curve 
opportunities’ 
(2016-06-08) 
3’00’’ ‘Nigeria Oil 
Infrastructure: 
Nigeria signs deals 




Djibouti ‘Djibouti Economy: 
Government cuts 





‘South Sudan Films: 
Group of young South 





Assail: Local tribe 
concerned over 
future prospects’ 
2’25’’ ‘South Sudan Food 
Crisis: More than 5 
million people in need 
of aid’ 
2’08’’ 
Ethiopia ‘Ethiopia Drought: 
Flash floods worsen 
food crisis in the 
country’ 
(2016-05-04) 
2’05’’ Sudan ‘Sudan 
Unemployment: 
Thousands hunt for 





Park: Global firms 
jostle for space, 
50,000 jobs to be 
created’ 
3’24’’ ‘Sudan’s ‘Boat of 
Death’: Play 
highlights the perils 






Ghana ‘Ghana benefiting 




4’45’’ Tanzania ‘Tanzania 
Infrastructure Plans: 
Parliament approves 






to determine vote in 
November election’ 
(2015-05-20) 
3’13’’ ‘Tanzania Public 
Transport: ‘Rapid 
buses’ introduced to 








for another 7-year 
term’ 
(2016-05-21) 
0’41’’ Zambia ‘Zambia Copper 
Output: Mining forms 











1’16’’ ‘Sino-Africa Ties: 
Paying respects to 
Chinese relatives who 
dies in Zambia’ 
(2016-05-24) 
3’47’’ 
Kenya ‘Kenya Doping 1’01’’ Zimbabwe ‘International Labor 1’32’’ 
 
Crisis: Athletics 
agent Federico Rosa 




disbursement of $5 
million to fired 
workers 
(2016-05-03) 
‘Kenya Safe City 
Project: Police: 
Crime drops thanks 
to tech firms’ 
collaboration’ 
(2016-07-05) 







Liberia ‘Liberia cookshop 
app: first online 
platform allows 
users to order food 
via the internet’ 
(2016-05-18) 
2’32’’ DR Congo ‘DR Congo Unrest: 
Protesters clash with 
police over likely 




‘Liberia Visual Arts 
Academy: Artist’s 
homecoming to 
help develop artists’ 
(2016-05-17) 
3’15’’ ‘DR Congo Girl-Child 
Protection: Activist 









Appendix 5 – Field Schedule 
 




























































Dining Hall at 






















































































































at 7th Floor 













at 7th Floor 



















at 7th Floor 





















































Café next to 
International 
Student 














































Business Self-Funded 30th 
May 
Starbuck at 






























Zambia 24 Male Regular Bachelor’
s Degree 
Manufacture Partially 





Gate of ZNU 
campus 








Regular Degree funded by ZNU July near North 












MBA Self-funded 4th 
July 
















































































































































of a bread 
shop near the 





















of a bread 
shop near the 
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of a bread 
shop near the 























































































































1. What foreign news networks do you regularly watch and why? 
2. Is CCTV-Africa popular in your country? 
3. How often do you watch CCTV-Africa and where do you watch it – on TV, on-line, 
on mobile devices? 
4. Would you please tell me how you generally feel about CCTV-Africa? What kind 
of network you think it is and how do you find its programmes? 
5. What do you think of the video you just watched? What is it about? Does it 
concern you that the CCTV-Africa is a part of a state-managed media system? 
6. Do you think the content of the news conveys a certain kind of agenda or 
ideology? If yes, what do you think it is? 
7. Do you agree with the agenda or ideology espoused by CCTV-Africa? If yes, why? 
If not, why not? 
8. Can you think of an example from your own viewing experience which supports 
this agenda or ideology or indeed opposes it? 
9. Do you think the news produced by CCTV-Africa is appealing to your government? 
10. What is the attitude of your government towards China? Is the relationship with 
Beijing a cooperative one? Do you support your government’s opinion of 
cooperating with the Chinese government?  
11. Do you think the general viewers in your country are supportive or against this 
agenda or ideology? If yes, why; if not, why not? 
12. Do you think the news proceeded by CCTV-Africa is appealing to the public of 
your country? 
 
13. Do you think the public and the elites have different opinions on cooperating 
with the Chinese government? If you do, what do you think is the reason for this? 
14. Would you describe yourself as part of the African elite? 
15. Does regularly watching Chinese news on African affairs influence the way you 
think about China? 
16. Is CCTV-Africa’s approach to covering African issues different from those of 
mainstream Western news networks such as CNN and BBC? 
17. Are you at all concerned that rather than a Western discourse about the world at 
large, African viewers are now being exposed to a Chinese perspective on African 
affairs? 
18. What do you say to critics who suggest that a Chinese version of cultural 
imperialism is replacing Western media and cultural imperialism? 
 
